Monſieur *BOSSU*'s

TREATISE

OF THE

EPICK POEM:

CONTAINING

Many Curious Reflexions, very Uſeful and Neceſſary for the Right Underſtanding and Judging of the Excellencies of *HOMER* and *VIRGIL*.

Made *Engliſh* from the *French*, with a *Preface* upon the ſame Subject, by *W. J.*

To which are added,

An Eſſay upon *Satyr*, by Monſ. *D'Acier*;

AND

A Treatiſe upon *Paſtoral*, by Monſ. *Fontanelle*.

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THE CONTENTS.

BOOK III.

Concerning the Form of the *Epick Poem*; or, concerning the *Narration*.

Chap. I. *Of the Parts of the Narration.* Page 1

Chap. II. *Of the Title of the* Epick Poem. p. 6.

Chap. III. *Of the Propoſition.* p. 9.

Chap. IV. *Of the Invocation.* p. 22.

Chap. V. *Of the Body of the* Poem, *or the Narration, properly ſo called.* p. 29.

Chap. VI. *How the Narration is pleaſant.* p. 32.

Chap. VII. *Of Probability.* p. 40.

Chap. VIII. *Of the Admirable, or the Marvellous.* p. 50.

The CONTENTS.

Chap. IX. *Of the Passions.* p. 55.

Chap. X. *How the Narration ought to be Active.* p. 65.

Chap. XI. *Of the Continuity of the Action, and the Order of the Narration.* p. 73.

Chap. XII. *Of the Duration of the Narration.* p. 82.

BOOK IV.

Concerning the Manners of the *Epick Poem.*

Chap. I. *Concerning the Manners in general.* p. 92.

Chap. II. *Of the Causes of the Manners.* p. 95.

Chap. III. *Concerning the Manners of other Sciences besides Poetry.* p. 105.

Chap. IV. *Of the Manners of Poetry.* p. 113.

Chap. V. *Whether the Hero of the* Poem *ought to be an honest Man, or no?* p. 121.

Chap. VI. *Of the Poetical Goodness of the Manners.* p. 128.

Chap. VII. *Of the three other Qualifications of the Manners.* p. 135.

Chap. VIII. *Of the Character of the Personages.* Aristotle's *Words about it.* p. 146.

Chap. IX.

The CONTENTS.

Chap. IX. *Of the Characters of* Achilles, Ulyſſes, *and* Æneas. p. 156.

Chap. X. *Of the Character of the other Perſonages.* p. 3.

Chap. XI. *What the Character is.* p. 168.

Chap. XII. *Of the Unity of the Character in the Hero.* p. 173.

Chap. XIII. *The Unity of the Character in the* Poem. p. 178.

Chap. XIV. *Of the Juſtneſs of the Character.* p. 186.

Chap. XV. *Of Falſe Characters.* p. 198.

BOOK V.

Concerning the *Machines.*

Chap. I. OF *the ſeveral ſorts of Deities.* p. 205.

Chap. II. *Of the Manners of the Gods.* p. 210.

Chap. III. *How the Gods act in a Poem.* p. 218.

Chap. IV. *When one muſt make uſe of Machines.* p. 224.

Chap. V. *How the Machines are to be uſed.* p. 229.

Chap. VI. *Whether the Preſence of the Gods is any Diſparagement to the Heroes.* p. 233.

BOOK VI.

The CONTENTS.

BOOK VI.

Concerning the *THOUGHTS* and the *EXPRESSION.*

Chap. I. *THe Foundation of this Doctrine.* p. 239.

Chap. II. *Concerning Deſcriptions.* p. 247.

Chap. III. *Of Compariſons or Simile's.* p. 255.

Chap. IV. *Concerning Sentences.* p. 261.

Chap. V. *Concerning diſguis'd Sentences.* p. 269.

Chap. VI. *Concerning ſeveral other Thoughts.* p. 279.

Chap. VII. *Of the Expreſſion.* p. 286.

Chap. VIII. *How we ought to judge of the Elocution of a Poem.* p. 291.

D'Acier's *Eſſay upon Satyr.* p. 298.

Monſieur Fontanelle *upon* Paſtorals. p. 316.

Monſieur

Monſieur Bossu's TREATISE OF THE *Epick POEM.*

BOOK III.

Concerning the Form *of the* Epick Poem, *or concerning the* Narration.

Chap. I.

Of the Parts of the Narration.

There are two Ways of relating an Action that is paſt: The one is ſimple and hiſtorical, when a Man makes the Rehearſal of it to his Audience, without forcing their Imagination, only leaving them under a Senſe

that they are reading a Book, or hearing ſomething or other related. The other is more artificial, where the Author makes no Appearance, nor ſays any thing of himſelf. But by a kind of innocent Magick, he raiſes from the Dead, and brings upon the Stage, thoſe very Perſons who have done the Action he would repreſent. He makes them ſpeak and act over again the ſame Words and Actions they ſpoke and did before, and in ſome ſort, tranſports his Auditors to the Time when, and the Places where the Action was done. By this means he does not declare it to them after a plain ſimple Way, as the *Hiſtorian*, but makes them Witneſſes of it, and the Action becomes its own Diſcoverer.

The Actions which Poets imitate, are ſuch Things as are in an equal Degree capable of two Forms, each of which conſtitute a different Species. Such as fall under the moſt *Artificial* and *Active* Form, are call'd *Dramatick Poems*, denoting their Nature by their * Title; and ſuch as are repreſented by the Poet only, who ſpeaks therein as an *Hiſtorian*, are for that very reaſon call'd † *Epick Poems*, or *Epopea*'s.

Whatſoever regard the *Dramatick* Poet has to his Spectators, yet the Perſons he introduces in his Poem, who are the only Actors therein,

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* Δρᾶν, To Act. Δρᾶμα, Action.
† Ἔπειν, To Speak.

are

are not in the leaſt acquainted with thoſe before whom the Poet makes them ſpeak: nay more, they don't know what they ſhall do themſelves, nor what the Iſſue of their Projects will be; and therefore they cannot either advertiſe the Spectators thereof, or beg their Attention, or thank them for it. So that this kind of Poem, properly ſpeaking, has no Parts exempt from the Action that is repreſented. This alone makes the *Comedy* and *Tragedy* entire and perfect, ſuch I mean as are in Uſe now-a-days; that is, without *Prologue*, *Epilogue*, and thoſe other Appendages, which being loſt, or left to the Choice of the Poet, have alter'd nothing of the Nature and Integrity of the Poem. When they are made uſe of, § they have nothing to do with the *Tragedy* and Action, ſince they are not made by the Actors.

But in the *Epick Poem*, where the Poet ſpeaks, he ſays nothing but what is a part of the Poem. So likewiſe an *Orator* not only alledges his Reaſons, and refutes thoſe of the adverſe Party; but beſides that, prepares his Auditors, begs their Attention, and at laſt raiſes the Paſſions that are proper to his Cauſe. Nothing of all this is look'd upon as foreign to his Subject: the *Exordium*, *Propoſition*, and *Peroration*, are true Parts of it, though leſs neceſſary than the *Narration* and the *Confir-*

§ Ἔξω τῆς Τραγῳδίας. Ἔξω τῆς Δράματος.

mation. 'Tis juſt the ſame in the *Epopea.* Before the Poet begins the large Recital of his Action, he propoſes it in general, and invokes the Gods that are to inſpire him. This makes up three Parts that have been always look'd upon as neceſſary, *viz.* the *Propoſition*, the *Invocation*, and the *Narration.* We may add to them a fourth, which is no leſs neceſſary, nor leſs uſual; and that is, *the Title*, or *Inſcription* of the Poem.

There are ſeveral others, which ſignify nothing to the Integrity of the *Epick Poem.* There is a Preface before the *Æneid*, which they ſay was made againſt the Plagiaries, who might have tranſcrib'd this Poem, and have had the Credit of it to *Virgil*'s Prejudice. It is contain'd in the following Verſes, where he ſpeaks of his other Works.

Ille ego, qui quondam gracili modulatus avena
Carmen, & egreſſus ſylvis, vicina coegi,
Ut quamvis avido parerent arva colono;
Gratum opus agricolis: at nunc horrentia
(Martis....

I queſtion whether theſe Verſes are proper for a Beginning, where the Reader's Mind, not being as yet in a Heat, requires ſomething more mild and juſt, than in the Sequel, where 'tis eaſily tranſported. In my Mind, the laſt of theſe four Verſes ſeems unworthy of this great Poet. All that needed be ſaid, was ſufficiently expreſt in the three firſt.

The

The other Parts are a *Dedication*, to flatter ſome great Man or other, and an *Epilogue* for the Concluſion of the Poem.

Virgil made uſe of theſe two Parts in his *Georgicks*. * He begins with the *Propoſition*, where he juſt mentions *Mæcenas*, to whom he dedicates this Piece, but ſays never a word in his Praiſe. † After this he makes an *Invocation*, wherein he addreſſes himſelf to all the Gods that preſided over *Agriculture*: and then he flatters § *Auguſtus*, joining him with the Gods he invokes.

*Afterwards he enters upon his Subject, and begins to treat at large of *Agriculture*. This Part is the Body of the Poem, as the *Narration* in the *Epopea*. † Laſtly, after he has finiſh'd his Treatiſe in four Books, he ends with an *Epilogue* deſign'd againſt the Plagiaries, as the Preface of the *Æneid* is; but with an Air ſo different, that theſe Verſes ſeem to be produc'd by another ſort of Genius. This is what he has done in his *Georgicks*.

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* Quid faciat lætas ſegetes, quo ſidere terram Vertere, Mæcenas, &c.

† Vos ô clariſſima mundi Lumina labentem cœlo quæ ducitis annum, &c.

§ Tuque adeo, quem mox quæ ſint habitura Deorum Incertum eſt, &c.

* Vere novo gelidus canis cum montibus humor Liquitur, &c.

† Hæc ſuper arvorum cultu, pecorumque canebam, &c.

But neither he nor *Homer*, in their *Epick Poems*, have made uſe of any of theſe unneceſſary Parts; ſo that I ſhall ſay nothing more about them. I will now ſpeak particularly to the other Four. 1. Of the *Inſcription* or *Title* of the Poem. 2. Of the *Propoſition*. 3. Of the *Invocation*. 4. and laſtly, Of the Body of the Poem, and the *Narration* properly ſo call'd.

Chap. II.

Of the Title *of the* Epick Poem.

WE here examine Things upon the Principles we laid down in ſpeaking concerning the Nature of the *Epick Poem*. We obſerved that it is a *Fable*; and we ſee nothing in the Practice of our Poets that gives us any other Idea of the *Title* and *Inſcription* of their Poems, than of the *Titles* of *Æſop*'s *Fables*. They have for their Title the Names of the Perſons that act in them. There lies this Difference, that all the Perſonages are nam'd in the Title of *Æſop*'s *Fables*, becauſe they are but few, and one is as important as another; but in the *Epick Poem* there is commonly one who is a great deal more conſiderable than the reſt, and the others are too many to be all nam'd. Therefore they only affix the Name of the principal Perſonage to it.

it. Thus the *Odyſſeis* and the *Æneid* bear only the Name of *Ulyſſes* and *Æneas*.

The Example of *Homer* in the *Inſcription* of the *Iliad* informs us, that the Title of the Poem may be deriv'd from ſomething elſe beſides the Name of the Perſonages. Perhaps he did not call it the *Achilleid*, becauſe *Achilles* does not act therein, as *Ulyſſes* and *Æneas* do in the other two Poems. He has as many Sharers in his Dignity as there are Princes in his Alliance. He has a General to whom he ſhould ſubmit, and refuſing to do that, he makes but little or no Figure in the whole Action, of which the Subject of the Poem is but a Part. He is but little better than a caſhier'd Officer. He is doubtleſs the moſt valiant; but the Poet ſings his Anger, not his Valour. And even there, the Anger which the Poet ſings is rather that which makes *Achilles* to abſent himſelf from fighting, than that which puts him upon killing of *Hector*. To conclude, the Fable conſiſts leſs in this Anger, than in the Quarrel and Reconciliation, wherein *Agamemnon* had as great a Share as he. So that the Poet makes no Scruple to mention them both in his *Propoſition*, when he comes as near the Fable it ſelf as poſſible: *I ſing*, ſays he, *the Anger of* Achilles, *that has done ſo much Miſchief to the* Grecians, *and*

§ Ἐξ ἧς δὴ τὰ πρῶτα διαστήτην ἐρίσαντε Ἀτρεΐδης τε ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν καὶ δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς. Iliad. 1.

cauſed the Death of ſo many Heroes; * *ſince the time that* Agamemnon *and he fell out and parted.* Theſe Conſiderations ought not to degrade *Achilles* from the Honour of being the chief Perſonage, which *Homer* has doubtleſs made him: but they may ſerve to prove, that tho' he is the chief Hero of this Fable, yet he is not the only Hero, as *Ulyſſes* and *Æneas* are in the Fables that go under their Names.

Statius and *Lucan* have each of them two Heroes; and they have, like *Homer*, given their Poems the Names of the Places where the Actions were done, and not of the Heroes who did them. But the *Thebaid*, and the *Pharſalia*, are ſuch defective Poems, that there's no relying upon their Authority.

In *Tragedies*, where the Name of the Perſonage is made uſe of for the Title, the Poet adds ſomething elſe to it, when he makes ſeveral Pieces under the Name of the ſame Hero. *Seneca* has done this in his two Tragedies of *Hercules*. The * One he names from the Madneſs which tranſported him, and the † Other from the Place where he was burnt. This is the Reaſon why more than one Name is requiſite for the Title of *Æſop*'s *Fables*; for there is ſcarce an Animal, but what is a Hero in ſeveral Fables. But this ſignifies little to the *Epick Poem*: 'Tis rare

* Hercules Furens. † Hercules Oetæus.

that

that an Author makes two of theſe Fables under the Name of one and the ſame Perſon.

Nor do Poets uſe to denote the Action in the Title of the Poem. Several Things happen'd to *Medea*, *Ulyſſes*, *Æneas*, and *Troy*; and one might feign a great many under the Names of the *Wolf* and the *Lamb*, which the Title alone would never inform us of. This ſignifies nothing; the Authors are well enough ſatisfied with theſe plain *Inſcriptions*, *Medea*, *the Odyſſeis*, *the Æneid*, *the Iliad*, *the Lamb and the Wolf*. And they refer us to the Diſcourſe it ſelf, to know what the Action is that is recited.

Chap. III.

Of the Propoſition.

THE *Epick Propoſition* is that firſt Part of the Poem, wherein the Author propoſes briefly, and in the general, what he has to ſay in the Body of his Work. And here two Things offer themſelves to our Conſideration; firſt, What the Poet propoſes; and ſecondly, After what Manner he does it.

The *Propoſition* ſhould only comprehend the Matter of the Poem; that is, the Action, and the Perſons that Act, whether Divine or Humane. We find all this in the *Iliad*, the *Odyſſeis*, and the *Æneid*.

The Action *Homer* propoſes in the *Iliad* is *the Revenge of Achilles*; that of the *Odyſſeis* is *the Return of Ulyſſes*; and that of the *Æneid* is *the Empire of* Troy *tranſlated into* Italy *by* Æneas.

Nor ſhould any one be ſurpriz'd at *Homer*'s way of expreſſing himſelf in his firſt Words; where he ſays, * he ſings the deadly Anger of *Achilles*; nor think he propoſes this *Anger* as the Subject of his Poem. He would not then have made the Rehearſal of an Action, but of a Paſſion. We are not to ſtop here, ſince in Truth he himſelf does not. He ſays, he ſings this *Anger* which had been the Cauſe of ſo much Slaughter among the *Greeks*, and of ſo many brave Mens Deaths. He propoſes an Action then, and not a mere Paſſion, for the Subject of his Poem; and this Action is, as we have already hinted, *the Revenge of Achilles*.

So in the two other Poems, a † Man is propos'd: but the Propoſition does not ſtop here; it adds either, § that he underwent much in returning home to his own Country; or, * that he went to ſettle in *Italy*; and both of them propoſe an Action.

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* Μῆνιν ἄειδε θεὰ, Πηληϊάδεω Ἀχιλῆος Οὐλομένην, ἣ μυρί' Ἀχαιοῖς ἄλγε' ἔθηκε, &c.

† Ἄνδρα μοι ἔννεπε Μοῦσα πολύτροπον. Arma virumque cano.

§ Ὃς μάλα πολλὰ Πλάγχθη. Odyſſ. 1.

* Trojæ qui primus ab oris Italiam, &c. Æn. 1.

If

If *Homer*'s Deſign had been to propoſe the two Parts of each Poem; his Deſign was not to do it very diſtinctly. Yet we may conceive the firſt Part of the *Iliad* by the Misfortunes of the *Grecians*, and the ſecond by the illuſtrious Deaths of ſo many Heroes. The *Grecians* are greater Sufferers than the *Trojans*, and there are fewer Heroes kill'd on their Side, but almoſt all are wounded.

The *Propoſition* of the *Odyſſeis* ſpeaks plainly enough of the Travels of *Ulyſſes*; but it leaves us rather to infer his Re-eſtabliſhment in *Ithaca*, than diſcovers it to us. The Poet ſays, his Hero did all he could to preſerve and conduct back his Companions to *Ithaca*; * but that theſe miſerable Creatures were their own Deſtruction, and that the God whom they had offended, would not ſuffer them to ſee the happy Day of their Return. By which 'tis plain *Ulyſſes* did ſee the Day, and preſerved himſelf according to his Wiſh.

The *Latin Poet* has clearly diſtinguiſh'd the two Parts of his *Æneid*. At firſt he makes his general Propoſition in two Verſes; and then he makes a Diviſion of it, ſaying in the † firſt Place, that he had ſuffer'd much both by Sea and Land; and then § ſecondly, that he had likewiſe ſuffer'd much by War.

---

* Αὐτὰρ ὁ τοῖσιν ἀρήιλετο νόστιμον ἦμαρ. Odyſſ.

† Multum ille & terris jactatus & alto.

§ Multa quoque & bello paſſus. *Æn.* 1.

This

This is the moſt conſiderable Difference between *Homer* and *Virgil*.

It was enough for *Achilles* to be reveng'd; and * *Ulyſſes* pretended only to ſave himſelf. This is the Scope and End of the *Odyſſeis*, as *Ariſtotle*, in the Scheme he has drawn, very well obſerv'd. But *Æneas* had a Settlement to make, and this Settlement was attended with great Conſequences. *Virgil* has been ſo exact, that he has omitted nothing of it. † He advertiſes us, that his Hero travell'd to *Italy* to build a City, and eſtabliſh his Gods and Religion there; and he adds, that from this Settlement proceeded the *Latins*, the City of *Alba*, and the *Romans* their Progeny.

It will not be amiſs to make this one Reflection more, that in the three Poems, the *Propoſition* takes notice where the Action of each Poem does begin. § This Beginning of the *Iliad*, is the Beginning of the Quarrel between *Agamemnon* and *Achilles*. * The Action of the *Æneid* begins at *Troy*, from whence *Æneas* was forc'd to part. † The *Odyſſeis* does not begin at the Ruin of *Troy*, as the *Æneid*, but ſome time after.

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* Αὐτὸς μὲν ἐσώθη. Odyſſ. 1.

† Dum conderet urbem, Inferretque Deos Latio, genus unde Latinum, Albanique Patres, atque altæ mœnia Romæ.

§ Ἐξ οὗ δὴ τὰ πρῶτα διαστήτην ἐρίσαντε Ἀτρεΐδης τε ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν καὶ δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς.

* Trojæ qui primus ab oris .... Profugus.

† Ἐπεὶ Τροίης ἱερὸν πτολίεθρον ἔπερσε. This

This is what I had to ſay concerning the Action propos'd; now for the Perſons.

The Divine Perſons are mentioned in the three *Propoſitions*. *Homer* ſays, that whatever happen'd in the *Iliad* was by * *Jupiter*'s Appointment; and that † *Apollo* was the Cauſe of the Quarrel between *Agamemnon* and *Achilles*.

The ſame Poet ſays, that it was *Apollo* likewiſe who hinder'd the Return of the Comerades of *Ulyſſes*.

§ *Virgil* likewiſe makes mention of the *Fates*, the Will of the Gods, and the Anger of *Juno*.

But theſe Poets chiefly inſiſt upon the Perſon of the Hero. It ſeems as if he alone were more properly the Subject Matter of the Poem than all the reſt. *Homer* names *Achilles* particularly, and adds *Agamemnon* to him, as we hinted in the former Chapter. *Ulyſſes* and *Æneas* are not nam'd, but only implied; and that in ſuch general Terms, that we ſhould not know them, had we not Information otherways, that they are the Perſons. For what does the Propoſition of the *Odyſſeis* ſay concerning the Return of *Ulyſſes* from the Ruin of *Troy*, but what might be in the Pro-

---

* Διὸς δ' ἐτελείετο βουλή.

† Εἰδὶ ξυνέηκε μάχεσθαι Ἀτρεΐδην τε Διί τε ἄνακτε.

§ Fato profugus, Vi ſuperum, ſævæ memorem Junonis ob iram.

poſition

poſition of a Poem, that treated of the Return of *Diomedes*?

This Practice might have perhaps ſome Reſpect to the primary Invention of the Poet, who ought at firſt to feign his Action without Names, and relates not the Action of *Alcibiades*, as *Ariſtotle* ſays; nor conſequently the Actions of *Achilles*, *Ulyſſes*, *Æneas*, or any other in particular: but of an Univerſal, General, and Allegorical Perſon. But ſince *Homer* has done otherwiſe in his *Iliad*, and has mention'd *Achilles* by his own Name, and that of his Father too; one cannot condemn the Practice of naming the Perſons in the *Propoſition*.

Beſides, *the Character* which the Poet would give his Hero and all his Work, is taken notice of likewiſe by *Homer* and *Virgil*. All the *Iliad* is nothing elſe but Heat and Paſſion, and that is the Character of *Achilles*, and the * firſt thing the Poet begins with. The *Odyſſeis* in the † firſt Verſe, preſents us with the Prudence, Diſſimulation, and Artifice, that *Ulyſſes* made uſe of to ſo many different Perſons. And in the Beginning of the *Latin* Poem, we ſee the § Meekneſs and Piety of *Æneas*.

Theſe Characters are kept up by another ſuch like Quality, namely that of a Warriour.

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* Μῆνιν ἄειδε. † Ἄνδρα πολύτροπον.

§ Inſignem pietate virum.

The

The *Propoſition* of the *Iliad* ſays, that the Anger of *Achilles* coſt a great many Heroes their Lives: That of the *Odyſſeis* repreſents *Ulyſſes* as Victor of *Troy*, from the Deſtruction of which he came: And that of the *Æneid* begins with Arms: I have already obſerved that *Horace* ſpeaks of Wars and Generals in the Subject Matter of the *Epopea*.

As for the way of making the *Propoſition*, *Horace* only preſcribes *Modeſty* and *Simplicity*. He would not have us promiſe too much, nor raiſe in the Reader's Mind too large Ideas of what we are going to relate. * His Words are theſe:

Begin not as th' old Poetaſter did,
(Troy's *famous War, and* Priam's *Fate, I ſing*)
In what will all this Oſtentation end?
The Mountains labour, and a Mouſe is born.
How far is this from the *Maonian* Stile?

---

* Nec ſic incipies, ut ſcriptor cyclicus olim.
Fortunam Priami cantabo, & nobile bellum.
Quid feret hic tanto dignum promiſſor hiatu?
Parturiunt montes, naſcetur ridiculus mus.
Quanto rectius hic qui nil molitur inepte?
Dic mihi, Muſa, virum captæ poſt tempora Trojæ,
Qui mores hominum multorum vidit & urbes.
Non fumum ex fulgore, ſed ex fumo dare lucem
Cogitat, ut ſpecioſa dehinc miracula promat,
Antiphaten, Scyllamque, & cum Cyclope Charybdim. *Hor. Poet.*

Muſe,

Muſe, ſpeak the Man, who ſince the Siege of
Troy,
So many Towns, ſuch change of Manners ſaw.
One with a Flaſh begins, and ends in Smoke,
The other out of Smoke brings glorious Light,
And (without raiſing Expectation high)
Surprizes us with dazling Miracles:
The bloody *Leſtrygons* in Humane Feaſts,
With all the Monſters of the Land and Sea;
How *Scylla* bark'd, and *Polyphemus* roar'd.

[Horace's *Art of Poetry engliſh'd by* Roſcommon.]

And in Truth what can be more *Simple* and *Modeſt* than the *Propoſition* of the *Odyſſeis*, which does not promiſe us any great Action of this Hero, but only the Dangers, and the continual Fatigues of his Voyages, and the loſs of his miſerable Companions?

We ſhall find the very ſame *Simplicity* and *Modeſty* in the *Propoſition* of the *Æneid*. The Poet does not ſay his Hero had done much, but only that he had ſuffered much. Tho' he ſpeaks of *Alba* and the *Roman* Empire; yet he propoſes neither as Parts of his Matter; but as Conſequences which other Heroes had brought to Perfection a great while after. So *Homer* in his *Odyſſeis* has ſpoken of the Deſtruction of *Troy*; but withal as an Action already done, and which his Readers were not to expect would be rehearſed in the Sequel of the Poem.

The

The *Propoſition* of the *Iliad* is ſomething more lofty, in that it mentions the Deaths of ſo many Heroes: But this is ſo far the Matter of this Poem, that it ſeems as if it could not have been wholly omitted. And beſides, Art might oblige the Poet to make ſome kind of Conformity between the Character and the Propoſition, and that of the whole Poem, which is nothing elſe but a long Series of Heat and Violence. But to conclude, the Poet acquitted himſelf of theſe Obligations with ſo much *Simplicity* and *Modeſty*, that one cannot charge upon him the tranſgreſſing of *Horace*'s Rule. For he does not ſay that theſe Heroes Deaths were the Effect of his Hero's Valour and Courage: He only ſays that he ſings the Anger of *Achilles*, which had brought ſo many Diſaſters upon the *Greeks*, and had been the Cauſe of the Death of ſo many Heroes, who were expoſed as a Prey to Birds and Beaſts. Certainly if there is any thing of Grandeur here, 'tis not ſo much in any Glory or Splendor, as in that Trouble and Smoke, which will ſcarce let us ſee it.

Beſide this Sort of Bombaſt, which things propoſed with too much glaring Produce; or which ariſes from the Dignity of the Perſonages, that at the very firſt are praiſed unſeaſonably, and ſet off with too great Ideas; there is yet another that reſpects the Perſon of the Poet. He ſhould ſpeak as modeſtly of himſelf, as of his Hero or his Subject. *Virgil* in plain Terms ſays that he ſings the Action of

Æneas

Æneas. *Homer* begs his Muſe to inſpire the Action into him, or to ſing it for him; this was all. *Claudian* has not followed theſe Exemplars. * He ſays, *his Song ſhall be full of Boldneſs: That the Poetical Fury, and the whole Divinity of* Apollo *had ſo ſwell'd his Mind, and poſſeſs'd his Senſes, that they had not left any thing Human about him: That the reſt of Mankind were profane, whoſe Converſation he could no longer endure:* With a great deal of ſuch like Stuff.

Theſe Raptures well manag'd, would look well enough in an *Ode*, a *Paſtoral*, or ſome ſuch Piece, that is ſhort enough to preſerve them to the laſt, and where we may ſuppoſe them to have been uttered all in a Breath.

But a Poem ſo long as an *Epopea*, admits not theſe Rhapſodical *Propoſitions* from a Poet that is well in his Wits. This is *Horace*'s Doctrine, who would have the Propoſition of the *Epick Poem* be *ſimple and modeſt*; and yet he ſticks not in one of his † *Odes* to do what *Claudian* does in the Propoſition we cited. This Poem of *Claudian* that begins ſo

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——— * Audaci promere cantu
Mens congeſta jubet. Greſſus removete profani.
Jam furor humanos noſtro de pectore ſenſus
Expulit, & totum ſpirant præcordia Phœbum, *&c.*

† Odi profanum vulgus & arceo.
Favete linguis, Carmina non prius
Audita Muſarum ſacerdos
Virginibus puerisque canto. *Hor.* l. 3. *Od.* 1.

ill,

ill, juſtifies the Rule which *Horace* has drawn from the Practice of *Homer*. One may even there obſerve, that thoſe who are ſo daring in what they propoſe, are ſo, more out of Lightneſs and Vanity, than out of any Knowledge of their Abilities and Art; and that commonly they are the leaſt able to keep up to it. *Claudian* was not able to carry the Terrors which he propoſed as the Subject of his Poem any farther than the middle of his firſt Book: and that infernal Darkneſs which ſhould have eclipſed the Light of the Sun, could not take off from the Luſtre of the Ivory Walls, and Amber Columns of *Proſerpina*'s fine Palace.

But we will not leave this Chapter without producing ſome Inſtances that are contrary to the Practice of *Homer* and *Virgil*. We may reckon ſix of theſe Sorts of Faults. The firſt is when any thing is propoſed that is foreign to the Subject: The ſecond is, the giving too large an Idea of the Subject Matter: The third is, when the Hero appears too dazling in the *Propoſition*: The fourth, when the Poet ſpeaks too favourably of himſelf: The fifth, is the omitting the Preſence of the Deity: And the ſixth is, when nothing is ſaid that may give a Light into the Character of the Hero.

There is ſcarce one of theſe Faults but may be met with in the *Propoſition* of the *Achilleid*.

Statius

§ *Statius prays his Muſe to tell him the Story of the magnanimous Son of* Æacus, *whoſe Birth ſtruck the Thunderer himſelf with Terror; and to whom Admittance into Heaven was deny'd, tho' he had from thence his Origin.* If *Horace* could not endure that a Poet ſhould propoſe *Priam's Fate, and the famous War of Troy*, tho' in truth this War was noble and illuſtrious: What would he have ſaid of him, who ſings a Hero that ſtrikes Terror into *Jupiter* himſelf?

This very Poet gives us likewiſe too favourable a Character of himſelf, when begging *Phœbus* to beſtow upon him new Inſpirations, * he tells him that in his firſt Poem, *he had worthily exhauſted thoſe he had receiv'd*, and braggs of his being ſo excellent a Poet, that *Thebes would look upon him as another* Amphion.

He ſpeaks of the Gods in this Propoſition, but 'tis more by Chance, than in Imitation of *Homer* or *Virgil*: ſince if he had been perſwaded that Art required ſo much, he would not have fail'd doing it in the *Propoſition* of the *Thebaid*.

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§ Magnanimum Æacidem formidatumqe Tonanti,
Progeniem, & patrio vetitam ſuccedere cœlo,
Diva refer. ———

* Tu, modo ſi veteres digno deplevimus hauſtu,
Da fontes mihi, Phœbe, novos ....
Meque inter priſca parentum ———
Nomina, cumq; ſuo memorant Amphione Thebæ:

To

To conclude, he has given a very ſorry Character of his Hero, when he ſtiles him *Magnanimous*. *Achilles* was certainly very Impatient, Cholerick, and Revengeful. *Homer* made him ſo, and *Statius* ſhould have kept up the ſame Character, which this firſt Poet had given him. † This is one of *Horace*'s Rules. But we need not ſeek any farther than *Statius* himſelf, for a Proof of his Error in this Point. In the Propoſition he contradicts this Character of *Magnanimous* which he had beſtow'd upon *Achilles* at firſt: For immediately after, among the Actions he was to mention of this Hero, he mentions one, that is far from *Magnanimity*; namely, his cruel Uſage of *Hector*'s Body, when after he had kill'd him, he bound him by the Heels to his Chariot, and drag'd him a great many times round the Walls of *Troy*, and the Tomb of *Patroclus*.

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† Scriptor, honoratum ſi forte reponis Achillem, Impiger, iracundus, inexorabilis, acer, &c. *Hor. Poet.*

CHAP. IV.

Chap. IV.

Of the Invocation.

§ HOMER in his two Poems inſerts the *Invocation* in the *Propoſition*. He does not ſay that he will relate what *Achilles*, or *Ulyſſes* has done; but intreats his Muſe to make the Recital. *Virgil* has theſe two Parts diſtinct: He firſt * propoſes what he would ſing, and then he † begs his Muſe to inform him about it. In this ſecond Part he § inſerts the Character of his Hero, which more properly belongs to the firſt. And this makes it appear, that it ſignifies little whether they are diſtinct from each other, or joyn'd together.

But let the way be how it will, the Poet cannot omit the *Invocation*. He ſpeaks of Things which he would know nothing of, unleſs ſome God or other had reveal'd them to him. He owes his Readers this Example of Piety and Veneration, which is the very Foundation of all the Moral, and the Inſtructions he pretends to lay down from the Fable: And laſtly, ſince the Gods muſt be con-

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§ Μῆνιν ἄειδε θεὰ— Ἄνδρα μοι ἔννεπε, Μοῦσα.
* Arma virumque cano.
† Muſa, mihi cauſas memora.
§ Inſignem pietate virum.

cern'd

cern'd in it, 'tis unreaſonable to dare to bring them upon the Stage, without craving their Leave firſt. So that with reſpect to the Gods, the Auditors, and the Poet himſelf, the *Invocation* becomes an indiſpenſible and neceſſary Part.

The Poet likewiſe addreſſes himſelf to the Gods very often in the Sequel of his Work: * Sometimes when he enters upon a new Matter, as *Virgil* does, when in his Seventh Book he enters upon the ſecond Part of his Deſign: † Sometimes when he relates ſome miraculous Action that is above common Probability; as in the Transformation of *Æneas*'s Ships into Nymphs: § Sometimes when he reveals thoſe Myſteries, which God ſeems to have been willing to keep ſecret from the Curioſity of Men; ſuch for inſtance, is that which happens in the Shades below, whither *Æneas* is conducted by *Sibyl:* And laſtly, at other times upon other Occaſions.

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* Nunc age qui Reges Erato, quæ tempora, rerum,
Quis Latio antiquo fuerit Status, &c.

† Quis Deus, ô Muſæ, tam ſæva incendia Teucris
Avertit; tantos ratibus quis depulit ignes,
Dicite. Priſca fides facti, ſed fama perennis, *Æn.* 9.

§ Dî quibus Imperium eſt animarum umbræque ſilentes,
Et Chaos & Phlegethon, loca nocte ſilentia late:
Sit mihi fas audita loqui, ſit numine veſtro
Pandere res altâ terrâ & caligine merſas. *Æn.* 6.

But

But the Principal *Invocation* is that at the Beginning. And here we are to take notice of two Things. The firſt is, what the Poet deſires: And the ſecond, to what Deity he makes his Application.

That which we demand in the firſt Queſtion, is, whether the Poet ſhould deſire that all his Matter ſhould be inſpir'd into him, or only a Part of it. The different Practice of our Authors obliges us to make this Reflection.

Homer has ſo well connected his *Propoſition* in the *Iliad* with the *Invocation*, that he implores his *Muſe* for all that he propoſes without Exception.

In the *Odyſſeis* he has begun after the ſame way; but after mentioning ſeveral Things which he begs his Muſe to aſſiſt him in, he at laſt retrenches ſome; and only intreats her to tell him a Part of them.

Virgil follows this laſt Method. That which is particular in him is, that he does not in the general Deſire one part of his Subject, but preciſely determines what part he would have his Muſe inſpire into him. 'Tis that which was the moſt ſecret and hardeſt to know. After he had very exactly propoſed all his Matter, he then addreſſes himſelf to his Muſe, and prays her to inform him of the Cauſes of all.

There is a very natural Reaſon to be given for this Conduct: For ſince the Poet ſuppoſes that his Action is true, and writes as if he would have it paſs for ſuch; he muſt likewiſe

ſuppoſe

ſuppoſe that ſuch an illuſtrious and important Action could not have been buried in Oblivion. By this means Hiſtory or Report might have informed him of one Part. This is the Idea he would have the Readers conceive, when he does not deſire the Muſes for all.

Perhaps likewiſe our Poets did this to divide the Buſineſs ſo, that they might have the Honour of ſinging a Part with the Gods. This is what * *Virgil* does in his Eighth *Eclogue*: He ſings the one half of his Matter; and prays the Muſes to go on and ſing the other Part, becauſe he could not do all.

However the Caſe ſtands, we ſee by this Practice what the Poet is allowed to do. Thus much for what he deſires; now let us ſee to whom he makes his Addreſſes.

The *Invocation* is proper to the Poem, when 'tis either addreſſed to the God who preſides over the Subject he treats on; or to the God who preſides over Poetry in general.

Ovid in his † *Metamorphoſes* makes uſe of the firſt ſort of *Invocation*. He names no God in particular, but addreſſes himſelf to all

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* Hæc Damon: vos, quæ reſponderit Alpheſibœus, Dicite Pierides: Non omnia poſſumus omnes.

† In nova fert animus mutatas dicere formas Corpora. Dî cœptis (nam vos mutaſtis & illas) Aſpirate meis.

all who had contributed to the miraculous Transformations he was about to deſcribe.

The Poet § *Lucretius* does the ſame in his Poem concerning *the Nature of Things*. He calls upon *Venus*, becauſe ſhe preſides o'er the Productions of Nature.

This is likewiſe what *Virgil* has done in his *Georgicks*. He names in particular all the Gods who were concern'd with *Husbandry*, and as if he had been afraid of omitting any one, * he calls upon them all in general.

But both he and *Homer* have left us another kind of an Example in their *Epick Poems* They have call'd upon the Muſes, and ſo they have diſtinguiſhed the Deities which preſide over Poeſy, from thoſe that preſide over the Actions of the Poems, and are the Perſonages that act in them.

Beſides, we are not to imagine that theſe Divinities which they invok'd, were look'd upon by the Poets themſelves, as Divine Perſons, from whom they expected any real Aſſiſtance. Under this Name of Muſe, they wiſhed for that Genius of *Poeſy*, and all thoſe Qualifications and Circumſtances, that were neceſſary for executing their Deſign. This is nothing elſe but an Allegorical and Poetical

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§ Quæ quoniam rerum Naturam ſola gubernas,
Te ſociam ſtudeo ſcribundis verſibus eſſe,
Quos ego de rerum natura pangere conor.

* Dique, Deæque omnes, ſtudium quibus arva tueri.

way

way of Expreſſion: As when they ſay, *the God of Sleep*, *the Goddeſs of Fame*, and the like. There are likewiſe Muſes of all Ages, Countries, and Religions. There are *Chriſtian* as well as *Pagan* Muſes. There are *Greek*, *Latin*, *French*, and *Engliſh Muſes*. There are new ones too, which begin every Day to appear in Behalf of thoſe who diſdaining the thread-bare Antiquities, are ſo bold as to invent Things wholly new.

When *Virgil* wrote his *Eclogues*, he invoked the † *Sicilian Muſes*, becauſe he imitated *Theocritus*: And this *Sicilian Poet* coming off ſo well, put the *Latin Poet* upon wiſhing for as lucky a Genius as this Iſlander had.

The Muſes of the Philoſopher *Lucretius* were § new, and had inſpired none before him. None had as yet entered the Gardens where this *Epicurean* Poet gather'd ſo many immortal Flowers: And the Waters of his Poetical Fountains were ſuch, as former Poets had never quenched their Thirſt with; he is the firſt that ever taſted of the Sweets of them.

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† Sicelides Muſæ, paulo majora canamus. *Vir. Ecl.* 6. Extremum hunc, Arethuſa, mihi concede laborem. *Ecl.* 10.

§ Avia Pieridum peragro loca, nullius ante
Trita ſolo: juvat integros accedere fontes,
Atque haurire, juvatque novos decerpere flores;
Inſignemq; meo capiti petere inde coronam,
Unde prius nulli velarint tempora Muſæ. *Lucr. l.* 3.

But the Doctrine of this Author leaves no room to doubt what ſort of Gods they were that he invok'd. At the very Beginning of this Poem, when he had addreſſed himſelf to *Venus*, as a Goddeſs who managed the whole Concern of natural Things, about which he was going to treat: He preſently informs us, **that the Gods never concerned themſelves with what was done below.* This is the main Principle of his whole Treatiſe: and † Religion, in his Account, is an Error that impoſes upon us. What then are theſe Muſes, and this *Venus* to which he addreſſes himſelf? Has he invoked the Deities to inſpire him with that, with which 'tis impoſſible they ſhould inſpire him? And did he intreat them to teach him, that 'tis an Error to pray to them, and a Miſtake to expect any thing from them? Other Poets are not ſo unreaſonable, and § *Horace*, who for ſome time was of the ſame Opinion, might well call this *Epicurean* Wiſdom downright Folly.

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* Omnis enim per ſe Divûm natura neceſſe eſt
Immortali ævo ſumma cum pace fruatur,
Semota ab noſtris rebus ſejunctaque longe, &c.

† Tantum Religio potuit ſuadere malorum.

§ Parcus Deorum cultor & infrequens,
Inſanientis dum ſapientiæ
Conſultus erro, nunc retrorſum
Vela dare, atque iterare curſus
Cogor relictos. *Hor. lib.* 1. *Od.* 34.

We

We will conclude this Chapter by a ſhort Recapitulation of all that has been obſerved about the *Invocation*; and from thence it may be ſaid, That the *Invocation* may be mixed with the *Propoſition*, or may be ſeparated from it: That it is always a neceſſary Part of the *Epick Poem*: And that it is a Prayer addreſſed to the Allegorical Genius of Poeſy, under the Name of *Muſe*, or ſome one elſe, by whom the Poet begs to be inſpir'd, either in the whole, or only in a Part of that which he has undertaken to relate.

Chap. V.

Of the Body of the Poem, *or the* Narration *properly ſo called.*

ALL the Parts of the *Epick Poem*, which we have already diſcours'd of, are nothing but Introductions into it. Let us now enquire into the Body of the Poem, and into that which is properly called the *Narration*. And in ſhort this Narration is the Recital which the Poet makes of his entire Action, epiſodiz'd with all its Circumſtances, and all its Decorations. 'Tis in this Part we are to look for the Beginning, the Middle, and the End of the Action: This is it which informs us of the Cauſes of all we read: In this are propoſed, in this are unravelled all the

Plots and Intrigues: In this the Perſonages, whether Divine or Humane, ought to demonſtrate their Intereſts, their Manners, and their Quality, by their Actions and Diſcourſes: And all this muſt be deſcribed with the Beauty, the Majeſty, and the Force of Verſe, of Stile, of Thoughts, of Similes, and of other Ornaments, that are ſuitable to the Subject in general, and to each ſingle Thing in particular.

We have ſpoken already to ſome of theſe Things, and ſhall ſay ſomething more about them in the remaining Parts of this Treatiſe: But in this we ſhall conſider, Firſt, the Qualifications of the *Narration*: Secondly, the Order our Poets have obſerv'd therein: And Thirdly, its *Duration*; that is, how long time they have aſſigned to the Adventures which they themſelves have related in each of their Poems. For we have already obſerv'd how much time they aſſign'd to the entire Actions.

We will begin with the Qualifications of the *Narration*. It muſt be *Pleaſant*, *Probable*, *Moving*, *Marvellous*, and *Active*. We prov'd the Neceſſity of theſe Properties, when we treated of the Fable, and the Nature of the *Epopea*, from whence we took them. So that without inſiſting any longer upon theſe Proofs, we ſhall in this Place only conſider, wherein theſe Qualifications do conſiſt, and what we are perſwaded *Homer* and *Virgil* have done to eſtabliſh them in the Poem.

* *Horace*

* *Horace* ſpeaks of the *Profitable* and the *Pleaſant* in ſuch a manner, that he ſeems to treat of them both alike. But we fanſy, if that had been his Deſign, he had more Regard to Poeſy in general, than to the *Epick Poem* in particular: With reſpect to the laſt we ſay, that the *Profitable* is a Property eſſential to the *Epick Narration*, whereas the *Pleaſant* is only a Mode or Qualification of it. For it muſt be granted, that the Fable, which is the very Soul of the *Epopea*, was only invented to inſtruct Men: That the *Profitable* is not made uſe of to pleaſe People; but on the other hand, the *Pleaſant* is inſerted to procure a more favourable Reception of the Inſtructions which the Fable contains.

So that the *Profitable* belongs not to any particular Part of the Poem, but to the very Nature of the *Epopea*, and of the Fable in general. I am ſatisfied then with what I ſaid about it in the firſt Book, where I think it was more proper to ſpeak of it, than to join it with the *Pleaſant* here. Beſides, it being eſſential, as I have already ſaid, it will be met with in a great many Paſſages, ſince all ſuppoſe it.

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* Aut prodeſſe volunt, aut delectare Poetæ,
Aut ſimul & jucunda, & idonea dicere vitæ...
Omne tulit punctum qui miſcuit utile dulci
Lectorem delectando pariterque monendo. *Hor. Poet.*

Chap. VI.

How the Narration *is* Pleaſant.

Pleaſantry in the *Epick Narration* is a neceſſary Qualification, which engages us to read the Poem with ſome ſort of Delight, tho' excited by the moſt terrible, the moſt violent, and the moſt afflicting Paſſions. The Effect may ariſe, either from the Poem alone; or from that Relation which the Poet makes between his Auditors and his Perſonages, and the Intereſt which he makes the firſt to have in the Action he relates. *Statius* rob'd himſelf of this Advantage, when not regarding the *Romans* for whom he wrote, he muſt needs hunt for his Subjects in Countries and States, whoſe Manners and Cuſtoms bore no relation to thoſe of his Readers, and wherein they had not the leaſt Intereſt. *Homer* has made a better Choice, and has better diſpoſed of his Actions. And if *Virgil* has not been more careful than *Homer*, yet at leaſt he has had infinitely more Luck than him. But we ſaid enough of this in the firſt Book.

The *Pleaſantries* which the Poem afords in its own Nature independently from the Auditors, are of three Sorts. The firſt ariſe from the Beauty of the Verſe, of the Stile, and of the Thoughts: Others depend upon the Perſons that are introduced into the Poem, upon their Manners, their Paſſions, and their

their Intereſts rightly manag'd: And the third Sort conſiſt in the Things which are deſcribed, and in the way of propoſing them.

We ſhall ſpeak of the firſt Sort in our laſt Book, wherein we ſhall treat of the *Thoughts* and *Expreſſions*. In this Book we ſhall allow a whole Chapter to the *Paſſions*, and all the next Book will be about the *Manners*: As for the reſt let us conſider them here.

It is not neceſſary that all the Perſons introduc'd into a Poem, ſhould have divided and particular *Intereſts* therein: Not only their great Number exempts them from it, but likewiſe a Multitude of *Intereſts* would too much annoy and ſubvert the Pleaſure we are diſcourſing of. It confounds the Hearer's Mind, it over-charges his Memory, and makes him leſs capable of thoſe Motions with which we would have him affected: The greater Variety of Things we have to take notice of and remember, the more ſedate and attentive ought we to be, for fear of loſing any neceſſary thing; and when any ſuch thing eſcapes us, we take but little Pleaſure in hearing that, which we have no farther Underſtanding of.

But there muſt be Care likewiſe taken, that no Action or Adventure of any length be deſcrib'd without intereſted Perſons. † The Recital which *Achemenides* makes of that which happened to *Ulyſſes* in *Polypheme*'s Den,

† Æneid. l. 3.

takes up no more than Forty Verſes. This wretched *Grecian* had a great Intereſt therein; but ſince he is but a very inconſiderable Perſonage in this Poem, *Virgil* provides that *Æneas* ſhould not be at a Diſtance from the Borders of the *Cyclops*, where he might in ſafety hear this Adventure: But all this is told in the Port, and upon the very Coaſt, where the *Trojans* were in Danger of ſuffering the ſame Fate with the Companions of *Ulyſſes*. So that *Achemenides* ſpeaks as well in their Behalf as his own; and in Concluſion ſays § that *they ſhould not ſo much as ſtay to weigh Anchor, but cut the Cables that detained them.* * *Æneas* for his part owns himſelf obliged to him. Without theſe Engagements, theſe Adventures are languiſhing, and make thoſe that hear them languiſh too.

But the Readers are very deſirous to know what any Perſon ſhall ſay or do in an Adventure wherein he has ſome Intereſt. This is more apparent in the *Theatre*, from whence the want of Intereſt has excluded the *Narrations* of the *Chorus*, and of ſuch Actors as were only to tell what paſſed behind the Scenes. After *Oedipus* was come to the Knowledge of his Parents and his Crimes, the Spectators were not very eager to know what the

§ Sed fugite, ô miſeri, fugite, atque ab littore funem Rumpite.

* Supplice ſic merito.

Thoughts

Thoughts of the old *Corinthian*, and the *Theban Phorbas* are, nor do they take any Delight in hearing them. But they cannot hear *Oedipus* and *Jocaſta* without Application and Attention.

As much might be ſaid concerning the *Manners* and the *Paſſions*, which are the ſecond ſort of *Pleaſantries*. There is nothing more cold and diſguſtful than to ſee Perſonages of no *Character*. Good Painters give this to all their Draughts; and repreſent them either paſſionate, or attentive upon ſome thing or other. Such as are moſt lively, and have moſt of the Character upon them, are the moſt delightfull to the Eye, and get moſt Credit to their Maſters. * 'Tis juſt with Poetry as with Painting.

The third Sort comprehends the *Pleaſantries* which the Things themſelves furniſh us with. There are ſome Things that in their own Nature are *Pleaſant*, namely, ſuch as are important and marvellous, as Wars, and other great Adventures, provided they are not collected without Choice and Judgment, nor carried on to an extreme, but judicious and well managed.

Others there are that are cold and inſipid; and great Skill muſt be uſed to manage them with Succeſs. The beſt way in ſuch Caſes is,

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† Ut Pictura Poeſis erit.

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to follow § *Horace*'s Rule; to examine thoſe Incidents, and ones own Strength; and to ſtudy them, and know himſelf ſo well, as to undertake nothing but what is proportionate to his Genius and Strength. If an Author diſtruſts himſelf in any thing, 'tis beſt letting it alone.

Dogmatical Things are generally dry and inſipid. Of this Nature is the Doctrine of *Plato*, and the *Pythagoreans*, which *Virgil* has touch'd upon in his ſixth Book with ſo much Succeſs. 'Twas neceſſary that this great Poet ſhould give us Inſtances of all ſorts of Perfections. Upon this Account we might ſay, what *Ariſtotle* upon another Occaſion ſays of *Homer*, that had an ordinary Poet manag'd this Subject, he would have been inſufferable. The Art which I diſcover in him, is what follows.

Firſt of all, he makes this Doctrine neceſſary for the better conceiving of the Wonders which follow. Beſides, he goes farther, for he makes it a neceſſary Part of his Fable, and his Subject; ſince 'tis the Foundation of the Religion, the Laws, and the Morality, which

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§ Sumite materiam veſtris, qui ſcribitis, æquam
Viribus, & verſate diu, quid ferre recuſent,
Quid valeant humeri. Cui lecta potenter erit res,
Nec facundia deſeret hunc, nec lucidus ordo.
Et quæ deſperet tractata niteſcere poſſe relinquet.
Hor. Poet.

Æneas

Æneas went to eſtabliſh in *Italy* under the Character of a *Pontifex* and a *Legiſlator*. In the third Place, before ever he propoſes it to the Readers, he puts them upon deſiring it as much as *Æneas* did; for without doubt they are mov'd with the ſame Curioſity, which the Poet beſtows ſo naturally on his Hero. They ſee with the ſame Amazement that he does Perſons that were to be born ſome Ages after: And what this Hero asks *Anchiſes*, that they ask *Virgil*. [**Is it poſſible, that there ſhould be any Souls here ſo fond of returning again upon the Earth, and of being impriſoned once more in a Body?*] And 'tis with Delight that they hear the † Poet in the Perſon of *Anchiſes* promiſe to ſatisfy their Curioſity in that Point. The Author does not dogmatize at all himſelf: But he brings it about, that it ſhould be diſcours'd of by two Perſons of the greateſt Importance in his Poem, and who were both very highly intereſted therein. Laſtly, he is very ſhort upon this Subject: He does not ſo much as ſpend thirty Verſes about it.

The moſt uſual and proper way for Poeſy,

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* O Pater, anne aliquos ad cœlum hinc ira putandum eſt,
Sublimes animas, iterumque ad tarda reverti
Corpora?

† Dicam equidem, nec te ſuſpenſum, nate, tenebo. *Æn.* 6.

is

is to lay down theſe Pieces of Doctrine diſguiſed under the Allegories of ſome Action or other. *Homer* does this often in ſome Phyſical Points. The Age *Virgil* lived in, obliged him to be more reſerv'd therein; by which means he has more Examples of Leſſons in *Morality*. We have ſaid ſomething already about this in the firſt Book: And ſhall ſay more of it in the Book about *Machines* and the *Gods*: And likewiſe in this Book, when we come to ſhew, how the *Epick Narration* ought to be *active*.

The meeting of Councils may be reckoned among thoſe Things which make the *Narration* languiſh, and render it unpleaſant. Quietneſs, Moderation, and arguing of Debates ought naturally to preſide there, and all this is oppoſite to the Motions, and the Action, which ought to appear throughout the whole *Epick Poem*.

Our Poets have carefully avoided all manner of ſage and ſerious Debates, where each Perſon ſpeaks in his Turn, and delivers his ſober Thoughts. They generally brought in ſome haſty or paſſionate Perſons, ſuch as are *Achilles*, and *Agamemnon* in the firſt Book of the *Iliad*, and almoſt all the other *Grecians* and *Trojans* of this Fable. Such likewiſe in the *Æneid* are *Venus* and *Juno* in the tenth Book, and *Drances* and *Turnus* in the Eleventh. The Council in the ninth Book is altogether as paſſionate, but the Movements are of another Kind. There are neither Quarrels, nor

Heats.

Heats. All the Perſonages therein are generous and manly: And yet of above threeſcore Verſes which the Poet ſpends about it, there are ſcarce five calm ones. *Niſus* and young *Euryalus*, that are introduced therein, make the reſt ſo paſſionate, that this Paſſage is not one of the leaſt tender and moving Beauties, which the *Æneid* has of this Kind.

If theſe Aſſemblies are without Paſſions, there ſhould be little ſaid in them, and no Body contradicting what is propos'd; theſe Incidents are not ſo much Debates, as ſimple Propoſals of what is going to be done. There ſhould likewiſe ſuch proper Places be choſen for them in the Poem, where they might not interrupt the Series of the Action. Of this Nature are the two Aſſemblies of the Gods in the firſt and fifth Books of the *Odyſſeis*. The firſt is at the Beginning of the Poem, where it interrupts nothing: And the ſecond does not laſt long, and is only a ſimple Tranſition from the Recital of the Tranſactions at *Ithaca* during the Abſence of *Ulyſſes*, to the Recital of that which more particularly regards the Perſon of this Hero.

The Reader is offended likewiſe, when that is related to him which he knows already. This was not ſo great a Fault in *Homer*'s Time. *Virgil* is more exact herein. *Venus* in the firſt Book, would not make a Recital of her Misfortunes to *Æneas*, ſhe interrupts it to comfort him. And in the third Book, when good Manners oblig'd this Hero to relate his

his Story to *Andromache*, *Helenus* comes in very opportunely, and ſo hinders him from going on with his Diſcourſe.

Chap. VII.

Of PROBABILITY.

TRuth and Probability may meet together, ſince a Thing that is true, may appear ſuch. This is what's common. But ſometimes Truth it ſelf is only Probability, as in miraculous, prodigious, and extraordinary Actions. Sometimes likewiſe there is Probability without Truth, as in the ordinary Fictions of the Poets. In a word, an Action may be either only true, or only probable, or elſe without Truth and Probability, or laſtly, it may have both theſe Qualifications. Theſe four ſorts of Actions or Things have been as it were divided among four ſorts of Learning. *Hiſtory* has got the firſt, relying only on that which is true independently from Probability, which may, or may not be in it. Such is the Action of the *Maid of Orleans*. The *Epick* and *Dramatick* Fables are oppoſite to Hiſtory, in that they prefer a probable Falſity before an improbable Truth. Such an Action as *Samſon*'s would be leſs proper for the Subject of an *Epick Poem*, than the Death of *Dido*, who made away with her ſelf when *Æneas* left her. *Æſop* is alike negligent of Truth and Probability

Probability in the Diſcourſes he attributes to the Beaſts. Laſtly, *Moral Philoſophy* ſhould not only mind the Truth of the Things it teaches, but 'tis likewiſe neceſſary that this Truth appear ſuch, and convince thoſe, we are willing to convince, that it is profitable.

But to what we have ſaid concerning the *Epopea*, we may add that naturally it makes uſe of both *Truth* and *Probability*, as *Morality* does; and that in its Expreſſions and its Dreſs, it aſſumes a Liberty very like that of *Æſop*. It is probable that *Æneas*, when going for *Italy*, endur'd a dreadful Storm, which caſt him upon the Coaſts of *Africk*, where he eſcaped. 'Tis a *Moral Truth*, that God proves, and ſometimes ſeems to abandon good Men, and that at laſt he reſcues them from the Dangers, into which he had permitted them to fall: This is not only *true*, but likewiſe probable. But the Diſcourſe that paſſed between *Juno* and *Æolus*, and what *Neptune* ſaid to *Boreas* and *Zephyrus*, have as little Truth and Probability in them, as the Intercourſe that paſſed between the *Country* and the *City-Mouſe*.

So much may be ſaid in general. To be more particular, and to ſpeak more exactly and methodically concerning the Probability of *Epick Narrations*, we ſhall reduce it to ſeveral Heads, and conſider it according to *Divinity*, according to *Morality*, according to *Nature*, according to *Reaſon*, according to *Experience*, and according to *vulgar Opinion*.

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It may be ſaid, that there is nothing with reſpect to *Divinity*, but what is probable; becauſe with God nothing is impoſſible. This is a Means the Poets often make uſe of to render every thing probable, when they have a mind to feign contrary to the ordinary Courſe of Nature. This is an ample Subject, and requires a particular Treatiſe: Which we ſhall beſtow upon it, when we come to treat of the *Machines*.

We have already obſerv'd that *Morality* requires both Truth and Probability, and the firſt is more neceſſary than the laſt. A Poet was formerly condemned and fined for a Default in this upon the Theatre: For he made a Perſonage, whom he had repreſented as an honeſt Man, to ſay, *that when his Tongue ſwore, his Mind did not.* Certainly 'tis neither true nor probable, than an honeſt Man ſhould ever trick another by a falſe Oath, and call God to witneſs thoſe Promiſes he never intends to keep.

Seneca the Philoſopher accuſes *Virgil* of a Fault againſt *Natural Truth* and *Probability*, when he ſays that the Winds were pen'd up in Grots: Becauſe Wind being nothing elſe but Air, or Vapours in Motion, it deſtroys its Nature to ſuppoſe it in a profound Repoſe. *Voſſius* anſwers this, and ſays, that the Poet has very well deſcribed the natural Production of Winds, which ariſe from the Hills by the Vapours and Exhalations, that are incloſed therein; and that 'tis concerning the Cauſes

of

of Winds which he ſpeaks, by a Figure very common among Poets and Orators, taking the Cauſe for the Effect. 'Tis as if we ſhould ſay, that the Winds are incloſed in Eolipiles full of Water, ſince when theſe Veſſels are warm, the Water comes out of them in Puffs of Wind. It would have been likewiſe a Fault againſt *Natural Probability* to have ſaid that *Æneas* met with Stags in *Africk*, if 'tis true that they could not live there. But theſe are venial Slips, becauſe *Ariſtotle* ſays, they make not againſt the Poet's Art, but ariſe from his Ignorance in ſome Things that he has learn'd from other Arts. Yet Care muſt be taken that they be not too groſs and viſible. There are ſome *Probabilities* of this Kind from which *Æſop* himſelf would not be excuſed. We ſhould never pardon him if he had repreſented the *Lyon* timorous, the *Hare* daring, the *Fox* dull, and the like.

The Probability with reſpect to Reaſon is uſually deſtroyed by thoſe, who only ſtrive to make Things look great. They tranſgreſs the Bounds which good Senſe preſcribes. They think 'tis creeping, unleſs they ſoar above the Clouds: And * little dream that when they quit the Earth, they part with what is ſolid to embrace an airy Fantom. *Statius* is very often guilty of this Fault. Who would believe, for

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* Et dum vitat humum, nubes & inania captat. *Hor. Poet.*

Inſtance,

Inſtance, that a ſingle Man ſurprized in an Ambuſcado by fifty Bravo's, that lay in wait for him, could kill nine and forty of them, and give Quarter to the laſt? Who would believe that this ſame Romantick Hero would fight at fiſty Cuffs with a young Prince for the Wall? And yet they wore Swords by their Sides, even when they were pulling off Hair, and ſcratching Faces with their Nails. The * Poet himſelf obſerves as much, and ſays their Anger roſe ſo high, that perhaps they had drawn upon one another, if King *Adraſtus* had not ſtep'd in between. Here is a ſtrange Illuſtration of the Rage of two Kings. The third Perſon finds it ſo reaſonable, † that he diſcovers by this noble Exploit the greatneſs of their Extraction. Is this at all probable? And is not a Man's Reaſon ſtrangely ſhock'd at this?

Sometimes the Poets are found Fault with for relating Things contrary to Experience. § *Scaliger* blames *Homer* for ſaying *that Jupiter thundered and ſnowed at the ſame time: Which is a thing*, ſays this Critick, *which we never obſerved.* But this does not contradict

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* Forte & nudaſſent enſes, ſic ira ferebat. *Theb. l.* 1.

† Haud humiles tanta ira decet.

§ Etiam decimo Iliados Jovem fulgurare facit, ubi ningit. Nunquam hoc vidimus. *Scaliger. Poet Book* 5.

Experience;

Experience; not may Years ago it was obſervable, that in *January* the Thunder was ſo violent, that it burnt down the Steeple of a Church at *Chalons*, and did as much at the Abby of *Chally* near *Senlis*, and in ſeveral other Places Terrible Claps of Thunder were heard, and ſeveral Thunderbolts fell at *Senlis* in a very deep and thick Snow. *Homer* then might likewiſe have ſeen the ſelf ſame thing.

But the principal Sort of *Probability*, and that which we nam'd laſt, is the *Probability* according to the common received Opinion; which is of no ſmall moment in this Place. A thing is probable when it ſeems to be true. But ſometimes it ſeems true to Men of Senſe, and falſe to the Vulgar; or the contrary. Since the Vulgar and the Learned are thus divided, it may be asked which ſide the Poet ought to take. The Subject ſhall be, for inſtance, the Adventure of *Dido*, or that of *Penelope*, or the Story of *Medea*, *Helen*, or the like. That which *Homer* and *Virgil* have wrote about it ſhall be probable to the Vulgar: But Men of Learning ſhall have read the contrary in Hiſtory. Some Authors ſhall have written that *Dido* was chaſt, and *Medea* innocent, that *Penelope* was baniſhed and divorced by *Ulyſſes* for having abuſed his Abſence, and that *Helen* was never at *Troy*.

'Tis no hard Matter to decide this Point by the Rules I have laid down. *Homer*, *Virgil*, and the reſt have made no Scruple to diſregard Hiſtory, that ſo their Fables might be more

more juſt. * *Horace* does not refer Poets to the Truth of Hiſtory, but either to Fables already invented, as that of the *Iliad*, or elſe to vulgar Opinions and Fame. *Ariſtotle* ſays nothing againſt, but rather ſeems to confirm this Doctrine, when he tells us, that a Poet does not write as an Hiſtorian, what ſort of Man *Alcibiades* was, what he ſaid, or what he did, upon ſuch or ſuch an Occaſion; but only what in all Probability he ought to have ſaid or done. He approves of the Fable of *Oedipus* upon the Theatre, and yet he ſays, that that which ſerves as a Ground-work to all this Action, has nothing of Reaſon in it: And that King *Oedipus* could not have tarry'd ſo many Years, before he made Inquiry into the Murder of his Predeceſſor King *Laius*. He only excuſes the Negligence that is attributed to *Oedipus*, upon the Account that this Fault againſt *Reaſon* was foreign to the *Tragedy*. But this Excuſe being only deſigned to juſtify the Conduct of the Poet, it expreſly ſuppoſes that this Action was invented contrary to the Truth of Hiſtory: And beſides it ſhews that *Ariſtotle* allows of this, when he goes about to prove that this Falſity hinders not but the Subject may be lawful and regular.

He likewiſe approves of the *Iphigenia* in

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* Rectius Iliacum carmen deducis in actus,
Aut Famam ſequere, aut ſibi convenientia finge.
Hor. Poet.

Taurica,

Taurica, and thinks it worth his while to make the Platform of it, as he did that of the *Odyſſeis*. And yet it does not appear that this Philoſopher nor the learned Men of his Times were perſwaded of a thing whoſe Falſity quite ruins this Action. Certainly they never thought, that in the very moment *Iphigenia* was going to be ſacrificed to *Diana* in *Aulis*, this Goddeſs conveyed her away, and ſubſtituted a Hind in her Stead. *Ariſtotle* was therefore of the Opinion, that a Poet, when his Fable ſo required, was not ſo ſtrictly tyed up to the Truths of Hiſtory, to ſuit himſelf to the Capacity of the Learned, as he was to that which might paſs for probable in the Eye of the Vulgar.

After all, it may be ſaid, that not only ev'ry individual Perſon finds his Story, and meets with his Satisfaction in this Practice: But likewiſe Men of Learning ſee more ſolid Truths therein, than any the Vulgar can meet with; and more certain than thoſe of Hiſtory which the Poet diſregards. The more learned they are, the leſs will they expect theſe Hiſtorical Truths in a Poem, which is not deſigned for that, but for things more myſterious. The Truths they look for there, are Moral and Allegorical Truths. The *Æneid* was never writ to tell us the Story of *Dido*, but to inform us under this Name of the Spirit and Conduct of that State which ſhe founded, and of the Original and Conſequences of its Differences with *Rome*. A Man takes ſome

Delight

Delight in ſeeing this; and theſe Truths are more pleaſant, more apparent, and better underſtood, than thoſe which the Poet might have taken out of an Hiſtory that was ſo little known in his time, and about which the learned Men of our Days, after ſo many Searches, do ſtill contend.

Beſides theſe ſort of *Probabilities*, there is ſtill another particular one, which we may call an *Accidental Probability*. It conſiſts not in making uſe of ſeveral Incidents, each of which in particular is probable, but in ordering them ſo, that they ſhall happen altogether very probably. A Man, for inſtance, may probably die of an Apoplexy, but that this ſhould happen exactly when the Poet has Occaſion to unravel his Plot, is not ſo eaſily granted.

The Faults againſt this *Probability* are of a large Extent: For they comprehend the Multitude of marvellous Things, each of which might have been regular in the particular; but which in all Probability cannot be heaped up in ſo great a Number, and ſo ſmall a Space. 'Tis likewiſe a Fault againſt this *Probability*, when an Incident not duly prepared (tho' it needs it) is brought in all on a ſudden. A Deſire of ſurprizing the Auditors by the ſight of ſome Beauty which they never expected, caſts Poets of little Judgment into theſe Errors; but the Effect thereof is of very ill Conſequence. When a Man ſets himſelf to ſeek for the Cauſes of theſe Events in what he

he has already ſeen, this Application of Thought takes away all the Pleaſure. It would vex a Man to take too much Pains to find out theſe Cauſes, but much more if he could not find them out at all. And when at laſt the Poet does diſcover them, the Paſſion is weaken'd or deſtroy'd by theſe miſplaced Inſtructions.

The *Comedians* make uſe of theſe Surprizes more frequently, and can reap ſome Advantage from them. But the Gravity of the *Epopea* will not away with theſe petty Amuſements. All there ought to be managed after a natural Way, ſo that the Incidents thereof muſt be duly prepar'd, or elſe be ſuch as need no Preparation.

Virgil is exact in this. *Juno* prepares the Tempeſt which ſhe raiſes in the firſt Book: *Venus* in the ſame Book prepares the Amours of the Fourth. The Death of *Dido*, which happen'd at the End of this Fourth Book, is prepar'd from the very * firſt Day of her Marriage. *Helenus* in the third Book prepares all the Matter of the ſixth. In the ſixth, *Sibyl* fortells all the enſuing Wars, the Out-rages of *Turnus*, the Misfortunes which were to happen upon the Account of *Lavinia*, and likewiſe the Voyage of *Æneas* with *Evander*. We ſhould be too tedious, if we took notice of ev'ry thing of this Nature.

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* Ille dies primus lethi.

Chap. VIII.

Of the Admirable, *or the* Marvellous.

Admiration is oppoſed to Probability. 'Tis the Buſineſs of the laſt to reduce ev'ry thing into the moſt ſimple, and moſt natural Order: Whereas on the other hand, we never admire any thing but what appears extraordinary, and out of the common Road. This is that which deceives ſome, who, to make their Heroes admir'd, raiſe them to what is impoſſible. This Practice meets with a quite contrary Effect; for if we would have a thing admired, we ſhould make it ſo probable, that it may be conceived and credited: We never admire that which we think has actually never been; and all extravagant Flights put us upon this Thought.

And yet for ought I know, I may yield too much to *Reaſon* and *Probability*, contrary to *Ariſtotle*'s Mind, who prefers the *Admirable* by far before them. Let us ſee what he ſays about it, and let the World agree to it, as they ſee Cauſe. * *'Tis requiſite*, ſays he, *that the* marvellous *ſhould be in* Tragedy, *but much more*

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* Δεῖ μὴν ἓν ἐν ταῖς Τραγωδίαις ποιεῖν τὸ Θαυμαστόν. Μᾶλλον δ' ἐνδέχεται ἐν τῇ Ἐποποιίᾳ τὸ ἀνάλογον. Διὸ συμβαίνει μάλιστα τὸ Θαυμαστὸν, διὰ

more in the Epopea, *which in this goes beyond the Bounds of Reason: For since they do not see the Persons act, as they do upon the Stage, that which transgresses the Bounds of Reason is very proper to produce the* marvellous. *That which* Homer *says of* Hector *pursued by* Achilles, *would have been very ridiculous upon the Stage, where one should have seen so many Persons in a Fight, looking on* Hector *as he was flying without pursuing him, and only one Person following, giving a Signal to the rest to stand off. But this is not discernable in the* Epopea. *Aristotle* says further, † "that "these Additions, that are made to Reason "and Truth for the raising of *Admiration*, "are likewise *Pleasant*; and that 'tis evident "how natural this is by the ordinary Practice "of most People, who to make their Story "the more diverting, add something or other "of their own Invention: But that *Homer* "out-does all Men in teaching us how to tell "these Sorts of Lies with a *bon Grace*.

διὰ τὸ μὴ ὁρᾶν εἰς τὴν πράττοντα. Ἔπειτε τὰ περὶ τὴν Ἕκτορος δίωξιν ἐπὶ σκηνῆς ὄντα γελοῖα ἂν φανείη· οἱ μὲν ἑστῶτες καὶ οὐ διώκοντες, ὁ δὲ ἀνανεύων. Ἐν δὲ τοῖς Ἔπεσι λανθάνει. Poet. c. 24.

† Τὸ δὲ Θαυμαστὸν, Ἡδύ. Σημεῖον δὲ. Πάντες γὰρ προστιθέντες ἐπαγγέλλουσιν ὡς χαριζόμενοι. Δεδίδακε δὲ μάλιστα Ὅμηρος καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ψευδῆ λέγειν ὡς δεῖ. Poet. ibid.

Theſe Fictions of *Homer* are, amongſt other things, ſuch as *Horace* commends in the *Odyſſeis*, and which he finds to be equally beautiful and ſurpriſing, joining together theſe two Qualifications, the *Pleaſant* and the *Marvellous*, after the ſame manner that we have obſerved *Ariſtotle* did.

But tho' this Philoſopher might have ſaid thus much, certainly he never deſign'd to allow Men a full Licenſe of carrying things beyond Probability and Reaſon. Beſides, without doing him the leaſt Injuſtice, and without abating any thing of his due Authority, it may be queſtioned whether the Example of *Homer*, which he propoſes, would have been exact enough for *Virgil*'s Imitation. For the Cuſtom of ſpeaking by Fables and Allegories, even in Proſe, and before the People, was not in Vogue at *Rome* in the *Latin* Poet's time. So that beſide the Allegorical Senſe, he was farther obliged to inſert ſome other, which one might underſtand ſimply without any more ado.

Laſtly, that which I infer from the Doctrine of *Ariſtotle*, is, that he preſcribes the *Marvellous* and the *Probable* to both the *Epick* and the *Dramatick* Poets: But in ſuch a manner, that the *Dramatick* have a greater regard to the *Probable* than the *Marvellous*; and that the *Epick* on the contrary prefer the *Admirable*. The reaſon of this Difference is, that we ſee what is done in Tragedy; and only hear by Recitals the Adventures of the *Epopea*.

'Tis

'Tis upon this Conſideration that *Horace* orders, * that in Tragedies themſelves the too ſurprizing Incidents (ſuch as the Transformation of *Progne* into a Bird, or of *Cadmus* into a Serpent) ſhould be kept from the Spectator's View. There needs only ſimple Narrations to be made of theſe Things. 'Tis likewiſe for this reaſon that the *Epopea* has the Privilege of *Machines*, which are as ſo many Miracles, and exceed natural *Probability*. But they are not after the ſame manner allow'd upon the Theatre.

§. We add further, that if for the better pleaſing the Auditors by a ſurprizing Incident, one ſhould tranſgreſs the Boundaries of Reaſon and Truth, their Minds ought to be diſpoſed thereto, by ſomething that may ſet them ſo far beſides themſelves, that they be not in a Condition to perceive that they are impoſed upon; or at leaſt that they may thank the Poet for having ſurpriſed them ſo pleaſantly. This is what Monſieur *Corneille* has obſerv'd in his *Cid*. He knew well enough that he could not bring *Rodrigues* into the Earl's Houſe, whom he had but juſt then murder'd, without tranſgreſſing againſt Reaſon and Probability: But then he knew as well

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* Multaque tolles
Ex oculis, quæ mox narret facundia præſens.
Aut in avem Progne, Cadmus mutetur in anguem.
Quodcunque oſtendis mihi ſic, incredulus odi. *Poet.*

that the Curioſity of the Spectators, and the Attention they gave to what paſſed between this young Hero and *Chimene*, would not ſuffer them to take notice of this Fault: And that tho' they ſhould have been inform'd of it, they would have taken it ill, if a more ſtrict Regularity had rob'd them of ſo great a Satisfaction.

I believe that the beſt Rules for knowing how far 'tis allowable to carry on the *Marvellous*, and for diſcerning what will be taking, what will offend, and what will be ridiculous; is firſt, a ſound Judgment; and then the reading of good Authors, and likewiſe the Examples of thoſe who have come off but ſorrily; and laſtly the comparing theſe two together. But in this Examen of Things, a Man muſt be well acquainted with the Genius's, the Cuſtoms, and the Manners of the ſeveral Ages. For that which is a Beauty in *Homer*, might have met with ſorry Entertainment in the Works of a Poet in the Days of *Auguſtus*.

'Tis not enough (to make an Incident admir'd) that it ſhould have ſomething that is *Admirable:* But beſide that, 'tis requiſite there ſhould be nothing in it that might put a Stop to its Effect, and deſtroy the *Admiration*; ſuch as would be all contrary Paſſions. *Admiration* in this Point has nothing but what is common to it ſelf and all the other Paſſions. Therefore for the better explaining of this Matter, we muſt join that with them.

CHAP. IX.

Chap. IX.

Of the PASSIONS.

THE *Epick Narration* ought to be *Admirable*, † but this Beauty is not enough. It is farther neceſſary, that it be moving and paſſionate, that it tranſport the Mind of the Reader, fill him with Inquietude, give ſome Pleaſure, caſt him into a Conſternation, and make him ſenſible of the Violence of all theſe Motions, even in Subjects which he himſelf knows are feign'd and invented at Pleaſure. § *Horace*, who preſcribes all this to the Poets, can't forbear admiring them, when they come off well, and he compares their Skill to the Power of Magick.

The *Paſſions* then are neceſſary to great Poems: But all are not equally neceſſary or convenient to all Poems. Mirth and Pleaſant Surprizes belong to *Comedy*. On the contrary, Horrour and Compaſſion belong to *Tragedy*. The *Epick Poem* keeps as it were in the

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† Non ſatis eſt pulchra eſſe Poemata, dulcia ſunto,
Et quocumque volent, animum Auditoris agunto
Hor. Poet.

§ Ille per extenſum funem mihi poſſe videtur
Ire Poeta, meum qui pectus inaniter angit,
Irritat, mulcet, falſis terroribus implet,
Ut magus. *L.* 1. *Ep.* 1.

middle between both, and seizes upon all these Passions, as is evident from the Grief that reigns in the fourth Book of the *Æneid*, and from the Sports and Diversions of the Eighth. The Passion that seems most peculiar to this kind of Poem is *Admiration*. It is the least contrary to the Passions of the two other kinds of Poems. We admire with Joy things that surprize us pleasingly, and we admire with Terrour and Grief such things as terrify and make us sad.

Beside this *Admiration* which in general distinguishes the *Epick Poem* from the *Dramatick*, each *Epick Poem* has likewise some peculiar Passion, which distinguishes it in particular from other *Epick Poems*, and constitutes a kind of singular and individual Difference between these Poems of the same Species. These singular Passions correspond to the Character of the Hero. Anger and Terrour reign throughout the *Iliad*, because **Achilles* is angry and the most terrible of all Men. The *Æneid* has all soft and tender Passions, because that is the Character of *Æneas*. The Prudence, Wisdom, and Constancy of *Ulysses*, do not allow him in either of these Extremes, therefore the Poet does not permit one of them to be predominant in the *Odysseis*. He confines himself to *Admiration* only, which he carries to an higher Pitch than in

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* Ἦε σὺ Πηλείδη, πάντων ἐκπαγλότατ' ἀνδρῶν.

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the *Iliad*: And 'tis upon this Account that he introduces a great many more *Machines* of the *Odyſſeis* into the Body of the Action, than are to be ſeen in the Actions of the other two Poems. This Doctrine will find a fitter Place in the next Book, where we ſhall treat concerning the *Manners* and the *Character*.

We have ſtill two things to ſay concerning the *Paſſions*. The one is, how to impreſs them upon the Auditors: And the other, how to make them ſenſible of them. The firſt is to prepare their Minds for them: And the Second is, not to huddle together ſeveral *Paſſions* that are incompatible.

The Neceſſity of preparing the Auditors is founded upon the natural and general Neceſſity of taking Things where they are, when we would convey them elſewhere. 'Tis eaſy applying this Maxim to the Subject in hand. A Man is in a quiet and profound Repoſe, and you have a mind by a Diſcourſe made on Purpoſe to make him angry: You muſt begin your Diſcourſe by a mild way; by this means you will cloſe him, and then going hand in hand together, as the Saying is, he will not fail following you in all the Paſſions you have a mind to excite in him by Degrees. But if at the firſt Touch you manifeſt your Anger, you will make your ſelf as ridiculous, and meet with as little Succeſs as *Ajax* in *Ovid*'s *Metamorphoſes*, in whom the witty *Ovid* has given us a notable Inſtance of this Default. He makes him begin his Plea by

Anger and violent Figures before his Judges who were profoundly calm. * *The Generals were ſet, the Souldiers ſtanding round about them,* Ajax *riſes, and being of a furious and impatient Diſpoſition caſts a fierce Look towards the Sea-ſhore, ſtretches out his Hands towards the Fleet that rode there, and then cries out: Oh Heavens! This Cauſe muſt be tryed in View of the Navy, and* Ulyſſes *my Competitor!*

Theſe neceſſary Preparations ariſe from the Diſcourſe that goes before theſe Movements, or elſe from ſome Action, that already begins to excite them before one ſpeaks. The Orators themſelves ſometimes make uſe of this laſt way. For tho' they generally excite not the *Paſſions* till the End of their Harangues, yet when they find their Audience already mov'd, it would be ridiculous, if by an unſeaſonable Calmneſs they ſhould begin by making them quit that, with which they would have them affected. The laſt time *Catiline* enter'd the Senate Houſe, the Senators were ſo diſturbed at his Preſence, that thoſe who ſat next him drew farther off, and left him to ſit

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* Conſedere Duces, & vulgi ſtante corona,
Surgit ad hos Clypei dominus ſeptemplicis Ajax.
Utque erat impatiens iræ, Sigeia torvo
Littora proſpexit, claſſemque in littore vultu.
Protendenſque manus; Agimus, pro Juppiter, inquit,
Ante rates cauſam, & mecum confertur Ulyſſes, &c.
Metam. Lib. 13.

alone

alone. Then the *Conſul* would have offended againſt Reaſon, if he had begun his Speech with that Sedateneſs that is uſual to *Exordiums*. He would have abated that Indignation with which he was willing to affect the Senators againſt *Catiline*; and he would have taken away from the Mind of this Parricide, that Dread and Terror he was minded to ſtrike him with, and which he was already ſenſible of, by this tacite Condemnation of the Senate. Therefore * omitting this firſt Part of the Speech, which upon ſuch an Occaſion would have been prejudicial to him, he takes his Audience in the Condition he found them, and continues and heightens their Paſſions.

That which is ſo rare among the Orators, is common among the Poets: They abound with Inſtances of this nature, where one may ſee the Paſſion prepar'd and kept up by the Actions. *Dido* begins a Speech as *Ovid's Ajax* did. *Oh Jupiter! What? Shall this Stranger go off ſo?* &c. But theſe Motions were very well prepar'd. † "*Dido* entertains "Thoughts of her Death before *Æneas* "left her. She ſpent her Night in nothing "elſe but Diſquietude, and ſuch diſtract-

* Quouſque tandem abutere, Catilina, patientia noſtra, &c.

† Illa dolos dirumque nefas in pectore verſat, Certa mori, &c. *Æn.* 4.

"ing

" ing Thoughts, as theſe her Fears poſſeſs'd
" her with.

* *Soon as the Dawn began to clear the Sky,*
Down to the Shore the ſad Queen caſt her Eye;
Where when ſhe doth the empty Port ſurvey,
And now the Fleet with Wings diſplay'd at Sea,
Her Hands held up, her golden Treſſes torn,
Muſt we, ſays ſhe, of Force endure this Scorn?
Can we not have Recourſe to Arms? nor meet
This Fraud with Fraud? nor burn this wicked Fleet?
Haſte, fly, purſue, row, and let every Hand
Snatch up with Speed ſome ſwift revenging Brand.

[Engliſh'd by *Edm. Waller* and *Sidney Godolphin* Eſquires.]

This is no Surprize to the Hearers: They are ſo well prepared for it, that they would have wonder'd if the Beginning of this Speech had been leſs paſſionate.

The Practice of *Seneca* is quite contrary. If he has any Recital to make, which ought

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§ Regina e ſpeculis ut primum albeſcere lucem
Vidit, & æquatis claſſem procedere velis,
Littoraque, & vacuos ſenſit ſine remige portus:
Terque quaterque manu pectus percuſſa decorum,
Flaventeſque abſciſſa comas: Proh Juppiter! ibit,
Hic, ait, & noſtris illuſerit advena regnis! &c. *Ibid.*

to

to imprint ſome great *Paſſion* or other; he takes away from both his Perſonages and his Audience all the Inclinations they might have towards it. If they are poſſeſs'd with the Sorrow, Fear, and Expectation of ſome dreadful thing: He will begin by ſome fine and elegant Deſcription of ſome Place or other, which only ſerves to ſhew the Copiouſneſs, and the poignant bloomy Wit of a Poet without Judgment. In the *Troad*, *Hecuba* and *Andromache* were diſpoſed to hear of the violent and barbarous Death of their Son *Aſtyanax*, whom the *Grecians* had thrown from the Top of an high Tower. It mightily concern'd them indeed to know, that among the Croud that flock'd from all Parts to that ſad Sight, * *Some there were who ſtood upon the Ruins of the old decay'd Buildings, others whoſe Legs trembled under them, becauſe they were mounted a little too high*, &c. People that have the Patience to ſpeak or hear ſuch idle Stuff, are ſo little inclin'd to weep, that they had need have notice, as the mercenary Mourners of old had, when 'tis time to ſet up their Whine.

The Second thing we think neceſſary for the well managing the *Paſſions*, and to make the Auditors ſenſible of them, is to inſert them in the Poem *pure* and *diſengag'd* from

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* Alta rupes cujus e cacumine erecta ſummos turba libravit pedes, &c.

every

every thing, that may hinder them from producing their due Effect.

'Tis neceſſary then to avoid the *vicious Multiplicity of Fables*, where there are too many Stories, too many Fables, too many Actions, the Adventures too much divided and hard to be remembred, and ſuch Intrigues as one can't eaſily comprehend. All this diſtracts the Mind, and requires ſo much Attention, that there is nothing left for the *Paſſions* to work upon. The Soul ſhould be free and diſengag'd, to be the more ſenſible of them. We deſtroy our true Sorrows, when we divert our Thoughts another way: And how contrary will theſe troubleſome Applications be to the Fictions and Movement of Poems? Of all the Obſtacles that deſtroy the *Paſſions*, the *Paſſions* themſelves are not the leaſt. They fight with and deſtroy one another: And if a Man ſhould mix together a Subject of *Joy* and a Subject of *Sorrow*, he would make neither of them ſink deep. * *Horace* informs us, that no Poetical Licenſe will allow of this ſort of Mixture.

The very nature of theſe *Habits* impoſe this Law. The Blood and Animal Spirits cannot move ſo ſmoothly on in their uſual way at Quiet, if at the ſame time they are

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* Non ut placidis coeant immitia,

ſtop'd

ſtop'd and retarded by ſome Violence, ſuch as *Admiration* cauſes. Nor can they be in either of theſe two Motions, whilſt *Fear* contracts them from the external Parts of the Body to make them rally about the Heart: Or whilſt *Anger* ſends them into the Muſcles, and makes them act there with a Violence ſo contrary to the Operations of *Fear*. A Poet then ſhould be acquainted with both the *Cauſes* and the *Effects* of the *Paſſions* in our Souls. 'Tis there we are more ſenſible of them, and know them better than in the Blood and the Animal Spirits. This Knowledge, and the juſtneſs of his Genius, will make him manage them with all the Force, and the Effects they are capable of. And here we will propoſe two Examples of that which we have ſaid concerning the *Simplicity* and the *Diſengagement* of each *Paſſion*.

The *Admirable* muſt needs be predominant in the warlike Vertues of a Maid; and this is the *Paſſion Virgil* makes uſe of in the *Epiſode* of *Camilla*: And on the contrary he has made *Pity* to reign in that of *Pallas*. This Paſſion agrees very well with this young Prince who is one of the *Hero*'s Party. But the Poet does not mix theſe two *Paſſions* together. He only ſhows in *Pallas* all that ordinary Courage that a young Man is capable of. He fights *Turnus*, but did not go out to attack him: He does not ſo much as wound him, nor put him in the leaſt Danger; he only attends his coming,

and

and * ſpeaks to him more like one that fear'd not Death, than one who expected to kill him. He is kill'd at the firſt Blow; and there is nothing extraordinary in it. But there is ſomething more than ordinary in the *Lamentation* which *Æneas* and the unhappy *Evander* made upon his Death.

Camilla on the contrary, made her ſelf admir'd by a Valour becoming a *Hero* but ſhe dies without being pitied. That which *Diana* ſays upon the Subject, deſerves not the name of a Lamentation in compariſon to that which *Æneas* and *Evander* made for *Pallas*. Beſides, the Speech of *Diana* is ſaid before her Death, and is not in a Place where it might have any great Effect. In ſhort, *Camilla* is kill'd, ſhe is reveng'd, and nothing more ſaid about it. How many Poets are there, that would have beſtow'd a Lover or two upon her, and endeavour'd to make an *Epiſode* as moving as that of *Clorinda* and *Tancred*? This Beauty did not eſcape *Virgil*'s View. † He ſays, *that ſeveral* Italian *Dames courted her for their Sons*. This Reflection ſhews us, that his Thoughts were upon every thing, and that it was not without Choice and Judgment, that he omitted that which

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* Aut ſpoliis ego jam raptis laudabor opimis,
Aut letho inſigni. *Æn.* 10.

† Multæ illam fruſtra Tyrrhena per oppida matres
Optavere nurum. *Æn.* 10.

would

would have appear'd ſo beautiful to other Poets. But he was not willing to ſpoil the Unity of the Paſſion, nor put a ſtop to its Effects.

Chap. X.

How the Narration *ought to be* Active.

THE *Epick Narration* ought to be *Active*. This Qualification is ſo neceſſary to it, that *Ariſtotle*'s Expreſſion herein ſeems to confound the *Epopea* with the *Tragedy*. 'Tis by this he begins to lay down Rules for this firſt ſort of Poem. * *'Tis requiſite*, ſays he, *that the Epick Fables be Dramatick, like thoſe that are in Tragedy.* Now that which makes *Tragedy Dramatick*, and upon the Account of which it has the Name which ſignifies to † *Act*, is, that the Poet never ſpeaks in it: and that every thing is repreſented by the Perſonages that are introduc'd, and who alone act and ſpeak therein. From whence we learn, that ſince *Ariſtotle* requires this Qualification likewiſe in the *Epopea*, he thereby orders, that the Perſonages ſpeak likewiſe in this kind of Poem.

* Περὶ δὲ τὴν διηγηματικὴν, καὶ ἐν μέτρῳ μιμητικὴν, δῆλον ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς μύθους καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις συνιστάναι δραματικούς. Poet. c. 23. † Δρᾶν.

Nor

Nor does he hereby exclude the Narration of the Poet. This can never be; ſince he himſelf ſays that the *Epopea* is *an Imitation carried on by a Narration*; and that in truth the *Narration* of the Poet is its *Form*, which diſtinguiſhes it the moſt eſſentially from the Actions of the *Theatre*. But he means, that theſe two things ought to be ſo mix'd, that the Perſonages ſpeak very often. * *Homer*, ſays he, *who merits ſo much Praiſe in other Things, is eſpecially to be admired for this, that he has been the only Poet, who knew what he ought to do. For the Poet ſhould ſpeak but little. The Poetical Imitation conſiſts not ſo much in what the Poet ſays, as in what he makes his Perſonages ſay: The other Poets ſhew themſelves from the Beginning to the very End of their Poems. They imitate but ſeldom, and then they carry not on their Imitation very far.* Homer *uſes a quite contrary Method. After having ſaid a very little himſelf, he preſently introduces ſome one or other of his Perſonages.* This is what *Ariſtotle* ſays, nor needs it any Comment. To this famous Example he has given us in *Homer*,

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* Ὅμηρος μὲν οὖν ἄλλα τε πολλὰ ἄξιος ἐπαινεῖσθαι, καὶ δὴ καὶ ὅτι μόνος τῶν ποιητῶν, οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ ὃ δεῖ ποιεῖν αὐτόν. Αὐτὸν γὰρ δεῖ τὸν ποιητὴν ἐλάχιστα λέγειν· ἃ γὰρ ὅτι τοιοῦτος μιμητής. Οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι αὐτοὶ μὲν δι' ὅλου ἀγωνίζονται, μιμοῦνται δὲ ὀλίγα, καὶ ὀλιγάκις. ὁ δὲ ὀλίγα καὶ περιμιασάμενος, εὐθὺς εἰσάγει ἄνδρα, ἢ γυναῖκα. c. 24.

we

we might join that of the *Latin Poet*, who ſpeaks leſs in his *Æneid*, than he makes his Perſonages ſpeak.

But the laſt Words of *Ariſtotle* are capable of two Interpretations, the firſt is, * *Homer ſays but little himſelf, and preſently introduces a Man or a Woman, or ſomething elſe that has Manners; but without that Qualification he introduces nothing.* So that all the Words which follow the mention of *a Man or a Woman*, ſignify a *Deity*, or a feign'd Perſon, which though in its own Nature it has no Manners, yet has ſome in the Poem, into which allegorically one may bring all manner of things as well as into other *Fables*.

For this Thought is taken from the Nature of Fables in general. When they are divided into different ſorts; by the Term *Moratæ*, that is, *by the Manners that are attributed to ſomething that has none*, we underſtand thoſe, where for the Perſonages we introduce Beaſts, Plants, and ſuch like Things, which in their own Nature have no Manners. Thus, for inſtance, in the Fable of the *Olive-Tree* and the *Reed*, the *Olive-Tree* is proud and vaunts it ſelf becauſe it ſtands ſo firm as not to bend to ev'ry Blaſt of Wind, as the *Reed* does. Whatever then is introduc'd into Fables, ought

* Ὁ δὲ ὀλίγα καὶ προοιμιασάμενος, εὐθὺς εἰσάγει ἄνδρα, ἢ γυναῖκα, ἢ ἄλλο τὶ ἦθος, καὶ οὐδὲν ἄηθες, ἀλλ' ἔχον ἦθος. Ib.

ſo

ſo neceſſarily and eſſentially to have *Manners*, that the Author is oblig'd to beſtow them upon things that naturally are not endued with them.

In ſhort, if the Names of *Man* and *Woman* which *Ariſtotle* makes uſe of, do not properly ſignify *Gods* and *Goddeſſes*, he would without doubt have omitted a great Part of *Homer*'s Perſonages. He has done well then in adding, [*or ſome other thing that has Manners.*] And this will denote not only *Apollo*, *Thetis*, *Jupiter*, and ſuch like Deities, who are angry, complain, and laugh as we do, but likewiſe the Horſe *Xanthus*, that ſpeaks in the *Iliad*; the Horſe *Rhœbus*, which *Mezentius* ſpeaks to in the *Æneid*; *Æthon* who laments the Death of *Pallas*, and ev'n *Fame* who knows ev'ry thing, and takes ſuch a Pleaſure in telling Tales; the Winds that are ſo mutinous and ſeditious that they would have overturn'd the Globe, and daſhed Heaven and Earth together by this time, if *Jove* had not taken Care to ſet a King over them, who ſhuts them up cloſe; and when he lets them out, always keeps a ſtrict Hand over them. And this according to the firſt Interpretation is what *Ariſtotle* means, by *thoſe other things which have Manners*, which the Poet introduces, and makes to ſpeak in the Fable.

The other way of interpreting this Paſſage of *Ariſtotle*, is to ſay, That he does not ſuppoſe that the Speeches the Perſonages are made

made to pronounce, are the only means of making a *Narration Active* and *Dramatick*, but that 'tis ſo, when the *Manners* are apparent. whether by the Perſons ſpeaking or only acting therein, or by any other way, ſuppoſing you have a mind to give this Precept a little larger Extent. In this ſenſe, not only the Speech of *Dido* to the Princeſs her Siſter, to whom ſhe diſcovers her Paſſion for *Æneas*, would be *Dramatical*; but this Qualification would be likewiſe in the Verſes that go before, where one may obſerve the Agitations and the Diſquietude of this Queen, who from the time ſhe firſt fell in Love, had loſt all her Quiet and Repoſe.

In this Senſe, the learn'd Diſcourſe of *Anchiſes* to his Son in the ſixth Book, may be likewiſe reckon'd among the *Dramatical* Paſſages. Firſt, becauſe 'tis not the Poet that ſpeaks, but one of his Perſonages. Yet I declare 'tis my Opinion, that this ſingle Qualification is not a ſufficient Reaſon why that which is ſpoken ſhould be *Dramatical*, if beſide that, there are not *Manners* to be obſerved therein. Now there are Manners in this Speech of *Anchiſes*. That which he ſays there, is the Foundation of all the Morality, the Laws, and the Religion which *Æneas* was going to eſtabliſh in *Italy*. So that the Subject Matter of this Speech is a *Moral Inſtruction*, wherein one may ſee the Immortality of the Soul eſtabliſh'd; and the Cauſes of the Paſſions and Manners both of the Living and the

the Dead. But that which makes moſt for our Purpoſe is, that this Speech contains the *Manners*, *Habits*, and Condition of *Anchiſes* himſelf who ſpoke it, and of thoſe who were in the ſame Place with him. The Poet having us'd no ſmall Skill to engage him thereto: *Each of us*, * ſays he, *feel the Torments that are proper to him; then are we ſent to the Elyſian Fields, where we, a few in number, ſpend our time*, &c.

But whatever *Ariſtotle's* Senſe is, he does not ſeem to favour the ſimple Explication of Arts or Sciences, which are without *manners*, and without *Action*, and which have nothiug of *Morality* in them. If a Man would ſpeak like a Poet, he muſt imitate *Homer*, and conceal theſe Things under the Names and Actions of ſome feign'd Perſons. He will not ſay that Salt is good to preſerve dead Bodies from Corruption and Putrefaction, and that Flies would preſently fill them full of Maggots: But he will ſay, that *Achilles* deſigning to revenge the Death of *Patroclus*, before he perform'd the laſt Offices to his dead Body, apprehends that the hotneſs of the Seaſon would corrupt it, and that the Flies that lighted upon his Wounds, would engender

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* Quiſque ſuos patimur manes. Exinde per amplum
Mittimur Elyſium, & pauci læta arva tenemus.
Æn. 6.

Maggots

Maggots there. He will not barely ſay, that the Sea offers him a Remedy againſt the Putrefaction he was afraid of: But he will make the Sea a Divinity; he will bring it in ſpeaking: In a word, he will ſay the Goddeſs *Thetis* comforts *Achilles*, and tells him, he might ſet his Heart at reſt, for ſhe would go and perfume his Body with *Ambroſia*, which would preſerve it a whole Year from Corruption. This is the way by which Poets, if they would imitate *Homer*, muſt ſpeak of Arts and Sciences. One ſees in this inſtance, that Flies breed Corruption, and fill dead Bodies with Maggots. One there ſees the Nature of Salt, and the Art of preſerving dead Bodies from Corruption. But all this is expreſs'd Poetically, and with all the Qualifications requiſite to that Imitation, which according to *Ariſtotle* is eſſential to Poetry: All is reduc'd into Action. The Sea is made a Perſon that ſpeaks and acts, and this *Proſopopœia* is attended with Paſſion, Tenderneſs, and Intereſt. In ſhort there is nothing therein but what has Manners.

This Inſtance may ſuffice; it is plain, obvious, and eaſy to be underſtood. We may for Diverſion ſake produce another from a Science a great deal more myſterious. The Chymiſts have too good an Opinion of their Philoſophy, and more Eſteem for *Virgil*, than to think he was wholly ignorant of their Art. There are ſome obſerve, that he has expreſs'd as clearly as themſelves, ſome of their choiceſt Operations.

Operations. Theſe Gentlemen are not ſatisfied with ordinary Metaphors and Allegories, ſuch as Poets uſe: But they carry on theſe Figures and Diſguiſes to the utmoſt Obſcurity of a Riddle. No Inconvenience then would follow, ſhould they ſuppoſe the Hero of the *Æneid* to be a Man who makes a Diſcovery of that Gold, which is produc'd after a miraculous manner, and which is reproduc'd and increas'd inceſſantly from the very firſt time of its being diſcover'd. The Principle of this happy Diſcovery is Piety, Induſtry, a Genius, and the Bleſſing of Heaven; *Æneas* was not deficient in any of theſe. But 'tis requiſite ſeveral Things ſhould be divin'd; For this Reaſon *Helenus* ſends *Æneas* to *Sibyl*, whoſe Advice he follows, and ſees the two Birds of *Venus*. Theſe are the two Extracts of Vitriol: For that green Mineral, which contains them, is a ſort of *Copper*, that goes under the Name of this Goddeſs. I omit the reſt, and leave it as I found it in the Books where by Chance I did read of it; at leaſt it will ſuit well enough with the Juſtice of that Advice *Sibyl* gives *Æneas* upon the Account of the Difficulty of this Diſcovery, and the ſmall Number of thoſe who ſucceed in it; and that laſtly, as ſhe ſays, this Undertaking is not fit for a wiſe Man. But to return:

We may likewiſe reckon among the Subjects that are not Poetical, the Deſcriptions of Palaces, Gardens, Groves, Rivulets, Ships, and a hundred other natural and artificial Things;

Things; when they are too long, and made after a ſimple, proper manner, without Allegories. This is what *Horace* calls purple Shreds, which Poets ſometimes place very ill, thinking that thoſe Faults will prove the fineſt Ornaments of their Works. Tho' this may be good in the leſſer Poems.

I believe I have already ſpoken in ſome other Place concerning the manner of making the *Narration active*, which is proper and eſſential to the Fable. And that is, to reduce the Precepts and Inſtructions we would lay down, into Action. *Virgil* abounds with Inſtances of this Nature. His Hero is a Legiſlator, but 'tis in a Poem. So that he does not appoint that ſuch a Sacrifice ſhould be made, or ſuch Ceremonies obſerv'd: But he does all this himſelf. He does not command one ſhould ſubmit to the Gods, nor does he preſcribe a way how to puniſh the Profane; but he demonſtrates at large the dreadful Torments that attend theſe Miſcreants.

Chap. XI.

Of the Continuity *of the* Action, *and the Order of the* Narration.

THe *Continuity* which the *Action* ought to have in the *Narration*, is a Conſequence of what has been already ſaid, and will ſerve

as a Principle to that we are about to obſerve concerning the Order which the Poet ought to mind in the Recital of all his *Action*. 'Tis upon this Principle we ſhall judge, when the Poet is permitted to begin the *Narration* by the Beginning of his *Action*, and to relate Facts one after another, juſt as they happen'd and in their natural Order; and when, on the contrary, he is oblig'd to invert this Order, and make uſe of the artificial one, beginning his Poem with the Incidents of his *Action*, which happen laſt perhaps in order of time.

In the firſt Place we will treat concerning the *Continuity*. From the time the Poet begins to rehearſe his Subject, from the time he opens his Poem, and brings his Perſonages, if I may ſo ſay, upon the Stage; he ought ſo to continue his Action to the very End, that none of the Perſonages be ever obſerv'd to be Idle, and out of Motion.

This *Continuity* is ſometimes to be met with in the *Action* it ſelf, and in the firſt Model of the Fable. Of this Nature is the Action of the *Iliad*. *Apollo* is provok'd, and ſends the Peſtilence into the *Grecian* Army. *Agamemnon* pacifies his Anger, the Soldiers recover of their Diſtemper, and afterwards fight. *Patroclus* and *Hector* are kill'd, their funeral Obſequies are over; and ſo the *Action* ends in leſs than fifty Days, without any Interruption and Diſcontinuity. But when the Action laſts for ſeveral Years, as in the *Odyſſeis* and the *Æneid*, it cannot be continu'd, tho' 'twere interrupt-

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ed by nothing elſe but the Winter Seaſon, a very unfit time for Wars and Voyages, which are the uſual Subjects of Poems. *Ulyſſes* tarries a whole Year with *Circe*, and ſeven with *Calypſo*: And *Æneas* ſpent ſeveral Years in *Thrace*, where he does nothing worthy to be recited by an *Epick Poet*. And perhaps he was more than a Year in *Sicily* during his Father's Sickneſs, and their Mourning for his Death. So that the Actions of theſe two Poems are not continued. But tho' the Actions are not continu'd, yet the Narration ought to be ſo, as we hinted before.

There is no Difficulty in managing the Actions that are continu'd: The Poet has nothing to do but rehearſe them in their natural Order, and relate the Things one after another, juſt as they happen'd: This is what *Homer* has done in his *Iliad*.

When the Action is long and diſcontinu'd, the Poet relates it in an artificial Order. He takes nothing for the Matter of his Narration, but what towards the End of the Action has ſomething of *Continuity* in it; and for his own Share he only relates this Part. For this Reaſon *Virgil* has begun his Recital juſt after *Æneas* left *Sicily*, where *Anchiſes* dy'd: And *Homer* at the very firſt makes his Hero quit the Iſle of *Ogyges*, after he had ſtaid there ſeven Years, all which time the Poet lets paſs before the opening of his Poem. In the Sequel of the Diſcourſe, ſome probable and natural Occaſion ariſes for repeating the moſt conſide-

rable and neceſſary things which went before theſe Beginnings. The Love *Dido* conceiv'd for *Æneas* made her extreamly curious to know his Adventures. This Paſſion made the Recital thereof ſo natural, that the * Poet thought himſelf oblig'd to make it more than once. The *Phæacans* indeed had no Intereſt in the Fortune of *Ulyſſes*; but the Poet ſupply'd that by making theſe dull Fellows mightily in Love with Romantick Adventures.

This artificial Order divides the Action into two Parts, very different from each other. The principal Part contains that which the Poet relates. He takes but a little Matter, but he treats of it amply, and with all the Pomp and Majeſty his Art can furniſh him with. The other Part is a great deal larger in the Number of its Incidents, and in its Duration; but 'tis of leſs Compaſs ſhould you reckon the Verſes it takes up, and conſequently in the Circumſtances and Movements which make a great Part of the Beauties of the Poem. But yet, if among the Incidents which the Poet is oblig'd to inſert in that which we here call the ſecond and laſt Part of his Work, there ſhould be any one important Incident, he may treat of this more largely than of the reſt, as *Virgil* has done the *Taking of Troy*. 'Tis true one may not treat of many

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* Iliacoſque iterum demens audire labores
Expoſcit, pendetque iterum narrantis ab ore. *Æn.* 4.

of

of them after this manner: The reſt ſhould be more conciſe. Beſides one ſees a great deal of Difference between the Death of *Priam* deſcrib'd in the Recitals of the ſecond Book, and the Death of *Camilla* related by the Poet in the Eleventh. For tho' that of *Camilla* is doubtleſs leſs conſiderable as to the Fable, yet the Poet extends it more by half than that of *Priam*.

Theſe two Parts of the *Epick Poem* may be compar'd to two of the *Dramatick*: † One of which is acted upon the Stage before the Spectators; and the other comprehends whatſoever is done behind the Scenes, and which we come to know of purely by the Recitals which the Actors make. * This laſt is leſs moving than the other; and let *Æneas*'s Sorrow for his firſt Wife *Creuſa* be never ſo great, yet her Death has nothing in it, whereby it deſerves to be compar'd to that of *Dido*.

The Diviſion of the *Dramatick* Action we are now ſpeaking of, † gives the Poet an Advantage of keeping from the Spectators View, whatever would offend them; either

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† Aut agitur res in Scenis, aut acta refertur. *Hor Poet.*

* Segnius irritant animos demiſſa per aurem,
Quam quæ ſunt oculis ſubjecta fidelibus. *Ibid.*

——† Non tamen intus
Digna geri promes in ſcenam; multaque tolles
Ex oculis, quæ mox narret facundia præſens.
Nec pueros coram populo Medea trucidet, &c. *Ibid.*

by its being too horrible, as a Mother's butchering her own Children; or by its being too incredible, as the Metamorphoſis of a Man into a Serpent or a Bird: Whereupon theſe Things ſhould only be related. So likewiſe the Diviſion of the *Epick* Action gives the Poet Liberty to retrench from this Action whatever would cauſe a Confuſion in the Poem. The things that are improper for the *Epopea* are not of the ſame Nature with thoſe, which ought to be excluded the *Theatre*, ſince that which is good in a *Dramatick* Recital, is likewiſe ſo in an *Epopea*, which only diſcovers things to us by reciting them. But on the contrary, the Things that confound the *Epick Poem*, are ſuch as are too languiſhing, and which cannot admit of that Action and Motion, which are the proper Ornaments of this ſort of Poem. And this is what * *Horace* orders to be excluded thence.

And in Truth how could *Virgil* make his Readers endure *Æneas*'s conſtant Attendance at his ſick Father's Bed, together with the Medicines; and Fomentations which ought to be made uſe of to recal the Spirits, and the natural Heat into the cold Limbs of this aged Prince? And the Sorrow too of *Æneas*, which ought to have been very great, would have been but a ſorry Ornament of a Poem:

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* Et quæ deſperet tractata niteſcere poſſe, relinquet. *Poet.*

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The Readers would not have been affected with them. Would they have beſtow'd one Tear upon the natural Death of a Perſon of his Age, who had ſo little to do in this Poem? Therefore has the Poet very judiciouſly drawn a Veil over all theſe Things.

By this means, the artificial Order cuts off the languiſhing and unpleaſant Incidents, and the Intervals of Time that are void of Action, which hinders the *Continuity* thereof: And † by theſe Retrenchments it gives the Poem that continu'd Force, which makes it run ſmoothly on throughout the whole, and beſtows on it thoſe Beauties which the Action in it ſelf has not. * By this means it haſtens towards a Concluſion, and at firſt tranſports the Readers into the Middle of its ſubject Matter, and always entertains in them a Deſire and Expectation to ſee the Events as ſoon as poſſible.

Our Poets begin their *Narration* ſo nigh the End, that the Reader imagines the Poem would end within a few Verſes. In the *Odyſſeis*, the Gods order *Mercury* to go to the Iſle of *Ogyges*, where *Ulyſſes* was detain'd by *Calypſo*. He was to charge that Goddeſs to give him leave to depart, and furniſh him

† Vehemens & liquidus puroque ſimillimus amni. *Hor. Poet.*

* Semper ad eventum feſtinat, & in medias res,
Non ſecus ac notas auditorem rapit. *Hor. Art. Poet.*

with ev'ry thing that was neceſſary for his Journey to *Ithaca*.

Virgil approaches ſtill nearer to a Concluſion. His Hero has already left *Sicily*, and is upon his Journey to *Italy*. The ſecond Part begins much after the ſame Manner: *Æneas* arriving at the Country which the Fates had promis'd him, finds there the Gods and Men who waited his coming with Impatience; and King *Latinus* offers him his Daughter *Lavinia*, ſole Heir to his Crown, in Marriage. Who would think then but this Hero was very well ſettled, and the Poem at an End? But a Storm caſts him upon *Carthage*, and furniſhes the Poet with what fills the firſt Part. The Jealouſy of *Turnus*, who pretends *Lavinia* was promis'd to him, and was his due, oppoſes the Settlement of the *Trojans*, and affords ſubject Matter for the laſt ſix Books.

The Beginning of the Action is reſum'd ſo pertinently, that theſe large Recitals of *Æneas* and *Ulyſſes* make no Interruption. *Æneas* relates all that preceded his Arrival at *Carthage*, and then the Poet undertakes to tell what happen'd to him in that City. This Series of Things is ſo exact, that the firſt Book may paſs for a mere Prologue, which informs us of the Action in general, and which in particular diſcovers the Humours and Intereſt of the Perſons that were to appear in Play. The Poet's Practice is the ſame in his leſſer Epiſodes. *Venus* ſo reſumes the Story of *Dido*, and *Diana* that of *Camilla*, that what in this

Poem

Poem follows the Recitals of theſe two Goddeſſes, is the natural Conſequence of what they related. We may obſerve the ſame Order in the *Odyſſeis*. But the Death of *Archemorus*, the Funeral Sports, and the March of the *Argives* towards *Thebes*, are by no means the Conſequences of that which is contain'd in the Recital of *Hypſipyle*.

If our Poets had made the Recitals of *Ulyſſes* and *Æneas* at ſeveral times, they could not have connected them to the *Action* that would have follow'd, and the Order would have been leſs exact, and more irkſome to the Readers.

Let us now in a few Words ſum up all that has been ſaid concerning the *Continuity* of the *Epick Narration*, and the Order *Homer* and *Virgil* have obſerv'd therein.

They have ſo begun, that when once their Perſonages have made their Appearance, they never ceas'd from Acting till the End of the Poem. For this Purpoſe, when the *Epick Action* was continu'd, and of a few Months Duration, as that of the *Iliad*; the Poet has related it himſelf in the *Natural Order*. But when it laſted for ſeveral Years, as the two others did, the Poets obſerv'd an artificial *Order*, and the laſt Part of their Subject that was only continu'd, was all that they themſelves related. They made their Heroes relate all that went before, and that in one Speech, made upon a probable Occaſion. They plac'd theſe Recitals ſo well, that the Things related

therein, precede immediately, and without any Interruption those which the Poet at last relates himself. So that neither the Mind, nor the Memory of the Readers are at a Loss to rejoyn the Consequence of the Incidents, which they read in the Poem.

Chap. XII.

Of the Duration *of the* Narration.

According to the Idea we have been proposing concerning the *Continuity* and the *Order* of the *Narration*; 'tis requisite we should say thus much concerning its *Duration*, viz. That the Space of a Year is to the *Epick Narration*, what the Space of a Day is to *Tragedy*; and that the Winter is as improper for this great Work, as the Night is for the *Theatre*; since both being void of Action, make a vicious Interval, and an irregular *Discontinuity* in these Poems. So then, the *Duration* of the *Epick Narration* only lasts one Campaign, as the *Duration* of the *Dramatick* Action lasts an artificial Day.

But we may carry on this Parallel a little farther, and say, that as the Time for the *Theatral* Representation is under Debate amongst Learned Men, and the Practice of the Ancients has its Obscurities, which every one interprets in Favour of himself, either for the natural, or the artificial Day: So the precise time of the *Epopea* admits of Dispute; for

for the Practice of *Virgil* in this Matter is not very clear.

First it may be ſaid that the Narration of the *Æneid* laſts a Year and ſome Months. And thus the Account may go. *Æneas* parting from *Sicily* after he had interr'd his Father there, returns thither again a Year after, and there celebrates his Anniverſary on the very Day he dy'd on. † *'Tis a full Year*, ſays *Æneas*, *ſince we interr'd my Father, and now we are return'd hither again the ſame Day he dy'd on.* So that the *Narration* beginning when *Æneas* left *Sicily*, juſt after his Father's Death, that makes a whole Year to the Sports of the fifth Book. By this means the time that is requiſite for the reſt of this Book, for the ſixth, and for the Wars of *Italy*, will be added to the Year.

One may reduce this *Narration* into a preciſe Year, by ſaying, that theſe Verſes cited out of the fifth Book, do indeed inform us, *that it was a full Year ſince* Æneas *had interred his Father in Sicily*; but that neither theſe Verſes nor any others intimate that he left *Sicily* immediately after this Action. One may then with Freedom ſuppoſe that he tarry'd there as long a time, as was afterwards

† Annuus exactis completur menſibus orbis,
Ex quo relliquias divinique oſſa Parentis
Condidimus terrâ, mœſtaſque ſacravimus aras.
Jamque dies, ni fallor, adeſt, &c. *Æn.* 5.

requiſite

requiſite for his Settlement in *Italy*. From whence one will infer that the *Narration* is compris'd within the Compaſs of a Year of twelve Months, and no more.

Each of theſe Opinions ſuppoſes that the *Winter* is comprehended in this Narration, and that *Æneas* ſpent the whole of that with *Dido*, in *Africk*, as the Poet plainly ſays in this Verſe ſpoken by *Fame*.

Nunc Hyemem *inter ſe luxu quam longa fovere.*

A third Opinion ſuppoſes that the Word *Hyems* in this Verſe ſhould not be underſtood for the *Winter Seaſon*; but that it ſignifies the ſame thing which it does in other Paſſages of this very Book, that have a neceſſary relation to this. * Now in thoſe other Paſſages it does not ſignify the *Winter*, but a *Seaſon* which the Riſing of *Orion* renders *tempeſtuous*, and that happens in the *Summer*; for this Conſtellation riſes about the *Summer Solſtice*. So that the Poet had only a mind to tell us, that *Æneas* indulg'd himſelf in the Amours of *Dido*, all that time, wherein the Riſing of *Orion*, for about ſix Weeks, made him afraid to put to Sea, and excus'd him from

* Dum pelago deſævit hyems, & aquoſus Orion.
Quin etiam hyberno moliris ſidere claſſem.

complying

complying ſo readily to the Orders of the Gods, that ſummon'd him to *Italy*.

By this means all the *Narration* of the *Æneid* will be reduc'd into the Compaſs of one ſingle Campaign, making it to begin in Summer, and to conclude before the End of Autumn in the ſame Year. This Opinion is grounded upon ſeveral Expreſſions of *Virgil*, which ſeem more exact than the former, tho' leſs agreeable to ſeveral Interpretations. *Æneas* leaves *Sicily*, and is caſt upon the Coaſts of *Africk* in the Summer; and this Summer is the ſeventh ſince the taking of *Troy*. This is what the Poet ſays in the Perſon of *Dido*, when ſhe receives this Hero into *Carthage*. † *This is now the ſeventh Summer ſince your Travels over ſo many Countries, and ſo many Seas.* He ſpends in *Carthage* neither the Winter, nor any part of Autumn; but he parted thence before the End of Summer. He arrives at *Sicily* and there keeps the Anniverſary of *Anchiſes* at the End of the ſame Summer he came to *Carthage* in; ſince the Poet ſays that this likewiſe was the ſeventh. * *This is now the end of the ſeventh Summer ſince the Ruin of Troy.* Laſtly, the Poem ends before Autumn does, ſince the Day before the

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† Nam te jam ſeptima portat
Omnibus errantem terris & fluctibus æſtas. *Æn.* 1.

* Septima poſt Trojæ excidium jam vertitur æſtas. *Æn.* 5.

Death

Death of *Turnus*, the Woods had ſtill their Leaves on, and caſt their Shadow. The Poet ſays, that † *Turnus lay in Ambuſh in a Valley, where the thickneſs of the Leaves and the Shade favour'd very much his Deſign.* By this means the Narration of the *Æneid* will compriſe only one Campaign, and be included within the two Seaſons of Summer and Autumn: * Beginning at the Solſtice and Riſing of *Orion*, which caſt *Æneas* into *Africk*; and ending before the Froſts of †Autumn had ſtrip'd the Leaves off the Trees.

As there are Reaſons for both Sides, ſo there are Difficulties in both. Some of them are reply'd to: And for thoſe that ſeem unanſwerable, we ſay, that the *Æneid* being uncorrect, we ſhould not wonder if we cannot underſtand all.

Homer is a great deal clearer. He has made an exact Journal of the Time he allows his two Poems.

The *Iliad* begins with a Plague, which laſts ten Days. The Poet has allow'd as many for the *Grecians* Recovery. The Battles that

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† Eſt in anfractu vallis accommoda fraudi,
Armorumque dolis; quam denſis frondibus atrum
Urget utrinque latus. *Æn.* 11.

* Cum ſubito aſſurgens fluctu nimboſus Orion,
In vada cæca tulit. *Æn.* 1.

† ——— Autumni frigore primo
Lapſa cadunt folia. *Æn.* 6.

follow

follow next, end the fifth Day. After that eleven Days are ſpent in the Funeral Rites of *Patroclus*, and eleven more likewiſe in the Funeral of *Hector*, and then the Poem ends. The twice ten at the Beginning, and the twice eleven at the End, make juſt two and forty Days, to which add the five in the Middle, and the whole *Duration of the Action* and the *Narration* amounts to ſeven and forty Days.

The Days are not ſo well rang'd in the *Odyſſeis*, but the Account is altogether as exact. The Poem opens with *Minerva*. She frees *Telemachus* from the Dangers he was in at *Ithaca*, and conducts him to *Pylos*. The fourth Day ſhe goes up to Heaven again, and brings it about that *Calypſo* be ordered to diſmiſs *Ulyſſes*. On the Morrow he begins a Ship, and in twenty Days finiſhes it; the twenty fifth he ſets Sail, and after a Voyage of twenty Days, is caſt upon the Iſland of *Corfu*. There he tarries three Days with *Alcinous*. All this makes one and fifty Days from the firſt opening of the Poem to the Arrival of *Ulyſſes* in his own Country. Eight and twenty of them he ſpent with *Calypſo*, reckoning the four that preceded the building of his Ship; three and twenty Days more he is upon his Journey, part of which he ſpent at Sea, and part with *Alcinous*. A Night after he arrives in *Ithaca*. Four Days he remains incognito at *Eumeus*'t Country Houſe. On the fifth he went to his own Palace, where he

was

was in Diſguiſe two Days, taking an Account of what had happen'd, and ſquaring his Actions accordingly. The next Night he kills his Rivals, and on the Morrow makes an end of diſcovering himſelf, and re-adjuſting all his Affairs. Therefore adding theſe ſeven Days to the one and fifty before; the *Duration* of the *Narration* in this Poem amounts to eight and fifty Days.

As for the *Seaſons* of the Year, the Poet gives us an Occaſion to gueſs ſomething about it. In the *Iliad* where there is more Action and Violence, the Days are longer than the Nights, and the Seaſon very hot. And on the contrary, *Homer* has aſſign'd longer and cooler Nights to the Prudence of *Ulyſſes*; placing the Maturity of *Autumn* in the *Odyſſeis*, as he has the contagious Heats of the *Summer* in the *Iliad*.

The Practice of *Homer* then is without Doubt to reduce the *Duration* of the *Epick Narration* into the Compaſs of a Campaign of a few Months. But the Difficulty of knowing the Deſign and Intention of *Virgil*, is the reaſon why 'tis queſtion'd, whether one might not advance it to the Compaſs of a whole Year or more, aud whether the Winter Seaſon ought in reaſon to be excluded thence.

I found my ſelf inſenſibly ingag'd in the Examen of this particular Queſtion: I found it a great deal larger than I imagin'd, and I have diſcourſed very amply upon it, from whence

whence ſeveral Things may be deduc'd, that in my Mind are of no ſmall Uſe for the underſtanding of the *Æneid*. I here propoſe this Queſtion about the Time by way of Problem, and freely leave others to determine and judge what they pleaſe.

But yet I ſay, that in this Uncertainty, two Reaſons rather incline me to a ſingle Campaign than a whole Year.

The firſt is, the Practice of *Homer*, which the *Latin Poet* commonly propoſes as his Exemplar, and who by wiſe Men has been eſteemed the moſt excellent Model for Poets to imitate. This Reaſon makes ſo much the more for me in this Treatiſe of the *Epick Poem*, becauſe 'tis founded upon that relation that is obſervable between the Practice of *Virgil* and that of *Homer*, the Rules of *Horace*, and thoſe of *Ariſtotle*.

The other Reaſon is ſtill more to my Purpoſe; and that is, that this reducing of it to one ſingle Campaign, is more conformable to that Idea I have propoſed concerning the Fable, and the Deſign of *Virgil* in this Poem.

We have already conſidered *Æneas* as a Legiſlator, and Founder of the *Romans* Religion. He is ſo exact in obſerving all the Ceremonies which were performed for the Dead, that there is not the leaſt Colour he ſhould omit one ſo conſiderable, as is that of *Mourning*, eſpecially for the Death of his Father, for which he ſpares no Coſt. This high Veneration he has for him, makes one

of

of the principal Qualities of his Character, and almoſt throughout the whole regulates the general Character of the Poem.

Now the *Mourning* of the *Romans* conſiſted in two things: the one is its Duration, which laſted ten Months: the other is, that the *Romans* in this ominous and inauſpicious time never undertook any thing of Conſequence. How then could *Æneas* dare to undertake his Settlement in *Italy*, which was then a Buſineſs of the higheſt Conſequence to him? So then, he was oblig'd to ſtay in *Sicily* full ten Months after the Death of his Father; and having ſtay'd leſs than two Months at *Carthage*, he return'd to *Sicily* to celebrate the Anniverſary of his Death, on the ſame Day he arriv'd there.

This agrees very well with the Expreſſions of the Poet which we have already cited. For the Anniverſary happens at the end of the ſeventh Summer, a little more than a Month after the Solſtice and riſing of *Orion*. *Æneas* then leaving *Sicily* in Summer during the riſing of this Conſtellation, which rais'd the Tempeſt in the firſt Book, he could not leave it the ſame Summer *Anchiſes* died, but muſt needs have left *Sicily* the Summer following, which is the ſeventh as the Poet ſays, and the ſame in which he returns to the Anniverſary. By this means, he muſt needs have paſs'd the Autumn, the Winter, and the Spring in *Sicily*, and have tarried there more than nine Months before his parting for *Carthage*;

thage; but he went out and came back again to it the ſame Summer.

In the other Opinions I neither find the Conformity of *Virgil* with *Homer*, nor the Obſervation of the *Roman Mourning*, to which I really think *Æneas* was oblig'd as much as he was to the other Ceremonies in which he was ſo punctual. But theſe Reaſons which make for me, may not perhaps make for others. I only propoſe them as I was oblig'd. 'Tis for Philoſophers and Criticks to examine Things, to propoſe Reaſons, and to make them intelligible, and 'tis for the Reader to draw his Inferences.

Monſieur

Monſieur Bossu's TREATISE OF THE EPICK POEM.

BOOK IV:

Concerning the Manners *of the* Epick Poem.

Chap. I.

Concerning the Manners *in General.*

UNder the Name of *Manners* we comprehend all the natural or acquired Inclinations, which carry us on to good, bad, or indifferent Actions. This Definition contains three Things. The firſt is the *Manners* themſelves which we call Inclinations, whether

whether they have their Source and Origin in our Souls, ſuch as the Love of Sciences and Vertue; or whether they proceed from the Conſtitution of the Body, as Anger, and the reſt, which we have in common with the Brutes. The ſecond thing is the Cauſe of thoſe *Manners*, which is either Nature, or our Cholee, and Induſtry, according as they are either *natural* or *acquir'd*. The third thing, is the effect of the *Manners*, namely, Actions, whether good, as that of *Æneas*, or bad, as that of *Achilles*, or indifferent, as that of *Ulyſſes*.

Thoſe *Manners* are *good*, which incline us to Vertue, and vertuous Actions; thoſe *bad*, which incline us to Vice and Sin; and thoſe are *indifferent*, which incline us to indifferent Qualities and Actions.

A right Diſtinction ſhould be made between real Vertues, and thoſe that appear ſuch, and are only mere Qualities. The real Vertues, ſuch as Piety, Prudence, and the like, make thoſe who are Maſters of them Good, Praiſe-worthy, and Honeſt-men. But real Vices, ſuch as Impiety, Injuſtice, Fraud, and the like, corrupt and vitiate thoſe who are tainted with them. Meer Qualities in their own Nature produce neither of theſe two Effects, ſuch as Valour, Art, the Knowledge of Sciences, and the like. *Solomon* could ſtill preſerve the Knowledge of the Sciences even when he was become an Idolater. *Æneas* and *Mezentius* were both Valiant, yet one was a pious

and

and a good Man, the other an atheiſtical and profane Fellow.

'Tis farther obſervable that among the Inclinations, there are ſome which belong more peculiarly to ſome particular Adventure, and that are only of Uſe upon certain Occaſions: Such for inſtance are *Valour*, *Clemency*, and *Liberality*. Others are more univerſal, and appear in every thing, ſuch as are *good Nature* and a *paſſionate Temper*. For a Man may be paſſionate, and violent, not only in War, but at a Council Board, and upon all other Occaſions, as *Achilles* was; or he may be mild and Good-natured even in the Heat of Battle, as *Æneas*. We ſhall call this laſt Species of general and univerſal *Manners* the *Character* of ſuch or ſuch a Perſon, and will treat of it more particularly.

The Cauſes of our *Manners* are either wholly *External*, or wholly *Internal*, or they may be conſidered as partly External, partly Internal. The *External* Cauſes are God, the Stars, and our Native Country. The *mixt* Cauſes are our Parents and Education. The *internal* Cauſes are the Complexion, the Sex, the Paſſions, and the Actions whereby we contract theſe Habits.

The Effects of our *Manners* are the Diſcourſes, the Deſigns, and the Eſſays we make to do ſuch or ſuch a thing, and the good, bad, or indifferent Actions.

Poetry is not the only thing, where the *Manners* are of uſe. *Philoſophers*, *Hiſtorians*, *Geogra-*

Geographers, and *Rhetoricians* treat of them as well as *Poets*. Each of these in his own way. But the *Poet* has need of all. And beside these, there are a vast Number of things, which he is indispensibly obliged to be acquainted with, that he may make his Personages speak, and act regularly. Whatsoever has been said on this Subject, yet I cannot wholly pass it over. I shall only content my self to apply it to the Practice of *Virgil*. Therefore before I treat of the *Poetical Manners*, I will explain at large what I have proposed concerning the Causes of the *Manners*, and I shall say something concerning the *Manners* that are foreign to *Poetry*.

Chap. II.

Of the Causes *of the* Manners.

GOD is the chief of all the *Causes* in general, we shall look upon him here in particular, as the most universal and first Cause of the *Manners*. He is the Author of Nature, and disposes of all things as he thinks fit. This Cause renders the *Manners* of *Æneas* good even to Admiration. 'Tis superfluous to show how this Hero is favour'd by *Jupiter*, since we see *Juno* who prosecuted him, loves and esteems his Person.

The *Stars*, and principally the *Signs* and *Planets*, are the second Cause of the *Manners*.

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The * Poet takes notice what Influence they have upon Men, when in the Perſon of *Dido*, He proves from them that the *Tyrians* are not ſo dull, but that they know what Eſteem ought to be had for Virtue. But is it by Chance, think ye, that this Poet, who elſewhere was ſo skillful in Aſtronomy, cauſes the Planets to act in favour of his Hero, conformable to the Rules of Aſtrologers? Of the ſeven there are three that favour him, *Jupiter*, *Venus*, and the *Sun*: All three act viſibly in the Poem in the Behalf of *Æneas*. There are three others, whoſe Influences are malignant. *Saturn*, *Mars*, the *Moon* or *Diana*. If they act, 'tis indeed againſt the Hero. But they appear ſo obſcurely that one may ſay *Virgil* has hid them below the Horizon. Laſtly, *Mercury*, whoſe *Planet* is ſaid to be good with the good, and bad with the bad, acts viſibly as the good Planets do, but he never acts alone, 'tis *Jupiter* that always ſends him out. And this is the Horoſcope which the Poet makes for the Birth of the *Roman Empire*.

The third *external Cauſe* of the *Manners* is the *Country* in which one is born. *Virgil* beſtows great Commendations on the Country of his Hero, and advances it far above *Greece*.

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* Non obtuſa adeo geſtamus pectora Pœni:
Nec tam averſus equos Tyria Sol jungit ab urbe.
Æn. 1.

* As

* As long as *Troy* was aſſaulted fairly by Force, it always remained victorious. 'Twas only the Fraud and Treachery of the *Grecians*, that gain'd the maſtery over the Generoſity of the *Trojans*. So that according to their Countries, the one Party are brave and generous, the other Knaves and Cheats; the one Civil, the other Barbarous; the one Hardy, the other Nice, *&c.*

After theſe *Cauſes*, that are properly *external*, follow next the *Fathers* and *Mothers*, whoſe Blood is derived down to their Children. We cannot ſay that the Parents are ſuch *Cauſes* as are altogether foreign to the Inclinations of thoſe who are formed from their Subſtance. Let us apply this to our Subject. *Æneas* ſprang from the Royal Blood of *Troy*. The firſt Princes of this Family were as virtuous, as powerful. But in Proceſs of time theſe two things were divided into two different Branches. *Ilus* left the Crown to *Laomedon*, and his Virtue to *Aſſaracus*. *Priam* and *Paris* were Heirs to the firſt, *Anchiſes* and *Æneas* to the ſecond. By this means the Poet beſtows upon his Hero the good Inclinations of his Anceſtors, before ever he reſtored to him the *Regal Power*. His Piety deſerv'd the Sceptre of his Fathers, and the Perfidiouſneſs of the other Branch was the Cauſe that

* Fracti bello fatisque repulſi
Ductores Danaum: *Æn.* 2.

Priam's Family was extirpated. The Innocent themselves felt likewise the Smart of it, as * *Virgil* observes of *Polydore*. This is more clearly expressed by the *Greek Poet*. † He lays down the Genealogy of *Priam* and *Æneas*, and adds that *Jupiter hated the Family of* Priam, *and that notwithstanding* Æneas *was to command the* Trojans, *and transmit the Empire to his Posterity*. These are the Advantages *Æneas* derived from his Father. His Mother was the Goddess, from whom he deriv'd the *Character* of *Good Nature*, and *Meekness*, which was the finest Ornament of his *Manners*.

Parents likewise hand down to their Children their Nobility, which often makes a great deal of difference between those that are noble, and those that are not. Now that which happens often, or ordinarily in these things, is the Rule which the Poet ought to go by. It would argue Ignorance, or Childishness to do otherwise: And one should fall under these Censures, if for instance, one should cause a Poetical Person to be born under an unlucky Constellation, to whom we

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* Postquam res Asiæ, Priamique evertere gentem Immeritam visum superis, &c. Polydorum obtruncat. *Æn.* 3.

† Ἤδη γὰρ Πριάμῳ γενεὴν ἤχθηρε Κρονίων. Νῦν δὲ δὴ Αἰνείαο βίη Τρώεσσιν ἀνάξει, Καὶ παῖδες παίδων, τοί κεν μέλοπτιδες γένωνται. Iliad.

would

would give good Inclinations and a happy Fortune; whatſoever Inſtances may be oppoſed againſt the pretended Doctrine of Aſtrologers, yet that which is admirable, and extraordinary in Poets, does not conſiſt in contradicting the common received Opinion about theſe things.

Education is another Cauſe of the *Manners* which depend upon the two former, to wit, the Care and Quality of the Parents. *Virgil* has not forgot this Cauſe. Thoſe likewiſe with whom one converſes, contribute very much towards thoſe various Inclinations that proceed from *Education*. Whether one ſuits himſelf to their Humour, or whether that Conformity of Humours makes theſe Conjunctions, and preſides o'er the Choice of Friends. The Companions of *Æneas* are good, ſage, and pious Perſons. * *Iapis* his Phyſician prefers his Skill in Phyſick beyond the Glory of Arms, even in that only Deſign of prolonging the Life of his old Father.

Education depends likewiſe on the Government and the State, under which one is brought up. One conceives quite different Sentiments under a *Monarchy*, than one ſhould

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* Ipſe ſuas artes, ſua munera lætus Apollo
Augurium Citharamque dabat, celereſque ſagittas.
Ille ut depoſiti proferret fata Parentis,
Scire poteſtatem herbarum uſumq; medendi
Maluit, & mutas agitare inglorius artes. *Æn.* 12.

do under a *Common-wealth*. This Point was of ſome moment to our Poet, who was willing to change the Inclinations of his Audience. 'Tis upon this Account that the Inclinations of all the Perſonages in the *Æneid* are unanimouſly for a *Monarchy*. And though the *Thuſcans* who were uſed cruelly by *Mezentius*, revolt from him, and drive him thence; yet this is not as the firſt *Brutus* did, to change the Face of the State, by baniſhing both the King and his Power together, but in order to ſubmit themſelves to a more juſt Monarch.

We may take into the Number of *mixed Cauſes*, the Riches, the Dignities, the Alliances, and the other Goods of Fortune, which we poſſeſs; upon which I will only make this Reflection: That a King, or General of an Army, do not always act in that Character.

Achilles was both. But he preſerves nothing of his Sovereignty, but that Independency by which he refuſes to obey *Agamemnon*, as otherwiſe he ought. The Fable requires only this, and *Homer* has ſaid no more of it. His *Achilles* is rather a private Man, and a ſingle Voluntier, who only fights in his own Quarrel, than a King or a General. So that nothing of all the good that is done any where elſe, but where he is preſent, is owing either to his Valour or his good Conduct.

Virgil's Hero is quite of another make. He never diveſts himſelf of his Dignities, he acts in the full Character of a General. And this

this advances his Martial Atchievements to a higher Pitch of Glory than thoſe of *Achilles*. The Abſence of both theſe Heroes gives their Enemies great Advantage againſt them, and is an Evidence how great and neceſſary the Valour of both of them is. But this is peculiar to *Æneas*, that whatever good is done in his Abſence, is owing to his Conduct. Two things preſerved the *Trojans* from the Rage of *Turnus*: The one is the Rampart and Fortifications of the Camp they were intrenched in. *Æneas* himſelf deſigned and over-looked theſe Works. The other is the good Order they obſerved to defend themſelves: And in this they did no more than what he ordered them at parting. And here is a Glory which the Hero in the *Iliad* can make no Pretenſions to; and if one would compare both together, *Achilles* is a valiant Soldier, and *Æneas* a compleat Commander.

The laſt Cauſes of the *Manners*, which we propounded, are purely *internal*. The chief and moſt general of theſe is the *Complexion*. Poets place high Characters upon Bodies of the largeſt ſize, and the fineſt make. * *Virgil* gives his Hero the Stature and Viſage of a God: And he obſerves † that Vertue is moſt

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* Os humeroſque Deo ſimilis. *Æn.* 1.

† Gratior & pulchro veniens in corpore virtus. *Æn.* 5.

charming, when a good Soul is lodged in a Body that reſembles it.

The *Complexion* varies according to the difference of Ages and Sexes. *Turnus* is younger than *Æneas*, becauſe *Æneas* ought to be ſage and prudent, and *Turnus* furious and paſſionate like another *Achilles*. I will not tranſcribe here what *Horace* has writ concerning the *Manners* that are proper to every Age.

As for the Sex, *Ariſtotle* ſays in his *Poetry*, that there are fewer good Women than bad; and that they do more Miſchief than good in the World. *Virgil* is but too exact in copying this Thought. *Venus* is the Mother and Protectreſs of *Æneas*: She ſeems to be good-natured through the whole. *Sibyl* likewiſe favours him. *Cybele* and *Andromache* are Well-wiſhers to him, and wiſh him no harm; but they appear but little. For this ſmall Number of good Women, how many bad ones are there, or at leaſt ſuch as bring a great deal of Miſchief upon this Hero? *Juno* is his profeſs'd Enemy, and employs againſt him *Iris*, *Juturna*, and *Alecto*. *Dido* thought of ruining him at *Carthage*, and calls in to her Aid her Siſter, a Nurſe, and an Inchantreſs. The *Harpies* drive him out of their Iſland. * *Helena* is a Fury that ruines the *Trojans* and *Gracians* themſelves. The *Trojan* Wo-

* Trojæ & Patriæ communis Erinnys. *Æn.* 2.

men,

men, though his own Subjects, ſet his Fleet on Fire. *Amata* contemns the Order of the Gods, and the Will of the King her Husband; and with the *Latin* Women firſt blows the Trumpet to Rebellion. † *Sylvia* puts her upon it. The Women, that were moſt eſteemed by this Hero, brought inſupportable Troubles upon his Head. At the end of the ſecond Book, § one may ſee his Sorrow for *Creuſa*. And * the innocent *Lavinia* is the Cauſe of all the Miſeries he ſuffers in the ſix laſt Books.

Camilla bears Arms againſt him, but ſhe gives us an Occaſion to make a more particular Reflection. *Virgil*, in her, has given us a pretty Example of the Inconſtancy of the Sex. It ſeems as if this courageous Damſel was brought in to fight, only to teach other Women, that War is none of their Buſineſs, and that they can never ſo far diveſt themſelves of their natural Inclinations. There ſtill remains ſomething in them which will prove the Ruine of themſelves, and which is a great Prejudice to thoſe who rely upon them. The Poet does admirably apply this Point to the *Manners* of that Sex; and makes uſe of this *Heroine* in the Caſe, who ſeems to be wholly of another make. In the Heat of the

† Sylvia prima ſoror, &c. *Æn.* 7.

§ Quid in everſa vidi crudelius? &c.

* Cauſa mali tanti conjux iterum. *Æn.* 6.

Battel ſhe perceives a Warrior with rich Amour. She was preſently for having the Spoils of this Enemy; and the Motives the Poet gives her are looked upon as a Woman's greedy Deſire. This Levity of the Sex makes *Camilla* forget her Dignity, and the taking Care of her Safety, and 'tis followed with very miſchievous Effects. She is killed, the Cavalry routed, and *Æneas* preſerved from an Ambuſcado he was juſt falling into.

The *Paſſions* likewiſe are the *internal Cauſes* of the *Manners*. If we love any Perſon, we love all we ſee in him, even to his Failings. If we hate any one, we have an Averſion for even his Perfections: So great a Power has *Paſſion* over us. When *Dido* loves *Æneas*, this Hero, in her Eye, is nothing leſs than a * God. † But is ſhe incenſed againſt him? Then he is no longer one of Humane Race, but ſome hard-hearted Rock of Mount *Caucaſus* is ſcarce good enough to be his Father.

But the moſt excellent of all the *Cauſes* of each Man's *Manners*, is his own *Actions*. This Cauſe imprints the ſtrongeſt Habits. 'Tis that in which we have the greateſt Share.

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* Credo equidem, nec vana fides, genus eſſe Deorum. *Æn* 4.

† Nec tibi diva parens, generis nec Dardanus autor,
Perfide! ſed diris genuit te cautibus horrens
Caucaſus, Hyrcanæque admôrunt ubera tygres.
Ibid.

'Tis

'Tis that which creates to us the greateſt Honour, if the *Manners* it produces be good; and, which on the other hand is our greateſt Shame, if they be bad. *Virgil* has very divinely touched upon this *Cauſe*, when he ſays that next after God, *Good Manners* are the chiefeſt and the beſt Recompence of *Good Actions.*

* *Ye brave young Men, what equal Gifts can we,*
What Recompence for ſuch Deſerts decree?
The greateſt ſure, and beſt you can receive,
The Gods, your Vertue, and your Fame will give.
[Engliſh'd thus by Mr. *Dryden.*]

CHAP. III.

Concerning the Manners of other Sciences *beſides* Poetry.

GEography, *Hiſtory*, *Philoſophy*, and *Rhetorick*, teach nothing concerning the Manners, but what the Poet ſhould be acquainted with. We will only here make a ſlight Application of it to our Subject.

* Quæ vobis, quæ digna, viri, pro talibus auſis
Præmia poſſe rear ſolvi? Pulcherrima primum
Dii moreſq; dabunt veſtri.

The *Geographers* in the Tracts they write concerning the Situation of the Seas and Continent, do likewiſe inform us of the Diverſity of States and Governments, of the Employments, the Inclinations, the Cuſtoms of the People, together with the Faſhion of their Habits. The Speech of *Remulus*, in the ninth Book of the *Æneid*, is all Geographical. It contains the *Education* of the *Italians*, and their War-like Manners adapted to every Age; and it ends with an *Antitheſis*, wherein he reproaches the *Trojans* with the Effeminacy of their Cloathing, as a certain Sign that their Inclinations were oppoſite to thoſe he had been deſcribing. There are ſeveral other Paſſages in the *Æneid*, where this Effeminacy of their Apparel is deſcribed, and the Reproach of it caſt upon *Æneas* himſelf with ſome ſort of *Emphaſis*. But *Virgil* very dexterouſly turns off from his Audience, who were the Progeny of the *Trojans*, this ſmall Reproach, which might elſe have reflected upon them. He ſays, that the *Romans* did not derive from their Fathers any of that effeminate Faſhion: But on the other hand, that the *Trojans* accommodated themſelves to the more manly and generous Cuſtoms of the *Italians*.

Hiſtory, as well as *Geography*, deſcribes the *Manners* and the Cuſtoms of States, and People in general. But *Hiſtory* adds likewiſe thereto the *Inclinations* and *Manners* of particular Perſons, which it names. Both of them treat equally of the *Manners* as indifferent,

rent, writing with no other Deſign than to demonſtrate them as they really are. 'Tis true, the Notices they give ſerve for the Conduct of a Man's Life, and each Man is to look upon the Examples he meets with as ſo many Precepts, which teach him his Duty. But this Application does not ſo much belong to theſe two Arts, as to *Moral Philoſophy*.

Poetry takes from *Hiſtory* and *Geography*, what both of them ſay concerning the *Morals*. The Poet deſcribes Things in general as *Geography* does, and uſually it claps them under particular Names, as in *Hiſtory*. Sometimes it joins both theſe things together, and makes the Application of them it ſelf. * *Virgil* being about to deſcribe the particular *Manners* of *Sinon*, advertiſes his Readers, that in the Villany of this ſingle *Grecian* one might diſcover the Wickedneſs of the whole Nation. *Moral Philoſophy* contains in it the ſimple Knowledge of the *Manners*, it ſuffers none that are either bad, or indifferent. It treats of them only with a Deſign to render them good. The *Vertues* are always good. Theſe it propoſes that we may embrace them. The *Vices* are always evil, and it teaches how to avoid them. The *Paſſions* in themſelves are indifferent, it corrects what is ill in them, and puts us in a Method how to make a right

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* Accipe nunc Danaum inſidias; & crimine ab uno Diſce omnes. *Æn.* 2.

uſe

uſe of them, and bring them over to Vertue's Side. There are ſome Inclinations that are ſo indifferent, they cannot alter their Property. Such are thoſe of young Children before they are capable of Good or Evil. *Philoſophy* looks upon them not to be ſo much *Manners*, as the cauſe of *future Manners*. We can produce an Inſtance of this without quitting our uſual Guides. *Horace* is no leſs a *Philoſopher* than he is a *Poet*. † 'Tis worth taking notice what he relates concerning a Man of *Canuſium*, *Servius Oppidius* by Name. He had a plentiful Eſtate left him by his Progenitors. Before his Death he bequeaths two of his Lordſhips to his two Sons, and gave them this Advice: *I have obſerved that you*, Aulus, *have managed your Play-things after a careleſs manner, either gaming, or giving them inconſiderately away: And you*, Tiberius, *on the other hand, are always counting your Tri-*

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† Servius Oppidius Canuſi duo prædia dives,
Antiquo cenſu gnatis diviſſe duobus
Fertur: Et hæc moriens pueris dixiſſe vocatis
Ad lectum: Poſtquam te talos, Aule, nuceſque
Ferre ſinu laxo, donare & ludere vidi:
Te, Tiberi, numerare, cavis abſcondere triſtem:
Extimui ne vos ageret veſania diſcors.
Tu Numentanum, tu ne ſequerere Cicutam.
Quare per Divos oratus uterque Penates,
Tu cave ne minuas; Tu, ne majus facias id
Quod ſatis eſſe putat pater, & natura coercet. *Lib.* 2. *Sat.* 3.

fles,

ſles, ſeem very anxious, and look about for Holes to hide them in. This makes me afraid you will both ruin your ſelves by two contrary Vices; the one by being as prodigal as Numentanus; *the other as covetous as* Cicuta. *Wherefore I charge you both, and conjure you, by the Guardian Gods of our Family that you,* Aulus, *diminiſh nothing of the Eſtate I leave you, and that you,* Tiberius, *never increaſe it; but live contented with what Nature, and your Father, think ſufficient for you.* This is the way *Philoſophy* treats of the Inclinations of Children. The Concluſion, and all the Commands of this prudent Father, are for riper Age.

Virgil treats of the Doctrine of the *Paſſions*, not only as a *Moral*, but as a *Natural Philoſopher*. He renders a Reaſon of theſe things from the Matter whereof Bodies are compoſed, and from the Manner whereby they are made, and united to the Souls. But he does it in a *Poetical* way, and very ſuitably to his Subject.

As *Rhetorick* propoſes a different End to it ſelf, ſo likewiſe does it treat of the *Manners* after a different way. The Orator's Deſign is not to render his Audience better than they are; he is contented if they are but convinced of that he undertook to convince them of. The better to effect this, he ſides with their Humour, and their Intereſts, as far as his Cauſe will bear. He appears modeſt, prudent, and a Man of Probity, that we may hearken

to

to him with Delight, that we may rely upon him, and that we may believe that he neither deſigns to impoſe upon us, nor is in the wrong himſelf. He gives us a quite contrary Idea of thoſe he ſpeaks againſt. In a word, he never troubles his Head with conſidering which are his own true Inclinations, or what the Inclinations of others are, but ſtudies to repreſent them all ſuch as they ſhould be, for him to gain his Cauſe.

The *Poet* ſhould know all this, that ſo he may the better make his Perſonages ſpeak. We might ſay that our Poets might look upon the Anceſtors of their Audience, as Orators do on thoſe in whoſe Behalf they ſpeak. Beſides, *Virgil* might have conſidered *Dido* as his Enemy. The Treachery of *Hannibal*, and the *Carthaginians*, would have diſpenſed a *Roman Poet* from ſome Civilities, which elſe, perhaps, one might think were becoming him. But the Fable does ſufficiently regulate the *Manners* of all the Perſonages, and 'tis to this one ſhould have the chieſeſt Regard.

The *Poet* as well as the *Orator* has his Auditors. All the difference I find is, that they are not ſo few in number, nor ſo fickle, nor ſo ſubject to particular Paſſions and Inclinations. The Poet writes for his whole Country, he muſt be read every Hour, at all times, and by ſober Perſons: He has nothing then to do, but to ſtudy in general the Humour of his own Nation, and the good Inclinations of his Prince, if he lives in a Monarchy, as *Virgil* did.

did. But if a Prince has bad Inclinations, and an Author is ſo complaiſant as to ſpoil his Poem, the better to accommodate himſelf to them, he expoſes himſelf to very ſhameful Cenſures.

The *Poet*, as well as the *Orator* and *Philoſopher*, is obliged to appear a grave, prudent, and honeſt Man. For this Reaſon, and becauſe he is obliged to teach us Vertue, he is engaged to be perfectly acquainted with *Morality*, and to be truly vertuous. This is a practical Science; and is not learnt by empty Speculations. If a good and ſolid Moral does not correct our Paſſions, 'tis almoſt impoſſible but our Paſſions will make us think the *Moral* falſe. We are not apt to condemn thoſe Faults in which we take Delight. We had rather believe that theſe are not Vices, than acknowledge that we our ſelves are vicious. If *Horace* had reaſon to ſay, that *Homer* would not have given ſuch Commendations of Wine, if he had not lov'd it; what can one think of thoſe who take ſo much Delight and Pleaſure in that which is the moſt ſhameful and criminal in our Paſſions? who make of them the moſt moving and tendereſt Paſſages of their Poems? and who turn all infamous Amours into ſuch Gallantries as an honeſt Man and a generous Cavalier may reckon among his good Fortunes? One ſhall never make Vice odious, if one repreſents nothing of it but what is amiable and pleaſant. Thoſe who repreſent it only under a plauſible Diſguiſe, give

give us reaſon to think, that they only expoſe it more to View thereby, and that their Lives are of a piece with their *Moral*, and their Writings. If there are any Readers that are of the ſame Mind, 'tis not to thoſe a Man ſhould ſuit himſelf. This would be on the other hand to deſtroy the moſt eſſential Rules of Poetry, and the Fable. A pernicious Art is no Art, or at leaſt one not to be tolerated. If there are no other Readers to be met with, and if the Poet is obliged out of Complaiſance to be debauch'd, woe to thoſe who encourage ſuch a Corruption; and who prefer the Glory of being Poets, to that of being honeſt Men.

Theſe Reflections are not beſide my Subject, ſince they ſerve to ſhew what is the Practice of *Homer* and *Virgil*. Theſe Pagans have not ſullied the Majeſty of their *Epiſodes* by theſe vicious Delicacies. *Ulyſſes* is cold to *Circe*'s Charms. He is melancholy with *Calypſo*. *Bryſeis* and *Chryſeis* only inflame *Agamemnon* and *Achilles* with Anger. *Camilla* has no Gallants. There is ſcarce mention made of *Turnus*'s Paſſion for *Lavinia*. And all the Amour of *Dido* is treated only as a vicious Treachery, for which this miſerable Queen is puniſh'd ſeverely.

CHAP. IV.

Chap. IV.

Of the Manners of Poetry.

That which is peculiar to *Poetry* in the Doctrine about the *Manners*, is to make the Reader know what are the Inclinations which the Poet beſtows upon his Perſonages, whether good, bad, or indifferent, no matter which. *Ariſtotle* defines the *Manners* of *Poetry* thus: * *The Manners*, ſays he, *are that which diſcovers the Inclinations of him that ſpeaks, and that whereby we know on what he will determine, before one ſees that he is carried that way, or actually rejects it.* From whence this Philoſopher concludes, † *That the Manners are not always in all ſorts of Diſcourſes.* An Inſtance will clear this Definition.

In the firſt Book of *Virgil*, *Æneas* appears to be very pious, and more forward to execute the Will of the Gods, than any other thing. In the fourth Book a very difficult Choice is propoſed to him. On one ſide Gratitude, Love, Natural Tenderneſs, and

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* Ἔστι δ' ἦθος μὲν τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὃ δηλοῖ τὴν προαίρεσιν ὁποία τίς ἐστιν, ἐν οἷς οὐκ ἔστι δῆλον, ἢ προαιρεῖται, ἢ φεύγει ὁ λέγων.

† Διόπερ, οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἦθος ἔνιοι τῶν λόγων. Poet. c. 6.

ſeveral

ſeveral weighty Conſiderations, engage him not to part from *Dido:* on the other ſide, an expreſs Order of the Gods commands him to *Italy*. Before any one ſees what ſide he will take to, and on what he will reſolve, That which he has ſaid ought to have demonſtrated what his Will and what his Inclinations are, and to what he will determine. His former Speeches which diſcover to me his future Reſolution, are the Poetical *Manners*. Theſe make one foreſee that he would leave *Dido*, and obey the Gods: He does ſo: The *Manners* then are good, and duly order'd. If to ſtay with *Dido*, he had diſobey'd the Orders of *Jupiter*, the *Manners* would have been bad; bad, becauſe they would have made one foreſee a Choice, and a Reſolution quite contrary to that which he ought to take. But if nothing had foreſhewn me the Reſolution of *Æneas*, nor what ſide he had taken to, nor the contrary; in this Caſe there would have been no *Manners*.

Therefore, as in *Philoſophy* the *Manners* are good, when they make that Man ſo in whom they are; and they are bad when they incline him to Vice and Evil Actions: and as in *Rhetorick* they are good when they manifeſt the Perſon that ſpeaks to be honeſt, prudent, and ſincere, and the Perſon againſt whom he ſpeaks to be guilty of the contrary Vices; and evil when he that ſpeaks ſeems vicious, and imprudent; and his Adverſary ſage, and well adviſed, independently from what they are in Reality:

Reality: So likewiſe in an *Epopea* the *Manners* are *good*, when one may diſcover the Virtue or Vice, the good or bad Inclinations of thoſe who ſpeak or act; but *bad* when a good Man appears vicious, or a wicked Man ſeems to have good Inclinations.

So that the *Manners* of *Æneas*, and thoſe of the Atheiſt *Mezentius* conſidered Poetically, are both equally good, becauſe they equally demonſtrate the Piety of the one, and the Impiety of the other, which are the Characters the Poet beſtowed upon them, and under which they are always repreſented by him. But in the *Hippolyte* of *Seneca*, the *Manners* of *Phædra's Nurſe* are very *bad*, becauſe this Woman is very wicked, and ſpeaks very fine things. At firſt ſhe perſwades this unhappy Queen, paſſionately in love with her Son-in-law, to the Virtue of Continence. * *'Tis Paſſion*, ſays ſhe, *which, to countenance the Vice, is not aſhamed to make Love a God; and for a greater Licentiouſneſs therein, it has diſguiſed this infamous Brutality under the Name of a falſe Deity*, &c. When a Body hears a long Speech full of thoſe chaſte Thoughts, would not one think that ſhe who ſpeaks is *Chaſtity* her ſelf come down expreſs from Heaven to baniſh from the Earth

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* Deum eſſe amorem turpiter vitio favens
Finxit libido; quoque liberior foret,
Titulum furori numinis falſi dedit.

all unlawful Love? But yet obſerve what a Part this Nurſe acts in the remaining Part of the Poem. 'Tis ſhe her ſelf that ſpeaks, and explains her Character. † *If the amorous Flame rages ſo much within your Breaſt, never value what the World ſays of it. Common Report ſeldom favours Virtue and Truth: but ſpeaks favourably of the moſt profligate, and ſays worſe of good Men than of others. Let us try to bend the Mind of this ſtubborn and untractable Youth. Let it be my Buſineſs for once. Let me take this rough Young-man to task, and for your Sake touch the very Heart of this reſentleſs Creature.* Here's good Morality turn'd out of doors in an inſtant. Surely *Seneca*'s Deſign in making her ſpeak thus, was only to put her Audience upon admiring her fine Faculty of diſcourſing *Pro* and *Con*, and what a great many pretty Sentences ſhe had got by heart. Let the Caſe be how it will, ſince he had a Deſign to make uſe of this Nurſe to debauch the chaſte Reſolution of *Hippolytus*, he makes her ſpeak well enough this ſecond Speech, and he re-aſſumes the *Poetical Goodneſs*, when he quits the

† Si tam protervus incubat menti furor,
Contemne famam; fama vix vero favet,
Pejus merenti melior, & pejor bono.
Tentemus animum triſtem & intractabilem.
Meus iſte labor eſt, aggredi juvenem ferum.
Mentemque ſævam flectere immitis viri.

Moral

Moral *Goodneſs*, and when he makes her vent ſuch profligate Maxims.

Sence then the *Goodneſs* that is proper to the *Poetical* Manners, is to make them appear ſuch as they are; it is neceſſary to obſerve, what are the things that diſcover to us the Inclinations of the Perſonages.

The firſt thing is the Speeches and Actions. † *There are Manners in a Poem* (ſays *Ariſtotle*) *if, as we ſaid, the Speeches and the Actions diſcover to us any Inclination.* The Poet makes his Perſonages ſpeak and act as he pleaſes. So that theſe two things are owing to him, they are wholly at his Diſpoſal. And they are the Foundation of all the reſt. When the *Manners* are well expreſt after this way, they are denoted purely and ſimply by the Term *Good*; and this * *Goodneſs* makes their firſt Qualification. *Ariſtotle* places it in the Front of all the reſt, that it may be the more exactly obſerved. † *Horace* likewiſe orders the Poet to be exact in demonſtrating the *Manners*.

The ſecond thing is the Knowledge which a Genius, Study, and Experience, gives us of the *Inclinations*, that are proper to each Per-

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* Ἔξει δὲ τὸ ἦθος μέν, ἐὰν ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη, ποιῇ φανερὸν ὁ λόγος ἢ ἡ Πρᾶξις προαίρεσίν τινα. Ariſtot. Poet. c. 15.

† Ἓν μὲν καὶ πρῶτον ὅπως χρηστὰ ἦ. Ibid.

† Notandi ſunt tibi mores. *Poet.*

ſon

ſon according to the Complexion, the Dignity, and all the other Cauſes whether natural or acquir'd, internal or external, all which we mention'd before.

As ſoon as the Poet has given the Dignity of a King to one of his Perſonages, without hearing him ſpeak, or ſeeing him act, we know that he ought to be grave, majeſtical, jealous of his Authority, and the like. The Inclinations ſhould be *ſuitable* to that which the Poet has propoſed; and † this *Conformity* and *Suitableneſs* makes the ſecond Qualification of the *Manners*.

The third thing is the Knowledge which we deduce from the Fable or the Hiſtory. This ſort of Diſcovery is comprehended under the Name of *Common Opinion* or *Fame*, for the Reaſons we have already mentioned. So that when a Poet has nam'd *Alexander*, we know that the Inclination of this Perſonage is all for Greatneſs and Glory, and that his Ambition is larger than the Extent of the whole Earth. If he introduces *Achilles*, we know he is angry, paſſionate, and impatient. The Manners of theſe Heroes in the Poem ſhould be like to that which * *Fame* has reported of them; and this *Reſemblance* makes the third Qualification of the Manners.

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† Convenientia finge. *Hor. Poet.*
Δεύτερον ἢ τὰ Ἁρμάττουσα. Ariſt. Poet.
* Famam ſequere. *Hor. Poet.*
Τείτον ἢ ὅμοιον. Ariſt. Poet.

Laſtly,

Laſtly, becauſe the Poems may be divided into two Parts, as the *Æneid*, the one half whereof requires Piety and Patience, and the other Violence and War, a Man may fanſy, according to theſe ſo different States, he may likewiſe make the Characters of his Hero diſferent. And then the Manners of each Part will be good in particular. But becauſe the Speeches and the Actions of the firſt Part have diſcovered the Inclinations which the Poet gives his Hero, and becauſe the Reader ſees 'tis ſo in the Fable and Hiſtory, and has the ſame Effect as common Fame; this would be to offend againſt the firſt and third Qualification, if we change the Character that is known: from whence it follows, that the Poet is oblig'd to make it conſtant and *Even*, that is, ſuch at the End of the Poem, as it appear'd to be at the Beginning: and this † *Evenneſs* of the *Character* is the fourth Qualification of the Manners. So that *there are four things to be obſerved in the Manners*: firſt, that they be *good*; ſecondly, *ſuitable*; thirdly, *likely*; and fourthly, *even*. Theſe four Qualifications are comprehended in *Ariſtotle*'s Definition; ſo that if one ſhould tranſgreſs any one of theſe, he would tranſgreſs this *Definition* by making us paſs a wrong

† Servetur ad imum
Qualis ab incepto proceſſerit, & ſibi conſtet. *Hor. Poet.*
Τέλαξον ὃ ὁμαλόν. Ar. Poet.

Judgment

Judgment upon the Inclinations of a Perſonage, and the Reſolutions he ought to take.

The moſt important and hardeſt thing is to diſtinguiſh theſe two Sorts of *Goodneſs* in the Manners: the one, which we may call Moral *Goodneſs*, and which is proper to Vertue; and the other Poetical, to which the moſt vicious Men have as much Right as the vertuous. It conſiſts only in the Skill of the Poet, to diſcover rightly the Inclinations of thoſe he makes to ſpeak and act in his Poem. That which raiſes the greateſt Scruple, is, that the Poetical Manners ſuppoſe the others; and *Ariſtotle* not only ſpeaks of theſe two ſorts in his *Poeſy*, but farther, he makes uſe of the ſame † *Term* to expreſs theſe two ſorts of *Goodneſs*.

To wind our ſelves out of this Difficulty, 'twill not be amiſs to begin here, by examining, whether according to *Ariſtotle*, the Poetical Hero ought neceſſarily to be an honeſt and vertuous Man. For if this be not ſo, then 'tis plain that when *Ariſtotle* requires for the firſt and moſt principal Quality of the Manners that they be good, he would not be underſtood to ſpeak of that Moral Goodneſs which makes Men good, and which is inſeparable from Vertue. So that though we do not perhaps penetrate through all the Obſcurity of this Expreſſion, yet we ſhall at leaſt

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* Χρηςὸν.

know

know the Bottom of his Thoughts. And ſince this Queſtion is neceſſary, we ſhall not ſtick to add Reaſon, and the Authority of others, to that of *Ariſtotle*; and that will eſtabliſh it the better.

Chap. V.

Whether the Hero *of the* Poem *ought to be an Honeſt Man, or no?*

THis Queſtion will ſeem unreaſonable to thoſe who have but one ſingle Idea of their Heroes; and who acknowledge none of that Name, but thoſe excellent Men who are endued with every Virtue, are Maſters of their Paſſions, and all their Inclinations, and whom an excellent and divine Nature raiſes above the reſt of Mankind. But neither the ancient Poets, nor the Maſters of this Art ever thought of placing their Heroes in ſo high a Sphere, without thinking it lawful to put them in a lower Form: 'Tis requiſite then to make the ſame Diſtinction between a Hero in *Morality*, and an Hero in *Poetry*, as we did between *Moral* and *Poetical Goodneſs*, and to ſay that *Achilles* and *Mezentius* had as much Right to the *Poetical Goodneſs*, as *Ulyſſes* and *Æneas*: So that theſe two cruel and unjuſt Men are as regular Heroes of Poetry, as theſe two Princes that are ſo juſt, ſo wiſe, and ſo good.

In the Poem it ſelf this Term admits of two Senſes. Sometimes it ſignifies indifferently all the Perſons of Note. So that not only *Æneas* and *Turnus*, but likewiſe *Entellus* in the Sports of the fifth Book, and *Miſenus* the Trumpeter of *Æneas* in the ſixth, are ſtyl'd *Heroes* by the Poet. But though the Name of *Hero* may be alſo beſtow'd on other Perſonages, yet there is ſo particular an Application of it made to the firſt, that when one ſimply ſays *the Hero*, by that Name we underſtand only *Achilles* in the *Iliad*, *Ulyſſes* in the *Odyſſeis*, *Æneas* in the *Latin Poem*; in a word, the principal Perſonage in any Poem.

There is likewiſe a particular Signification of the Word *Heroick* when 'tis uſed to denote an *Epopea*, and to diſtinguiſh this ſort of Poem from others. *Ariſtotle* and *Ovid* give this Name not to the Poem, but to the Verſes made uſe of therein, and which they likewiſe call *Hexameter Verſes*. This laſt has been almoſt the only Name we have retain'd. If we would call *Epick Poems Heroick Poems*, becauſe of the *Heroick* Verſes that are made uſe of therein, one might with as much Reaſon call the *French Epopeas Alexandrine Poems*, ſince the Verſes they uſe in theſe Poems are call'd *Alexandrines*. And if the Name *Heroick* comes from the Perſonages of the Poem, who are ſtyl'd *Heroes*; *Tragedy* would be as much an *Heroick Poem* as the *Epopea* would, ſince the Action and the Perſonages of *Tragedy* are no leſs *Heroick*, than the

Action

Action and the Perſonages of the *Epopea*.

But I queſtion whether theſe Reflections be ſo uſeful as to deſerve ſo many Words. They may only ſerve to diſcover to us the different uſe of the Terms *Hero*, and *Heroick* among the Ancients, and the Moderns; and to prevent condemning the firſt for ſuch Notions, which they never follow'd. When we know that they did not affix the Idea of Vertue to theſe Terms taken in a Poetical Senſe, that they never confin'd the Name of Hero only to the principal Perſonage in the Poem, and that they did not call the *Epopeas* by the Name of *Heroick Poems*; We ſhall not in theſe Works look for Examples of a real and excelling Vertue, and no one will wonder that *Horace* has ſaid on the contrary, that all the *Iliad* where ſo many Hero's loſt their Lives, contains nothing but Injuſtice, Violence, Paſſion, and Wickedneſs.

I have omitted one Signification of the Word *Hero*, which may be conſidered as *Moral*, and as *Poetical*. In this Senſe we call ſome Men that were born of ſome Deity, and a Mortal Perſon, as *Achilles* who was the Son of the Goddeſs *Thetis* and *Peleus*; and *Hercules* who was the Son of *Jupiter* and *Alcmena*. But this lays no Obligation upon Poets to make theſe Heroes good Men: Becauſe there were likewiſe wicked Gods. And one may likewiſe obſerve that ſometimes the Poets do make theſe Divine Men very wicked Perſons, witneſs *Polypheme* and *Cacus*.

* The firſt of theſe, though *Neptune*'s Son, was a horrible Monſter, and devoured his Gueſts, and contemned *Jupiter* himſelf. † *Cacus* was the Son of God *Vulcan*, and yet *Virgil* ſays, that there was no Villainy but this notable Raſcal would undertake.

This is ſaid in the general concerning all ſorts of *Heroes*; let us now take a particular View of the chief Perſonages in each Poem.

Ariſtotle ſays, * *That an Heroical and Divine Vertue is ſomething more than Humane*; and conſequently that Heroes are Divine Perſons, and that the Excellency of their Nature raiſes them above all Men. But he ſays this in his Book of Morality. † In his *Poetry* he teaches a quite contrary Leſſon, that this chief Perſonage of a Poem whom we ſtyle a Hero, ſhould be neither *good* nor *bad*. But he would have him be between both, neither *advanced above the reſt of Mankind by his Vertue, and his Juſtice, nor ſunk below them by his Vices and Wickedneſs*. There is nothing

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* Monſtrum Horrendum,
Viſceribus miſerorum & ſanguine veſcitur atro. *Æn.* 3.

† At furiis Caci mens effera, nequid inauſum
Aut intentatum ſceleriſve dolive fuiſſet. *Æn.* 8.

* Τὴν γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἀρετὴν ἠθικήν τινα καὶ θείαν. Ariſt. de moribus ad Nicomachum. lib. 7. c. 1.

† Ὁ μεταξὺ ἄρα τοῦτον λοιπόν. Ἔστι δὴ τοιοῦτος ὁ μήτε ἀρετῇ διαφέρων καὶ δικαιοσύνῃ, μήτε διὰ κακίαν καὶ μοχθηρίαν, &c. Ar. Poet. c. 13

then

then of Communication between theſe two ſorts of Heroes, one of which ought to be advanced by his Vertue above the reſt of Mankind, and the other ſhould not be in the ſame Claſs with Men of Perfection.

Beſides, it muſt be obſerved, that he only ſpeaks of that which is the moſt compleat Part in the Poems, and not ſimply of that which is regular and allowable: And moreover, that this Mean, which he requires, is for complex Fables. So that he does not abſolutely exclude from the Number of theſe Poetical Heroes, neither Perſons of the greateſt Vertue, ſuch as *Ulyſſes*, nor the moſt vicious, ſuch as *Ixion* and *Medea*. *Horace* mentions theſe two laſt among the regular Heroes. * He ſays, that *ſhe* ſhould be barbarous and inflexible, and *Ixion* treacherous. Certainly this *Critick* never wrote his Rules for irregular Perſonages.

But ſince laſtly, both *Ariſtotle* and *Horace* approve of *Homer*'s Practice in the Manners he has given to *Achilles*, and ſince they propoſe this Hero as a Model for other Poets to imitate; the bad Morals of this Perſonage ſhould convince us, that according to the Rules of *Ariſtotle* and *Horace*, and according to *Homer*'s Practice, 'tis by no means neceſſary that the principal Perſon of an *Epopea*

* Sit Medea ferox invictaque: Perfidus Ixion. *Hor. Poet.*

ſhould be an honeſt Man. For never does an honeſt Man prefer his own Paſſion and private Intereſt to the publick Cauſe, the Glory of his Country, the Honour and the Life of his innocent Friends. Never did an honeſt Man uſe ſuch vile Language as this to his General, *Go thou impudent, drunken, fearful Fellow; there are none but Drones who obey thee.* Theſe Contumelies are ſeditious, and of very bad Conſequence, and they are ſo much the more criminal, becauſe he who ſaid them might be the Ringleader of a Faction. A good Man, if God denies him any thing, will never break out into a Paſſion againſt him, and will never tell him that he will be revenged on him if he can. 'Tis only profane and Mad-Men that ſpeak thus.

Was *Ariſtotle* ignorant of theſe continual Extravagancies of *Achilles*? Or did this learned Philoſopher take them for real Vertues? There is not the leaſt Colour for ſuch a Thought. We ſhould more probably believe that *Ariſtotle* conſider'd this Poetical Hero only as a Savage, directly oppoſite to the Hero of his Morality. For in the Paſſage above cited, *he oppoſes this Brutality to the Heroick and Divine Vertues. Becauſe a God and a Beaſt are incapable, the one of Vice, and the other of Vertue.* And in truth the one of theſe Natures is of two high, and the other of too low a Pitch. Laws are made for neither the one, nor the other of them. And is not this what *Horace* ſays of the Character of *Achilles*?

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He ſhould not acknowledge that he was under the Tye of any Laws. Therefore there is no Medium; he belongs to one of the two contraries which *Ariſtotle* propoſes, either above or below Mankind; he is Divine or Brutal. And which to fix upon is no hard Matter. *Horace* ſays he is a Fool.

Homer, 'tis true, has ſome Faults, and * *Horace* owns it; but the *Character* of *Achilles* cannot be one of theſe Faults, which are ſo few, are no Offence, and are owing either to humane Frailty, or a pardonable Negligence. Theſe are the Faults *Horace* cenſures, or to ſpeak more properly, which he excuſes in *Homer*. And can this be applied to the Character of *Achilles?*

We conclude this Point by confirming the Practice of *Homer* and the Authority of *Ariſtotle* and *Horace* with a reaſon drawn from the Eſſence of the Poem, according as we propos'd it. The Moral does as well teach us how to avoid Vices as (in Conformity to *Horace*) we ſaid concerning the *Iliad* and *Achilles*; as it does how to imitate Vertue, as *Horace* obſerves of the other Poem, and the other Hero of *Homer*. And laſtly, the Fable which is the very Soul of the Poem, and which is of the ſame Nature in *Homer* as

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——* Non ego paucis
Offendar maculis, quas aut incuria fudit,
Aut humana parum cavit natura. *Poet.*

in *Æsop*, is as regularly capable of the most base and criminal Men, and Animals for its first and only Personages, as it is of the most generous and the most Praise-worthy.

Without dwelling then upon any new Proofs which the Inference will afford us, we may conclude, that Reason and the Nature of the Poem, the Practice of *Homer*, and the Precepts of *Aristotle* and *Horace*, do all inform us that 'tis not at all necessary that the Hero of a Poem should be a good and vertuous Man: And that there is no Irregularity in making him as treacherous as *Ixion*, as unnatural as *Medea*, and as Brutal as *Achilles*.

Chap. VI.

Of the Poetical Goodness of the Manners.

What we are going to deliver here concerning the Goodness of the Manners, is only an Explanation of what *Aristotle* has writ about it in the fifteenth Chapter of his Poetry. The whole Passage runs thus: * *There are four things to be observed in the Manners.*

* Περὶ δὲ τὰ ἤθη τέτταρά ἐστιν ὧν δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι. Ἓν μὲν καὶ πρῶτον, ὅπως χρηστὰ ᾖ. Ἔστι δὲ ἦθος μέν, ἐὰν, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη, ποιῇ φανερὸν ὁ λόγος, ἢ ἡ προαίρεσις προαιρεσίν τινα. Φαῦλον μὲν ἐὰν φαύλην, χρηστὸν δὲ ἐὰν χρηστήν. Ἔστι δὲ ἐν ἑκάστῳ γένει, &c.

The

The firſt and principal is, the Method of making them good. There will be Manners in a Speech or Action, if, as we before hinted, either one or the other diſcovers on what the Perſon that ſpeaks or acts will reſolve. Let theſe Manners be vicious *and* bad, *provided they foreſhow* vicious *and* bad *Inclinations; or* good *and* vertuous, *provided they likewiſe foreſhow* good *and* vertuous *Inclinations. This happens in all ſorts of Conditions; for a Woman and a Foot-boy will be good in a Poetical Senſe, though commonly Women are rather bad and vicious, than good and vertuous, and Foot-boys are of no account.*

This Paſſage has ſomewhat of Difficulty in it: perhaps I have changed it too much, by confining it to my Senſe; but I had rather interpret it thus, than otherwiſe ——

After what has been ſaid in the former Chapter, I ſee not the leaſt Reaſon to apply this *Goodneſs* which ought ſo ſtrictly to be obſerv'd in the Manners of the Poetical Perſons, to Morality and Vertue. I am of Opinion then, that we are to underſtand this of the Poetical Goodneſs; and this is what *Ariſtotle* would make out, when afterwards he ſays, that there will be *Manners in a Speech or Action, if either of them foreſhow any Inclination, Choice, and Reſolution*, as I have already ſaid upon the Occaſion of another of *Ariſtotle's* Paſſages, to which *Ariſtotle* refers us.

This will likewiſe ſerve to illuſtrate upon what Account I have render'd the Word προαίρεσις by this Phraſe, *upon what he will reſolve.* The Greek Word ſignifies neither an Inclination, nor a ſimple Act of the Will, without Deliberation and Choice; but it ſignifies the Choice which one makes, and the Deſire one has, after ſome ſort of Deliberation. Thus *Ariſtotle* himſelf explains this Term very largely in his *Ethicks.* The Word *Reſolution* ſignifies thus much, but being uſed alone, is too equivocal.

Ariſtotle adds, that the *Manners are bad, when the* Reſolutions *that are taken are ſo; and that the Manners are good, when the Reſolutions are good.* I did not think that this Goodneſs of the Manners was a Poetical Goodneſs, and that his Meaning was, that for the well ordering of the Manners in a Poem, 'tis requiſite that the Perſons which are introduced take ſuch Reſolutions and Deſigns as are juſt and good, that an Author tranſgreſſes this Rule, and makes the Manners Poetically bad, when the Perſonages are determin'd to do a bad Action. This Interpretation would condemn the Practice of *Homer* in the Perſon of *Achilles*, in that of *Agamemnon*, and in almoſt all the Perſonages of the *Iliad* and *Odyſſeis.* Certainly this was never *Ariſtotle's* Deſign. The *Æneid* it ſelf would be liable to the ſame Cenſure. *Dido*, *Turnus*, *Amata*, *Mezentius*, and ſeveral others, would ſpoil all the Places where they act

act ſo viciouſly; that is to ſay, they would ſpoil the whole Poem, from one end to the other. I have therefore interpreted this Place in a Moral Senſe, and thought that *Ariſtotle* intended to teach us, that the Poetical Manners are equally good, let them be in a Moral Senſe good or bad, provided that the Poet orders Matters ſo, that they appear before-hand to be ſuch as either the good or the bad Perſons of his Poem ought to have.

The reſt of the Text confirms me farther in my Opinion, and in the Diſtinction I have made between the Moral and the Poetical Goodneſs of the Manners. *Ariſtotle* ſays that the Goodneſs of the Manners he ſpeaks of, may be met with in all Sorts of States and Conditions, even amongſt *Foot-men who have no Goodneſs in them.* Without doubt a Foot-man cannot be Maſter of that Goodneſs to which he has no Right. He will then be *morally bad*, becauſe he will be a diſſembling, drunken, cheating Raſcal; and he will be *Poetically good*, becauſe theſe bad Inclinations will be well expoſed.

This Inſtance of *Ariſtotle*, and the Application he himſelf makes of what he ſays of the Goodneſs of the Manners to a Foot-man, does teach us that he does not ſpeak only in the Behalf of Heroes, let the Word be taken in what Senſe ſoever, but that this Goodneſs he deſcribes, as well as the other Qualifications of the Manners, reaches to all Sorts of

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Poetical

Poetical Perſons, from Kings and Princes down to Foot-men and waiting Boys; without excepting any one in *Comedy*, *Tragedy*, and the *Epopea*.

But though we mention the Liberty Poets have of putting vicious Perſons in a Poem, yet this Liberty has its Bounds and Rules, and they are not to ſuppoſe Virtue and Vice muſt go hand in hand together. 'Tis Neceſſity and Probability that regulate theſe two Contraries. And they regulate them ſo, that when they give to Vertue all that is poſſible, yet they allow Vice only that which cannot be cut off from the Poem without ſpoiling the Fable. Thus *Ariſtotle* cenſures the vicious Manners, not becauſe they are vicious, but becauſe they are ſo without any Neceſſity for it. But he does not blame the Obſtinacy of *Achilles*, as unjuſt and unreaſonable as it was, becauſe it was neceſſary to the Fable. If *Achilles* had received Satisfaction from *Agamemnon* before the Death of *Patroclus*, the Action would have been at an end: or elſe *Achilles* would have fought no more, and ſo the Fable would have been defective and imperfect: Or elſe having no particular Quarrel againſt *Hector*, he would have fought only for the Common Cauſe, and conſequently the Siege and War of *Troy* would have been the Subject of the Poem, and the Action would have been *Epiſodical* and ſpoil'd. 'Twas neceſſary then that *Achilles* ſhould be unjuſt and inexorable. But the Poet carries the Vices of

Achilles

Achilles no farther than the Neceſſity of the Fable forc'd him, as we obſerved before.

'Tis time now to join the Authority of *Horace* to that of *Ariſtotle*. Certainly if the Poet ſhould take ſpecial Care to make the Manners good in a Moral Senſe, there would have been as little Reaſon to give the Name of Manners to indifferent Inclinations in Poetry, as in Moral Philoſophy, and the Maſters in both Sciences would have been equally ridiculous, if they had laid down Rules and Precepts for theſe ſorts of Inclinations. Yet * *Horace* has done it, and after he has advertis'd us, that the obſerving the Rules about the Manners is a Buſineſs of the higheſt Moment; the firſt things he preſents us with to be obſerved, and on which he beſtows the Name of Manners, are the moſt indifferent Inclinations of any in the World. † *A Child*, ſays he, *that juſt begins to ſpeak and walk, without Leading-ſtrings, is moſt paſſionately deſirous of being with his Play-fellows.* What follows is much the ſame, or rather worſe. For if it were not altogether an indifferent thing for the little Creatures at this Age to

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* Tu, quid ego & populus mecum deſiderat, audi.
Si plauſoris eges aulæa manentis, & uſque
Seſſuri, donec cantor, Vos plaudite, dicat;
Ætatis cujuſque notandi ſunt tibi mores. *Poet.*

† Reddere qui voces jam ſcit puer, & pede certo
Signat humum, geſtit paribus colludere, &c. *Ibid.*

fly

fly out into a Paſſion for nothing, to be pacified again as eaſily, and to change their Minds every quarter of an Hour, it would be a wicked thing. After the ſame manner does he treat of the Inclinations of Youths: *They*, ſays he, *delight in Horſes, Dogs, and the Field. They are prone to Vice, and can't endure to be reproved.* 'Tis only on grown up Men that he beſtows honourable and rational Inclinations. He ends all with the croſs-grained Humour of Old Men, that are covetous, fearful, impotent, dull, teſty and the like. Now what Moral Goodneſs is there in all theſe Inclinations? And yet in this that *Horace* recommends to the Poets, we are to look for that Goodneſs which *Ariſtotle* ſays is the firſt and principal thing to be obſerved in the Manners. And this is likewiſe what may be obſerved in the Idea we have propoſed of the *Poetical Goodneſs*, which conſiſts only in repreſenting the *Manners* and *Inclinations* juſt as they are, no matter whether *morally Good*, or *morally Bad*.

Horace, never ſpeaking of Vertue as a thing neceſſary, recommends the obſerving of the four Qualities in the *Manners*, which *Ariſtotle* himſelf likewiſe requires. The firſt is, that they *appear*: the ſecond, that they be *ſuitable*: the third, that they be *likely*: And the laſt, that they be *even*.

With great Reaſon then have we affirmed that the *Poetical Goodneſs* conſiſts in diſcovering to the Reader by the Speeches and Actions,

ons, all the future Inclinations and Reſolutions of the Perſonages who ſpeak and act in the Poem.

Chap. VII.

Of the three other Qualifications of the Manners.

THere is no ſuch Difficulty in the other three Qualities of the Manners in Poetry, as in the Goodneſs of them We have already explained in particular what *ſuitableneſs* they ought to have with the *Internal* or *External Cauſes*, which either raiſe or diſcover them in Men. What *Reſemblance* the Poet ought to give them, to what Hiſtory, the Fable, or Common Report, have publiſh'd of them; and laſtly, what that *Evenneſs* of them is which ought to be obſerved in each Perſonage, without permitting him to alter his Character. We ſhall ſatisfy our ſelves with only making here ſome general Reflections upon theſe three Qualities.

The firſt Reflection we make is this, that ſometimes theſe Qualities happen ſo oppoſite in one and the ſame Perſon, that if we would do Juſtice to the one, we ſhall be unjuſt to the other. An Inſtance of this may be obſerved in the Emperour *Maurice*: His Inclinations would not have been *ſuitable* to the Dignity of an Emperour, if one ſhould make him

him covetous, and they would not be like to what we know of him, if one ſhould make him magnificent and liberal. In truth there is a ſort of Avarice which Kings are capable of, to wit, the Deſire of heaping up vaſt Treaſures. Such was the Paſſion of *Polymneſtor* King of *Thrace*, which gave *Virgil* an Occaſion to ſay, * *That this inordinate Thirſt after Riches, carried Men on to ſtrange Extravagancies.* † Such was likewiſe the Paſſion of *Pygmalion* King of *Tyre*. The Queſtion here does not lie concerning this ſort of Avarice, but concerning the ſordid, baſe Niggardlineſs which coſt ſo many *Roman* Souldiers their Lives. They were Priſoners of War with the King of *Perſia*, who required but a very ſmall Ranſom for them. *Maurice* refuſes to pay it, and by this baſe, unworthy Denial of ſo ſmall a Sum for ſo weighty a Conſideration, he caſt the Conqueror into ſuch a Fit of Paſſion, that he ordered all theſe miſerable Souldiers of ſo wicked a Prince to be butchered immediately.

It may be asked then what a Poet ſhall do that he may neither offend againſt the *ſuitableneſs* of an Emperor's *Manners*, nor againſt the *Reſemblance* of them to that which is to

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* —— Quid non mortalia pectora cogis
Auri ſacra fames? *Æn.* 3.

† —— Portantur avari
Pygmalionis opes pelago. ——
Æn. 1.

be

be found in Hiſtory about them? In anſwer to this, I ſay, that a Man will not be perplex'd with theſe ſorts of Perſonages, if in the Compoſition of his Poem he will but obſerve the Method I propoſed in my firſt Book. In the firſt Place the Author will make his Fable with univerſal Perſons, and without Names, and conſequently without ſo much as thinking of *Maurice*. And when he has a mind to make the Epiſodes, and ſhall look out for particular Names to give to his Perſonages, if in his Platform he meets with a Miſer, he will not think it adviſeable to give him the Title and Dignity either of a King or an Emperor: And if in the ſame Platform he meets with a liberal and magnificent Perſon, to be ſure he will never chuſe the Emperor *Maurice* to act this Part. So that to the Queſtion propounded it may be anſwered, that the Emperor *Maurice*, whether liberal or covetous, is not one that can regularly be brought into any Poem.

But he may be made uſe of therein, if the Fable admits ſuch a thing as the diſſembling his Avarice without changing it into Liberality; according to Mr. *Corneille*'s Practice in his *Heraclius*. *Phocas* could reap ſome Advantage from this criminal Paſſion of his Enemy, and ſo render his Cruelty againſt this Prince ſomewhat leſs odious. *Maurice* did indeed know that God made uſe of this Tyrant to puniſh the Crime, which his Avarice put him upon committing: But this I doubt would have been

been againſt the *ſuitableneſs* of the *Manners*, and the Spectators would have been offended with this Reflection. The Poet has judiciouſly concealed this vicious Inclination of *Maurice*, without attributing the contrary to him, which would likewiſe have offended againſt what was *likely*.

One cannot then act contrary to the Qualities of the *Manners*, but we may ſometimes omit them; and this is the ſecond Reflection I would make upon the Subject.

When a Man omits the firſt Quality, he neceſſarily omits all the reſt; ſince that is the only Source and Foundation of them. If the Manners appear not at all, they ſhall be neither *ſuitable*, nor *likely*, nor *even*, nor the contrary. This may be done in all the Perſonages that are of no note in a Poem, ſuch as are the Multitude of Perſons juſt mentioned in Battles, and ſeveral others. Becauſe if the Poet on one ſide is obliged to relate no Action, nor incident without *Manners*, *Intereſt*, and *Paſſion*, that the *Narration* may be *active* and pleaſant, and the Minds of the Readers may attend thereto: So likewiſe ought he not to admit of any more intereſted and paſſionate Perſons, than what he is preciſely obliged to, without augmenting the Number of them, that ſo the Memory may not be over-burdened, nor the Attention diſtracted to no purpoſe. So in the *Æneid*, we ſee but little of the Manners of *Mneſtheus*, *Cloanthes*, *Meſſapus*, *Ufens*, and of ſo many valiant Commanders,

manders, and other Perſons that have conſiderable Poſts in the Poem.

When we make the Manners of a Perſon appear but only once, we may make them *ſuitable* to his Dignity, Age, and Sex, *&c.* We may make them like to what common Fame has publiſh'd of them; but 'tis plain that there can be no Equality of them, no more than there can be an Inequality: On the contrary, it ſometimes happens, that one and the ſame Perſon is of an even and uneven Temper at the ſame time. Becauſe this Character, which in moſt Men reſembles the Sun, whoſe Equality conſiſts in appearing always the ſame; * in others is like the Moon, whoſe Equality conſiſts in changing her *Phaſes* four times a Month: Sometimes this Inequality proceeds from Age, as *Horace* has obſerved in † Children and Youths. They owe this to the Softneſs and the want of due Conſiſtency of their Brains. Objects are very eaſily impreſſed upon them, and theſe Images are as eaſily wiped away by the Impreſſion of new Objects, or meerly by the Motion of the Animal Spirits. But it happens in ſome Perſons, that their Brain-pan is never cloſed ſufficiently. This was the Misfortune of *Tigellius Auguſtus*'s Fidler. It would be ill ſuiting

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*. Stultus ut Luna mutatur.

——— †. Puer mutatur in horas.

——— Juvenis amata relinquere pernix.

one's

one's ſelf to his Humour, and it would offend againſt what is likely, only to repreſent him always in the ſame Vein. He was covetous and prodigal: As proud as a King in his Dreſs, and cloathed as meanly as a Cobler. So active and diligent as to ſpend whole Nights without a wink of Sleep, and ſo lazy as to lie a Bed till the Afternoon for it. Lastly, if we would take **Horace's* Word for't, there could nothing be added to the Inequality of this Man's Humour. There is another Inequality that is more common, but comes on more ſlowly, and that is the Inequality of a Man in the different Ages of his Life. † In his Youth he never thinks of heaping up Wealth, but idly ſquanders it away. § In his riper Age he gathers it in, and lays it out as honourably. * And when he comes to be Old, he ſeeks for, and heaps up Wealth with Greedineſs, and is ſo far afraid of laying it out, that he had rather live miſerably than ſpend a Farthing upon the ordinary Neceſſaries of Life. This Inequality is of little uſe in a Poem. It ſeldom happens that a Poet repreſents one and the ſame Perſon at his fifteenth, and at his ſix-

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* Nil æquale homini fuit illi, &c. *Hor. Lib.* 1. *Sat.* 3.

† Juvenis
Utilium tardus proviſor: Prodigus æris.

§ Ætas virilis quærit opes, inſervit honori.

* Senex quærit, & inventis miſer abſtinet ac timet uti. *Hor. Poet.*

tieth

tieth Year. 'Tis the others that are of more uſe in Poems. But when a Poet introduces them, he ought to give his Hearers timely notice, that this Inequality is the expreſs Character that he gives to his Perſonage.

Terence has ſomething upon this Subject in his *Brothers* worth taking notice of. His *Demea* is a teſty and rough old Gentleman, one that keeps a ſtrict hand over his Family, and thriſty to the higheſt Degree. This was the conſtant Courſe of his whole Life, and he carried on this croſs-grained Humour to the very End of the Play. And then he thinks of being better humour'd, more endearing and obliging, and is concerned for nothing. Here is a ſtrange Inequality. Yet the Poet makes it very regular. *Demea* himſelf gives his Audience notice of it. *Never*, ſays he, *did Man caſt up the Buſineſs of his Life ſo exactly; but ſtill Experience, Years, and Cuſtom, will bring in ſome new Particulars that he was not aware of; and ſhew his Ignorance of what he thought he knew, and after Tryal make him reject his former Opinions. This is plainly my Caſe at preſent: For ſince my Glaſs is almoſt out, I renounce this rigid Life I have always led. But why ſo? Becauſe Experience ſhews me there's nothing like Gentleneſs and good Nature: And this Truth appears plainly to all that knew me and my Brother. He always ſpent his Time in Eaſe and Pleaſure; always courteous, complaiſant, ſpoke ill of no Man, but careſs'd all; liv'd as he pleaſed, ſpent*

as

as he thought fit, the World bleſs'd him, and lov'd him too: But I, that ruſtick, rigid, moroſe, pinching, brutiſh, griping Fellow, muſt needs marry; And how have I ſmarted for't? I had Children too, thoſe were new Troubles: And truly in building up their Fortunes, I have worn out my Life, and the beſt of all my Days: And now I'm juſt marching off the Stage, the Fruit of all my Labour is to be hated like a Toad. But my Brother enjoys all the Pleaſure of a Father without the Drudgery: They love him, and fly me like the Plague. Him they truſt with all their Secrets, dote upon him, live with him, but me they ſlight: They both pray for his Life, but long for my Death: Thoſe I have brought up with the greateſt Labour, he has gained with a little Coſt; ſo I take all the Pains, and he reaps all the Pleaſure. Well, well, for once we'll try what can be done, whether we can ſpeak obligingly, and act the Gentleman too; ſince my Brother urges me to't. I'de willingly have my Children love and reſpect me too; if Gifts and Compliments will do the Feat, I'll not be behind the beſt of them: But my Eſtate muſt go to wrack: What care I for that? Since I have one Foot in the Grave already.

But I enlarge too far upon a thing ſo well known as this *Comedy*. *Terence* carries on the Reflection ſtill farther, and ends it not till he ends his Play, and he is ſo cautious in it that he leaves his Audience nothing to gueſs at.

* There

* There is another Inequality of the *Manners*, that is occaſioned by the Change of a Man's Fortune, and which uſually cauſes Men to be of a low and dejected Spirit, when they are in Miſery and Diſtreſs, and fierce and proud when they are in Power, and think they are Maſters of their Fortune. A Poet may range this *Suitableneſs* in the Manners of Perſons, who are of an ordinary Vertue, and who are more inclined to be vain and proud, than truly generous; and by this Conduct the *Equality* will not be alter'd. But if he makes a Perſon generous, then he ſhould alter leſs by the Change of his Fortune. Theſe Perſonages ſhould be as bold in their worſt, as in their beſt Circumſtances; or as modeſt after a Victory as after the loſing of a Battle; according as the Poet orders either Fierceneſs or Gentleneſs to be the commanding Character he gives them.

This laſt Character is that which *Virgil* beſtows upon the *Trojans*. They appear very humble before *Dido* when the Storm had uſed them ſo ſcurvily, and brought them under the Mercy of the *Carthaginians*. † *Never imagine*, ſay they, *that we are come hither*

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* Omnibus nobis ut res dant ſeſe, ita magni atque humiles ſumus. *Terent. Hecyr. Act.* 3. *Scen.* 3.

† Non ea vis animo, nec tanta ſuperbia victis. *Æn.* 1.

with

with a Deſign to do you any Harm. Vanquiſhed Perſons, ſuch as we are, have neither Power nor Boldneſs enough to undertake any thing. This would denote a Baſeneſs of Spirit, if they appeared ſuch before their Enemies, or if they treated them with Scorn and Cruelty after they had conquered them. But we ſee 'tis true Modeſty, when we hear the ſame Language from them after a Victory. *Æneas* overcame the *Latins* in a hot Engagement, their Legates fell at his Feet beſeeching him to give them leave to burn their Dead; and he was ſo far from ſhewing the leaſt Arrogancy, * that he even excuſes his being forc'd to conquer them, and declares to them that his Deſire was only for Peace.

Let us now make a Reflection upon the *Reſemblance* the Manners ought to have with what common Fame has publiſhed of them. This Quality has this peculiar to it ſelf, that one may obſerve the reſt in all ſorts of Perſonages, and one may likewiſe commit Faults againſt them always. But there are ſome Perſons in whom there is nothing to be obſerved either for or againſt the *Reſemblance*. Theſe Perſonages are of two Sorts. The one are ſuch as are wholly invented, as are all thoſe of *Comedies*, and almoſt all the Perſonages of the *Epick Poem* and *Tragedy*, ſince in both

* Nec veni, niſi fata locum ſedemque dediſſent; Nec bellum cum gente gero, &c. *Æn.* 11.

there

there are but a few Names taken from Hiſtory or the Fable. The ſecond ſort is of ſuch that are really taken from Hiſtory, but whoſe Manners are known by few, and of whom common Fame has ſaid nothing: For in this Caſe 'tis plain, one cannot give them Inclinations, that are like or contrary to what common Fame has ſaid of them; ſince ſhe has ſaid nothing about them. So likewiſe *Ariſtotle* does not oppoſe Names taken from Hiſtory to Names that are invented, but he oppoſes to them Names that are well known. The ſame we may affirm of the Manners. *Dido* of the *Æneid* is of this ſecond ſort. The Poet having feigned in his Fable ſuch a Perſonage as we perceive this Queen to be, the Obſcurity of Hiſtory gave him entire Licenſe to make uſe of a Name ſo little known.

This Licenſe is only for ſuch as firſt make uſe of theſe Names: For thoſe who make uſe of them afterwards, are obliged to keep up the Character that was at firſt given them, and which comes to be known this way. They can only change ſome Circumſtances that are leſs known, and add other new ones, which ſhall be compatible with what one knows already of it.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the Character *of the* Personages. Aristotle's *Words about it.*

THE *Character* of a Person is that which is proper and peculiar to him, and distinguishes him from others. As this is discernable in the Lines of a Man's Face; so it is likewise to be met with in the *Manners* we are now discoursing of. That which I have met with in *Aristotle* about it, is in the same Chapter, from whence we cited that which has been already said about the *Manners.* * *Since,* says he, *Tragedy is an Imitation of what is best amongst Men, we ought to do like good Painters, who when they give each Person his proper Form and Character, and so make their Figures like them, do likewise represent them much fairer. In like manner should the Poet*

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* Ἐπεὶ δὲ μίμησίς ἐστιν ἡ Τραγῳδία βελτιόνων, ἡμᾶς δεῖ μιμεῖσθαι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς εἰκονογράφους. Καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι ἀποδιδόντες τὴν οἰκείαν μορφὴν ὁμοίους ποιοῦντες καλλίους γράφουσι. Οὕτω καὶ τὸν ποιητὴν μιμούμενον καὶ ὀργίλους, καὶ ῥαθύμους καὶ τ' ἄλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντας ἐπὶ τῶν ἠθῶν, ἐπιεικείας ποιεῖν παράδειγμα ἢ σκληρότητος δεῖ. οἷος τὴν Ἀχιλλέα ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὁ Ὅμηρος. Ταῦτα δὴ δεῖ διαστηρεῖν· καὶ πρὸς τούτοις, τὰς παρὰ τὰ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀκολουθούσας αἰσθήσεις τῇ ποιητικῇ, καὶ γὰρ κατ' αὐτάς ἐστιν ἁμαρτάνειν πολλάκις. Poet. c. 15.

form

form Examples of Goodneſs or of Hardheartedneſs, when he imitates a paſſionate and cholerick, or a ſoft and mild natur'd Man, or any other ſuch like Character. 'Tis after this manner that Homer *himſelf has attributed Goodneſs to* Achilles. *Care muſt be taken of this, and beſides without ſpeaking here of what is neceſſary, 'tis requiſite to obſerve the Series and the Conſequence that is in Poetry, wherein we are ſubject to commit ſeveral Faults.*

Every one knows what Affinity there is between *Painting* and *Poetry*. *Horace* begins his Art with it, and *Ariſtotle* likewiſe compares them both together in the very firſt Chapter of his *Poetry*. He ſpeaks of it in ſeveral other Places, and by this which we have here cited 'tis plain his Judgment is, that one cannot perceive a more perfect Idea of the *Poetical Character* in the *Manners*, than by the Practice of *Painters* in the *Character* which they give to their Pictures. If we would underſtand his Mind exactly, we cannot do it better than by enquiring in the Art, how one may draw a Portraicture perfectly like its Original, and which at the ſame time ſhould be finer? I'll venture to give my Thoughts about it.

Painters in their Perſonages have three ſorts of Subjects. Either they repreſent particular Perſons to the Life, ſuch as *Auguſtus*, young *Marcellus*, *Virgil*, *Seneca*, *Paulinus*, &c. Or they repreſent Dignities and ſuch like Characters, as a King, a Philoſopher, a Miniſter of

State, a Poet, a Valet, a Beggar, &c. Or laſtly, they repreſent a Paſſion, ſuch as Anger, Joy, Diſcontent, Cruelty, &c.

We may add that Painters and Poets, of an elevated Fancy, are more for drawing Kings, Princes, and things of State and Grandeur: And that the leſs noble Genius of others, puts them upon the Choice of Valets, Drunkards, and deſpicable Perſons. *Ariſtotle* attributes the Variety of *Dramatick Poems*, and the Invention of *Tragedy* and *Comedy*, to the Diverſity of Genius's. The firſt would doubtleſs make finer Perſonages than the laſt. But this makes no difference as to the exact Likeneſs of the Characters. But the one, and the other may meet with equal Succeſs as well in the Baſeneſs and Deformity of *Irus* and *Therſites*, as in the Majeſty and Bon mien of *Agamemnon* and *Paris*.

But we cannot here make any uſe of this Difference, and this Interpretation, ſince *Ariſtotle* ſpeaks only of Poems, and famous Perſons: And we can without quitting *Tragedy* and the *Epopea* meet with this Difference of more or leſs Comelineſs in an exact *Likeneſs*.

Two things are conſiderable in the Perſons one would paint. The firſt are the Features which we may call *Characteriſtical*: Such are the natural Wrinkles of the Face, the Proportion of each Part, the Colour of the Eyes and Hair, the Shape of the Noſe, the Thickneſs of the Lips, the Wideneſs of the Mouth, and other ſuch like Properties. This is what

ſhould

ſhould properly and chiefly fix the Imagination, and give it the Idea of the Perſon we would repreſent. 'Tis abſolutely neceſſary that theſe Features be obſerved in the Copy, to make it more like the Original; and 'tis of theſe that the Expreſſion of *Ariſtotle* is to be underſtood [*Giving to each Perſon the Character that is proper to him.*] Theſe *Characteriſtical Features* are ſo far fix'd in compariſon to the reſt, that they continue the ſame even in the Change of Ages and Sexes; and they eaſily diſcover the Fathers by the Countenance of their Children, and the Mothers by that of their Sons.

The ſecond thing is a great deal leſs permanent, and leſs affix'd to its Subject, and conſequently leaves a Painter more to his own Liberty. 'Tis the Colour of the Fleſh, the Plumpneſs, and ſeveral other things, that augment or diminiſh the Beauty of a Perſon without changing the Features, and the Proportion of his Countenance. There are ſome, whom a pale Colour would better become than a fairer Complexion; or who would be much more taking, were they made a little Fatter, or a little Leaner. There needs only a ſlight Diſtemper, a Diſturbance, or a few Days of Diverſion to produce theſe Alterations. So that a skilful Painter will conſider a Perſon under different States, and with thoſe various Motions which may naturally happen to him. And having obſerv'd what becomes him beſt, he will paint him in ſome Action

or other, wherein he ſhall be a little mov'd with Fear or Anger, according as he has a Mind to make him more pale or more lively than the Original: Or elſe he will give him a ſmiling Countenance, if he perceives the Perſon has ſome Defect which a Smile would conceal, *&c.* After this manner, without altering the natural Reſemblance, Painters *repreſent Perſons more comely than they are.*

Theſe two, whereof one makes the Picture like to, and the other makes it more comely than the Original, which we have applied to particular Perſons, may likewiſe be applied to whole Orders of Men according to their Dignities, Ages, Paſſions, and other Habitudes. The Throne, Diadem, Scepter, and Majeſty, make up the Character of a King. But there are ſome Perſons, and Faces, that carry a great deal more Majeſty in them than others, and on whom a Crown ſits a great deal better. Nature has made no old Man but what carries in his Countenance the Character of his Age: But ſhe has made ſome Venerable and Auguſt, and others Contemptible and Diſtaſtful. There are ſome Perſons whom Anger renders more Comely, tho' commonly this Paſſion very much diſfigures the Countenance.

A Painter then in the various Countenances he ſees, being ſtock'd with ſo many different Subjects which may ſerve him as a Ground-Work to keep up the Characters we have been diſcourſing of, if he is a good Painter, he will not be contented with a Sceptre and

a Crown, with Wrinkles and gray Hairs, and with the Features that in general are proper to an incenſed Perſon: But he will ſtudy upon divers Complexions, thoſe that under theſe Characters will be the moſt taking, and will make Choice of thoſe whom Nature has made Venerable and Auguſt, and in whom even without a Crown, one may diſcern ſomething of Majeſty and Royalty.

There is another way of embelliſhing a *Character*, and that is by deducing the Agreeableneſs of it from the very Eſſence and Properties of the *Character* it ſelf. Anger makes Men look pale or red; it makes them gnaſh their Teeth, fall foul upon every thing they meet with, tear themſelves, and expreſs ſuch Motions and Poſtures as are ſtrange, terrible, and extravagant. But 'tis not always attended with theſe Effects. It has ſome more moderate ones: And 'tis at the Painters Choice to make uſe of thoſe which he pleaſes, and to reject the more violent ones, if his Deſign requires them not, and to expreſs the moſt moving, the moſt pleaſant, and the leſs irregular ones.

His Liberty is ſometimes more, ſometimes leſs. When he repreſents one ſingle Perſonage, and invents the Deſign as he pleaſes, then all depends upon him, and if he ſucceeds not, he is to blame. But if one ſhould require a Story of him, and determine the Perſons for him, then he will be often perplex'd in a great many things by the very Eſſence of his

Subject, which permits him not to make uſe of certain Beauties, which would be very advantageous to him. A King preſerves his Gravity beſt in a moderate Paſſion, but *Agamemnon* is not capable of this Moderation in the Sacrifice of *Iphigenia*. The Beauty of *Helen* and that of *Paris* would be more conſpicuous by Day-light, than by Torch-light, but yet 'tis neceſſary that this Princeſs ſhould be carry'd off in the Night. *Europa*, ſmiling amidſt the Nymphs and Flowers, would be more comely: But would any one repreſent her ſo when carried into the midſt of the Sea upon a Bull. A Painter might come off with Succeſs in the raviſhing of *Helen*, if one would give him Liberty to make Choice of a Model; he would likewiſe ſucceed in the Portraicture of a Perſon that he draws to the Life, if he invents the Shadows, the Poſture, and the Action thereof: And he would come come off but pitifully were he obliged to join theſe two things together, and to give to *Helen*, when raviſh'd, the Countenance of a Perſon, that he had painted with Succeſs in a contrary Action.

The Conſtraint is ſtill greater, if one ſhould repreſent ſeveral Actions of one and the ſame Story, and if one ſhould paint the carrying off of *Europa* in four Tables. For the ſame Features of one ſingle Perſon will ſerve as a Foundation of moderate Joy, a dreadful Fright, a mortal Confuſion, and a miraculous and pleaſant Surprize.

The

The great Poems are of this laſt Sort. The ſeveral *Epiſodes*, wherein we ſee the ſame Perſon act, are as ſo many Tables, wherein the ſame *Character* of one ſingle Countenance ought to ſerve as a Foundation to the different Characters of oppoſite Paſſions. *Achilles* is repreſented at the Council Board, in the Fight, and at the Funeral Solemnities of his Friend. The Poet has not made his Hero ſage and prudent in this firſt Table; he has not made him proud in the Ceremonies and Religion of the laſt; that ſo he might be leſs angry and paſſionate than in the Battle. This Variety of Characters would have made three *Achilles's*, and would have had ſomething of the Ignorance of a Painter, who willing to paint *Achilles* in theſe three different Adventures, would chuſe for his Model three Countenances that had no relation to each other, and would repreſent one of them entire in each Table. But *Homer* at the Council Board gives *Agamemnon* Occaſion to provoke *Achilles*, who is preſently tranſported with Anger againſt him, and who begins to revenge himſelf by affronting and venting ſeditious Reproaches againſt him. And in the Funeral of *Patroclus*, the Ceremony that is moſt viſible is the Cruelty which *Achilles* ſhews to the Body of the brave and unhappy *Hector*, which he ties by the Heels to his Chariot, and for twelve Days together inhumanely drags about the Tomb of his Friend. Thus is *Achilles* always the ſame, and is no leſs Cholerick and Revengeful

at the Council Board, and the Funeral Solemnities, than in War and Battle.

The Poet then, in the Conſtitution of his Fable, ought to mind what he is obliged to, and what *Character* it requires: He will afterwards examine all its Parts, and all the *Epiſodes* it preſents to him. He will ſee which of them he can apply to his Character, or to which he can apply it; * by this means making Choice of thoſe that are for his Turn, and rejecting the others, (as *Homer* has done in the Amours of *Achilles* and *Briſeis*, with which the very Eſſence of his Fable furniſh'd him.) Thus having entirely diſcovered all the Lineaments of his Character that are indiſpenſably annex'd to the very Eſſence of his Fable, and to his Subject, he is oblig'd to keep to them as their proper Form, wherein does eſſentially conſiſt the Reſemblance of his Fable to the probable Action which he would imitate; let it be in the Perſons, or in the Dignities, or in the Paſſions, or any other things that are capable of a *Character*. This is the firſt thing a Poet is obliged to. The ſecond is to examine all the other Circumſtances of his Character, which the Eſſence of his Fable does not make neceſſary, and which are as the Colours of a more or leſs Paleneſs and

* Hoc amet, hoc ſpernat promiſſi carminis autor. *Hor. Poet.*

Redneſs,

Redneſs, the Complexion whereof may naturally change. He will diſcover thoſe that are moſt capable of rendring his *Character* pleaſant, and his Perſonages good, even in a moral Senſe, and he will make uſe of them, and not of the others. 'Tis by this means that without altering the Reſemblance, and the Juſtneſs of the Character, a good Poet, like a good Painter, will make his Perſonages better, and a ſorry Poet like a ſorry Painter, will make them worſe than they are. 'Tis thus that *Homer* himſelf has made his *Achilles* good, as we have obſerved.

One may underſtand and interpret the Text of *Ariſtotle* in a Senſe different from that which I propoſed in the Beginning of the Chapter: But it will ſtill ſuit with the Doctrine I have drawn from thence. The other Interpretation is this, *When a Poet imitates a paſſionate Man, or a mild and good humour'd Perſon, or any other Character, he ought rather to propoſe to himſelf Models of Goodneſs, than of Hard-heartedneſs*, &c.

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

Of the Characters of Achilles, Ulyſſes, *and* Æneas.

ARISTOTLE propoſes *Homer's Achilles* to us, to teach us the way of making the imitated Perſonage like the Original which we propoſe to our ſelves; in ſuch a manner that this *Reſemblance*, which may be attended with Deformity and Vice, or Beauty and Virtue, have that which is the moſt perfect of theſe Qualities: We have already taken notice that the *Reſemblance* conſiſts in this Part of the Character which is proper and neceſſary to the Fable, and which the Subject obliges indiſpenſably to be obſerved; and that the Beauty or the Goodneſs *Ariſtotle* ſpeaks of, and which he diſtinguiſhes from the *Reſemblance*, conſiſts in the Circumſtances of the Character, which are not neceſſarily contain'd in the Eſſence of the Fable. This is what we are more fully to diſcover in the Practice of *Homer* and his *Iliad*, to which *Ariſtotle* refers us, that ſo we may inſtruct our ſelves, where he himſelf learn'd his Inſtructions.

We have ſufficiently made it appear, that *Achilles* ought to be paſſionate, unjuſt, and inexorable. The Fable neceſſarily requires this; 'tis that renders his Manners *Bad*, and ſo unworthy a Man of Honour. But they have nothing

nothing in them that is irregular, or contrary to the Precepts of *Ariſtotle*, ſince he requires Goodneſs only in the Circumſtances, where the Poet is at his Liberty, and ſince he blames Vice only when 'tis not neceſſary. So that this is that, which I call part of the Character which renders *Achilles* like to the Idea, which the Poet form'd of him, when he laid down the firſt Model of his Fable.

But the *Fable* leaves the Poet to chuſe the Circumſtances which may either raiſe and embelliſh the *Character*, or render it more deform'd and odious. *Achilles* that is paſſionate, inexorable, and unjuſt, might be likewiſe fearful, and cowardly, and have reveng'd himſelf by betraying his Party. He might have given ſome ſecret Intelligence to his Enemies, he might have receiv'd them into his Quarters, or have injur'd his Allies by any other wicked Practices; which might have occaſioned a great deal of Miſchief to have fallen upon the *Greeks*, *Agamemnon*, and himſelf, and which might have been no Hindrance to his Reconciliation. For ſuppoſe the *Greeks* without *Achilles* were ſtronger than the *Trojans*, in this Caſe their Diſadvantage and Loſſes would only have happened by the Treachery of this Hero. And the Treachery ending with this Reconciliation, the Valour of the *Greeks* might have got them the Victory. The Fable would not have been leſs juſt, nor have had leſs of the Moral and Inſtructions than that it at preſent contains.

Thus

Thus the Essence and the Justness of the Fable leaves the Poet at his full Liberty to make Choice either of the Valour or the Cowardice of *Achilles*, for to degrade or raise his Character; and 'tis to this Choice, that the Precept of *Aristotle* refers, when he orders Poets to imitate good Painters, who, always preserving whatever the Character has that is necessary or proper to the Subject, raise it by all the Embellishments 'tis capable of. If *Homer* had chose to have made his Hero cowardly, rather than valiant, he would have offended against what *Aristotle* orders here and elsewhere, *viz.* Never to represent a Personage that is wicked, without Necessity forces one to it. But this great Poet's Practice is not thus. As unjust, and as passionate as the Anger of his Hero was, and tho' 'twas so pernicious to his Allies, and to *Patroclus* himself, yet he has done nothing herein, but what is necessary. He has observ'd in this Character what his Fable indispensibly oblig'd him to. But for as much as it has left him at his Liberty therein, he has made use of it so far to the Advantage of his Hero, that he has almost conceal'd his great Vices by the dazling Show of a miraculous Valour which has deceived so many Persons.

This Goodness may be likewise added to the Difference we put between the *Epick Fable*, and those of *Æsop*, for 'tis neither necessary nor congruous in these last. The Heroes there may be intirely vicious.

'Tis

'Tis eaſier to diſcover what Goodneſs there is in the Characters of *Ulyſſes*, and *Æneas*, ſince the very Eſſence of the Fable requires Goodneſs and Virtue: But yet 'tis ſtill neceſſary to know the Practice of our Poets in the Character they have given them.

The Fable of the *Odyſſeis* is all for the Conduct of a State, and for Policy. Therefore the Quality it requires is *Prudence*; but this Virtue is of too large an Extent for the Simplicity which a juſt and preciſe Character requires; it is requiſite it ſhould be limited. The great Art of Kings is the Myſtery of *Diſſimulation*. 'Tis well known that *Lewis* the eleventh for the Inſtruction of his Son, reduced all the *Latin Language* to theſe Words only, *viz. Qui neſcit diſſimulare, neſcit regnare.* 'Twas likewiſe by this Practice that *Saul* began his Reign, when he was elected, and then full of the Spirit of God. The firſt thing we read of him in Holy Writ is, * that he made as if he did not hear the Words, which ſeditious People ſpoke againſt him.

This then is the Character which the *Greek* Poet gives his *Ulyſſes* in the Propoſition of his Poem, he calls him ἄνδρα πολύτροπον; to denote this prudent Diſſimulation, which diſguiſed him ſo many ways, and put him upon taking ſo many Shapes.

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* Ille vero diſſimulabat ſe audire. *Reg. lib.* 1.

Without

Without mentioning any thing of *Circe* who ſtay'd him with her a whole Year, and who was famous for the Transformations ſhe knew to make with all ſorts of Perſons: The Reader finds him at firſt with *Calypſo*, the Daughter of wiſe † *Atlas*, who bore up the vaſt Pillars that reached from Earth to Heaven, and whoſe Knowledge penetrated into the Depths of the unfathomable Ocean: That is to ſay, who was ignorant of nothing that was either in Heaven, Earth, or Sea. And as the firſt Product and principal Part of ſo high, ſo ſolid, and ſo profound a Knowledge was, to know how to conceal ones ſelf; this wiſe Man call'd his Daughter by a Name that ſignified a * *Secret*. The Poet makes his Hero, which he deſign'd for a Politician, to ſtay ſeven whole Years with this Nymph. She taught him ſo well, that afterwards he loſt no Opportunity of putting her Leſſons in Practice: For he does nothing without a Diſguiſe. At his parting from *Ogyges* he is caſt upon the Iſle of *Pheaca*: As kind as his Reception was, yet he ſtays till the Night before he went off, ere he would diſcover himſelf. From thence he goes to *Ithaca*. The firſt

† Ἄτλαντος δυσάτης ὀλοόφρονος, ὅστε θαλάσσης
Πάσης βένθεα οἶδεν, ἔχει δ' οὐρανὸν αὐτὸς
Μακρὸν, καὶ γαῖαν τε καὶ ἠερόεντα κάρηνα ἔχουσι. Odyſſ. lib 1.

* Καλυψὼ.

Adven-

Adventure that happens to him there, was with *Minerva*, the moſt prudent among the Deities, as *Ulyſſes* was the moſt prudent among Men. * She her ſelf ſays thus much in this very Paſſage. Nor did they fail to diſguiſe themſelves. *Minerva* takes upon her the Shape of a Shepherd, and *Ulyſſes* tells her he was oblig'd to fly from *Crete*, becauſe he had murder'd the Son of King *Idomeneus*. The Goddeſs diſcovers her ſelf firſt, and commends him for that theſe Artifices were ſo eaſy, and ſo natural to him, as if they had been born with him. Afterwards the Hero under the Form of a Beggar deceives firſt of all *Eumæus*, then his Son, and laſt of all his Wife, and every Body elſe, till he had found an Opportunity of puniſhing his Enemies, to whom he diſcovered not himſelf till he kill'd them, that is the laſt Night. After his diſcovering himſelf in his Palace, he goes the next Day to deceive his Father, appearing at firſt under a borrow'd Name, before he would give him Joy of his Return. Thus he takes upon him all manner of Shapes, and diſſembles to the very laſt. The Poet joins to this *Character* a † Valour and a Conſtancy which

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*Εἰδότες ἄμφω Κέρδε· σὺ μὲν ἐσσὶ βροτῶν ὄχ' ἄριστος & ἀπάντων βουλῇ καὶ μύθοισιν· ἐγὼ δ' ἐν πᾶσι θεοῖσι Μήτι τε κλέομαι καὶ κέρδεσιν. Od. l. 13.

† Aſpera multa Pertulit adverſis rerum immerſabilis undis.

renders

renders him invincible in the moſt daring and deſperate Adventures.

The Fable of the *Æneid* is quite different from the two *Greek* ones. The Poets Deſign was to introduce among the *Romans* a new ſort of Government, and a new Maſter. 'Twas requiſite then that this new Maſter ſhould have all the Qualities, which the Founder of a State ought to have, and all the Virtues which make a Prince belov'd.

Diſſimulation is a wrong Method. We bear but little Love to a Man we diſtruſt, and thoſe who love *Ulyſſes*, love him only after they had had a long Experience of his Goodneſs, and of the Good-will his Father bore towards them. But the Hero of *Virgil* had only new Subjects, as *Auguſtus Cæſar* has, and by the way, I ſhall here ſay, that the Latin Poet was more ſtraitned in this than *Homer*, and that he was like to thoſe Painters, who ought to ſuit their Stories to the Model of a Countenance we have preſcrib'd them. *Æneas* then ought only to give his Subjects Signs of Sincerity and Frankneſs. He could not have the Character of *Achilles*. The Violences of *Achilles* were entirely oppoſite to the Deſign of the *Æneid*; and the Poet has judiciouſly aſſign'd them to *Turnus* and *Mezentius*, which he oppoſes to his Hero. He was therefore oblig'd to a Character that is oppoſite to that, as we have often and often ſaid.

So that the Character of *Achilles* is the inexorable Anger of a revengeful, unjuſt, and valiant

valiant Prince; That of *Ulyſſes* is the wiſe, and prudent Diſſimulation of a valiant King, whoſe Conſtancy nothing could ſhock. And that of *Æneas* is a mild, and good natur'd Piety, upheld as the two others by a Valour and an unſhaken Courage.

Chap. X.

The Character *of the other* Perſonages.

ALL the Perſons in a Picture do not appear in an equal Degree. The principal Perſonage muſt always appear above the reſt, and be view'd at his full Length, as far as Art and Perſpective will admit. Some others appear almoſt as much. There are others that are half hid, or which appear more or leſs, and there are ſome likewiſe which ſerve only to repreſent a great number of Perſons, whoſe extream Parts are the only things we can diſtinguiſh, and which ſhew that there is ſome Body there. Laſtly, ſome are very near, and are ſeen diſtinctly, and others are at ſuch a Diſtance as confounds the Features, and the very Members themſelves, and gives them rather the Colour of the Air than their own proper Hue. As for thoſe that are near, a conſiderable Part whereof we ſee, 'tis neceſſary that they ſhould wear either in their Countenance or their Poſture, the Character that is proper to them, and make it appear what Intereſt they

they have in the Action which is repreſented. As for the reſt, the leſs is ſeen of them, the leſs is one likewiſe oblig'd to make them known.

The Caſe is juſt the ſame in the *Epopea*. The Poet leaves the greateſt part of his Actors in Obſcurity, and at a Diſtance; but beſide his Hero, to whom he has a particular Regard, there are likewiſe ſeveral others, whoſe Character muſt be ſet off in a greater or leſs Light, according to the Intereſt he makes them have, following in this the Rules which we have apply'd to the Hero. We will take notice of the Differences by what follows.

Dido is the chief Perſonage which the Poet preſents us with, and the moſt conſiderable in the firſt part of the *Æneid*, ſince 'tis ſhe that makes the Intrigue or Plot thereof. She is the Foundreſs of *Carthage*, as *Æneas* is the Founder of *Rome*, and ſhe repreſents the Obſtacle which this Republick laid in the way of the *Roman* Victories, which were to raiſe that State to be Miſtreſs of the World. So then, as *Æneas* bore the Character of *Rome*, ſo ſhould *Dido* of *Carthage*. Therefore ſhe is paſſionate, bold, daring, ambitious, violent, perfidious: And all theſe Qualities are carry'd on by a Craftineſs which is the very Soul and Character of her. 'Tis by her Craftineſs that ſhe ſucceeded ſo well in her great Undertakings, in revenging her Husband, puniſhing her Brother, and deceiving of King *Iarbas*. 'Tis

'Tis by theſe very Wiles ſhe would ſtop *Æneas*'s Journey, and being not able to compaſs that, deceivcs her very Siſter who was her only Confident.

This Character is vicious and odious. *Virgil* was oblig'd to it by the very Nature of his Fable. But in the Liberty it has given him, he has taken Care according to *Ariſtotle*'s Maxim, to give this Character all the Softneſs that is proper to his Subject; and to raiſe it by all the Beauties he found it capable of receiving. *Dido* does not make uſe of the Wickedneſs of her Temper, but only to ſtay *Æneas* at *Carthage*: She is inclin'd thereto by the Violence of a Paſſion that renders this Action leſs odious, and which puts the Readers upon lamenting and pitying the Torments ſhe endures, and the * Death ſhe condemn'd her ſelf to. Elſewhere he makes her Exerciſe her Craftineſs, only upon noble, lawful, and glorious Occaſions. † He gives her Qualities truly Royal. She is magnificent, courteous, and has a great Eſteem for Virtue. All this is to be obſerv'd in that obliging way whereby ſhe entertain'd the *Trojans* before ever ſhe had ſeen *Æneas*.

In the ſecond Part of the Poem there are a great many more intereſted Perſons than in the firſt. *Latinus* is a very good and pious

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* Quin morere ut merita es. *Æn.* 4.

† Sunt hic ſua præmia laudi. *Æn.* 1.

Prince,

Prince, but old and without Sons. This gives the Queen an Occaſion of diſobeying his Orders, and *Turnus* a Deſire of being his Son-in-Law in ſpite of him, and of forcing the good old Man to proclaim War againſt *Æneas*, and of making uſe of his Subjects, his Arms, and his Authority. This Default of Authority is natural and ordinary among Kings that have no Heirs.

Amata pretends to have a kind of Right of diſpoſing of her Daughter. She is ſtrangely affected for her Kinſman *Turnus*. She was ſo obſtinately bent upon having him for her Son-in-Law, that ſhe had rather die than change her Reſolution. This Obſtinacy of the Woman put her upon taking all manner of Shapes, keeps up her Anger and her Violence, and is the principal Character the Poet gives her.

The Character of *Turnus* is the ſame with that of * *Achilles*, as far as the Alteration of the Deſign, and the Difference of the Fable, would admit. 'Tis a young Man, furious, and paſſionate for a Damſel that a Rival would rob him of. † His Mind is all upon Arms and War, without troubling his Head whether it be juſt, or whether the Want of

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* Alius Latio jam partus Achilles. *Æn.* 6.

† Arma amens fremit, arma thoro tectiſque requirit;
Sævit amor ferri, & ſcelerata inſania belli. *Æneid.* 7.

Juſtice,

Juſtice, and the contrary Order of the Gods make it criminal and impious. He ſuffers himſelf to be tranſported with Anger, the moſt prevailing of all his Paſſions. This is the firſt Idea our Poet gives of him, and which he always keeps up very carefully. He is leſs of a Soldier, and more of a General than *Achilles*. But this General in Office ſometimes forgot himſelf to act the part of a private Soldier. * Had it not been for this, he might have put an End to the War the very ſecond Day, when breaking into the Entrenchments of *Æneas*, which he beſieg'd, his Fury made him forget to keep the Paſſage open for his own Men, as he might eaſily have done. So far is it true that Anger is his principal Character. He was ſo full of the Idea of *Achilles*, and ſo far maſter of his Spirit, that he brags of being like him. † *Go*, ſays he to *Pandarus*, when he kill'd him, *Go tell* Priam *thou haſt met with a ſecond* Achilles *here.* The Poet makes uſe of theſe Artifices to ſhew the Readers what ſort of Humour *Turnus* was of.

* Et ſi continuo victorem ea cura ſubiſſet,
Rumpere clauſtra manu, ſocioſque immittere portis:
Ultimus ille dies bello gentique fuiſſet.
Sed furor ardentem cædiſque inſana cupido
Egit in adverſos. *Æn.* 9.

† Hic etiam inventum Priamo narrabis Achillem. *Æneid* 9.

The

The Character of this Hero has likewiſe this Injuſtice of *Achilles*, in that, from his own particular Quarrel he raiſes a general War, renders his Anger pernicious to both Parties, and more to his own than to that of the Enemy, and expoſes ſo many Thouſand Innocents for his ſingle Intereſt. The Blackneſs of this Character is ſhaded, as the Vices of *Achilles*, by the Luſtre of a wonderful Courage.

This may ſuffice without ſpeaking of the other Perſonages; one may apply to them whatever we have ſaid here concerning the *Manners* and the *Character*.

Chap. XI.

What the Character *is.*

FRom what has been ſaid we may infer, that in the *Epick Poem* the *Character* is not properly any particular Vertue or Quality, but a Compoſition of ſeveral, which are mix'd together in a different Degree with the Ornaments and Beauty 'tis capable of, obſerving the Neceſſity of the Fable, and the Unity of the Action.

All the Qualities that go toward the making this Compoſition, cannot be all of the ſame Claſs, nor be equal among themſelves. Becauſe one carrying the Hero upon one Encounter, and another upon another Encounter,

ter, the *Character* will ſeem varied, and the Poem as well as the Hero will look like a Body animated with ſeveral Souls. 'Tis requiſite then there ſhould be one commanding Quality to Rule the reſt, and be the Soul of them, and that this appear throughout. After the ſame manner as a Hero being painted in divers Fables ought to be diſcern'd in all, and to have the ſame Features in his Countenance, let his Poſtures and his Paſſions be never ſo different. This commanding Quality in *Achilles* is his *Anger*, in *Ulyſſes* the *Art of Diſſimulation*, and in *Æneas Meekneſs*. Each of theſe may by way of Eminence be ſtyl'd *the Character* in theſe Heroes.

But theſe *Characters* cannot be alone. 'Tis abſolutely neceſſary that ſome other ſhould give them a Luſtre and embelliſh them, as far as they are capable: Either by hiding the Defects that are therein by ſome noble and ſhining Qualities, as the Poet has done the Anger of *Achilles*, by ſhading it with an extraordinary Valour; or making them entirely of the Nature of a true and ſolid Vertue, as is to be obſerv'd in the two others. The *Diſſimulation* of *Ulyſſes* is a part of his Prudence, and the *Meekneſs* of *Æneas* is wholly employ'd in ſubmitting the Will of this Hero to the Gods. For the making up this Union our Poets have join'd together ſuch Qualities as are by Nature the moſt compatible. *Valour* with *Anger*, *Piety* with *Goodneſs*, and *Prudence* with *Diſſimulation*. This laſt Union

was neceſſary for the Goodneſs of *Ulyſſes*, for without that his *Diſſimulation* might have degenerated into Wickedneſs and Knavery.

Beſides, the Fable requir'd Prudence in *Ulyſſes*, and Piety in *Æneas*, as we before obſerv'd. In this the Poets were not left to their Choice. But *Homer* might have made *Achilles* not valiant. The Cowardice of this Hero would have abated nothing of the Juſtneſs of his Fable. So that 'tis the Neceſſity he lay under of adorning his Character, and of not making *Achilles* vicious, where there was no need for it, that oblig'd him to give him the Title of *Valiant*.

The Valour then as well as the Prudence, and the Piety in the other two Poems, which are the ſecondary Qualities we have been ſpeaking of, make up the Goodneſs of each Hero, and communicate this ſame Goodneſs to the whole Poem. But if on the one hand, this ſecondary Quality is an Ornament to the firſt, on the other it receives ſuch a Determination from it, as makes its Extent leſs, but withal more juſt; a Hero may be endu'd with a peaceful, generous, and *Roman* Valour, which is ready to pardon Injuries upon Submiſſion. Such is the Valour of *Æneas*. He may likewiſe be endued with a cholerick, cruel, brutiſh, and inexorable Valour which never pardons, and had rather its Vengeance ſhould fall upon its Friends, than ſpare one ſingle Enemy, and this is the Valour and Character of *Achilles*.

But

But ſhould we conſider theſe two Qualities a-part, for to know which of them deſerves chiefly to be ſtyl'd the *Character*, we ſhall preſently exclude Valour, ſince 'tis neither eſſential to the Fable, nor does *Achilles* make any Shew of it, but keeps it without Action for above half the Poem: Nor laſtly does the Poet ſing it. But he ſings the *Anger*, and this Anger is neceſſary to the Fable, at leaſt it is predominant as much during the Abſence of *Achilles*, as when he is re-united to the *Grecians*, and fights in Perſon. So Prudence is not the principal part of the *Character* of *Ulyſſes*, ſince the Poet does not ſing a prudent Man, but a Man that changes himſelf into all ſorts of Forms. We may likewiſe ſay, that the *Meekneſs* of *Æneas* is his chief Quality, tho' the Word *Pius* which the Poet makes uſe of, ſignifies equally *Meekneſs* and *Piety*.

To theſe two Qualities muſt a third be joined to ſupport them, and carry on the Character with greater Force. A Prince will be to no purpoſe good and pious, or prudent and diſſembling, if he is not Valiant and Brave: He will meet with many invincible Difficulties. Without Valour *Æneas* would have been routed by *Turnus*, and *Ulyſſes* would have fainted under a hundred Hardſhips. *Valour* then is neceſſary to produce great Deſigns, and to put them in Execution. But there is no need to dwell long on this Subject. The Conſequences thereof are very clear.

We conclude then, that the *Character* of the Hero in the *Epick Poem*, is compounded of three ſorts of Qualities. Thoſe of the firſt ſort are neceſſary and eſſential to the Fable. That of the ſecond are the Ornaments of it. Valour which ſupports both makes the third ſort. The firſt, which is the Principal, muſt be ſome Univerſal Quality, ſuch as ſhould be met with in all ſorts of Occaſions and Encounters, and ſuch as ſhould make the Hero known throughout.

In the *Character* of the other Perſonages there is likewiſe ſome Compoſition, for one ſingle Quality can never exactly diſtinguiſh one Perſon from others, unleſs it be determin'd by ſome other that may render it proper and ſingular. But 'tis not neceſſary that Valour or any other noble Inclination, ſhould be admitted into theſe leſſer Characters. I ſee nothing that's Noble or Good in *Therſites*, *Amata*, or in that Number of dull Souls in the *Odyſſeis*: and without mentioning theſe laſt, or *Drances* in whom the Poets have not expreſs'd the leaſt Valour; the Women that are introduced into Poems, do manifeſtly exclude the Neceſſity of this Warlike Quality.

CHAP. XII.

Chap. XII.

Of the Unity of the Character in the Hero.

THe exactneſs of our Poets preſents us with an *Unity* in the Character, which we cannot paſs by without a Reflection. It is obſerv'd in the Conduct of the Hero in particular, and that of the whole Poem; and I fanſy one might apply to both the firſt Rule of *Horace*, which orders that every thing be reduc'd to a *Simplicity* and *Unity*. It ſeems indeed, as if the Character were as much the Life and Soul of the Hero, and the whole Action, as the Fable is of the Poem, and conſequently it ſeems to require as exact an *Unity*. We will begin with the Hero's Character. We have already hinted at this *Unity of the Character* in the Perſonages, when we ſaid that the *Manners* ought to be *even* or *equal*. If we would ſuppoſe the *Equality* of the *Manners*, and the *Unity* of the Character to be one and the ſame thing, then in treating of this point under the Title of the *Equality of the Manners*, I had forgot what I have here added under this Head of the *Unity of the Character*. I ſaid there, that the Equality conſiſted in giving no one Perſon ſuch Sentiments as were contrary to one another. But I add here, that this is not ſufficient for the Unity of the Character, and that 'tis

moreover neceſſary, that the ſame Spirit appear in all ſorts of Encounters, whether ſimilar, contrary, or others.

Thus *Æneas* for inſtance, acting with a great deal of Piety and Mildneſs in the firſt part of his Poem, which requires no other Character, and afterwards making a great Shew of an Heroical Valour in the Wars of the ſecond part, but without any Appearance either of a hard or a ſoft Diſpoſition, would doubtleſs be far from offending againſt what we have laid down about the *Equality* of the *Manners:* But yet there would be no *Simplicity* or *Unity* in this Character. So that beſides the *Qualities*, that claim their particular place upon different Occaſions, there muſt be one appearing throughout which commands over all the reſt. Without this we may affirm 'tis no Character. And this is what would be that Poet's Fate, that would give his Hero the *Piety* of *Æneas*, and the *Valour* of *Achilles*, without reflecting on the mild Temper of the one, or the hard Nature of the other.

Or to ſpeak more properly, this Poet could by no means give his Hero the Qualities of the two other Hero's. There is a great deal of difference between a Face in general, and the Face of *Æneas* in particular, between a Fore-head, a Noſe, a Mouth, and an Eye in general, and the Fore-head, Eyes, Noſe, and Mouth of *Achilles*. There is likewiſe a great deal of difference between *Valour* in general,

and

and the *Valour* of *Achilles*, and between *Piety* in general, and the *Piety* of *Æneas*. This is evident from the Thoughts and the Practice of the *Latin Poet*. Had he taken *Achilles* for a Model of Valour, and had he thought that *Homer* had carry'd this Quality to the higheſt Pitch it could go, certainly he would have made his *Æneas* a great deal more like the *Greek Hero*, than he has *Turnus*, ſince he makes him a great deal more valiant than *Turnus*, and he would never have fail'd giving this Idea to his Readers, and telling them, that *Æneas* is another *Achilles*. How comes it to paſs that he never does this? And on the contrary, gives this Quality to *Turnus* ſeveral times: 'Tis doubtleſs, becauſe he ſaw well enough, that 'tis by the Character one Man reſembles another, and that *Valour* in general is not the Character of *Achilles*: That to be more Valiant as *Æneas*, or leſs Valiant as *Turnus*, 'tis not requir'd that one ſhould have more or leſs of the Character of this *Grecian Hero*: But that one ſhall reſemble him the more, the more one is endu'd with a Cholerick, Violent, and unjuſt Valour, as *Turnus* was; and that on the contrary, one ſhall have a Character oppoſite to that of *Achilles*, tho' one be never ſo Valiant, when one is reaſonable, mild, and moderate.

One may then make a Hero as *Valiant* as *Achilles*, as pious as *Æneas*, and if one pleaſe, as *Prudent* as *Ulyſſes*. But 'tis a meer Chimæra to imagine a Hero that has the *Valour*

of *Achilles*, the *Piety* of *Æneas*, and the *Prudence* of *Ulyſſes*, at one and the ſame time. This Viſion might happen to an Author who would ſuit the Character of a Hero to whatever each part of the Action does naturally require, without regarding the Eſſence of the Fable, and the Unity of the Character in the ſame Perſon upon all ſorts of Occaſions. This Hero would be the mildeſt, beſt natur'd Prince in the World, and the moſt cholerick, hard-hearted, and implacable Creature imaginable, contrary to *Horace*'s Prohibition in the Caſe. He would be extreamly tender as *Æneas*, extreamly violent as *Achilles*, and would have the Indifference of *Ulyſſes* that is uncapable of the two Extreams; 'twould be in vain for the Poet to call this Perſonage by the ſame Name throughout. The Hero of the *Temple*, and the *Cabinet*, would not be the Hero of the *Field*.

But can there be no Moderation nor Accommodation made by giving a Hero as much Valour, Prudence, and Piety, as an honeſt Man is capable of, and by retrenching from each of theſe Qualities, whatever it has defective, and contrary to the two others? To judge how far this Practice is allowable, we need only reflect on the Effects it would produce in ſeveral Poems, whoſe Authors were of the mind that the chief Character of any Hero, is that of an honeſt Man. They would be alike in all theſe Pieces, we ſhould ſee them all valiant in Battle, prudent in Counſel,

ſel, pious in the Acts of Religion, Courteous, Civil, Magnificent, and laſtly, endu'd with all the prodigious Vertues the beſt Poet could invent. All this would be independant from the Action, and the Subject of the Poem. And upon ſeeing each Hero ſeparated from the reſt of the Work, we ſhould not eaſily gueſs to what Action, and to what Poem the Hero does belong. So that we ſhould ſee that none of theſe would have a Character, ſince the Character is that which makes a Perſon diſcernable, and which diſtinguiſhes it from all others.

Nor would this falſe *Reſemblance* be only among the Hero's, but likewiſe among the other Perſonages, which one were willing to repreſent as honeſt Men. They would not differ from the Hero himſelf, but as *Plus* and *Minus*. He would be a more honeſt, more valiant, and more prudent Man, *&c.*

Homer and *Virgil* furniſh us with quite different Examples. *Achilles*, *Ulyſſes*, and *Æneas*, have nothing in common, and differ as much among themſelves as the three Poems, and the three Actions, of which they are the Hero's. They have each of them a Character which admirably diſtinguiſhes them from others, and whoſe *Unity* and *Simplicity* is ſo exact, and ſo uniform, as to make them appear the ſame upon all Occaſions. *Homer* has ſo prepar'd his Fables, that 'twas eaſy for him to preſerve this *Unity* in the principal Parts. *Virgil* has done the contrary. His

first part is like the Action of the *Odyssea*, whose Character is Coolness, Dissimulation, and Prudence. The second is like the *Iliad*, full of the Horrors of War, which naturally draw along with them Anger and Cruelty, and yet he has made Mildness and the softest Passions predominant in both parts. *Æneas* is as Meek and Pious when he kills *Lausus* in the Heat of Battel, as he is in the Sports, and the peaceable and religious Combats, which he celebrated in Honour of his Father *Anchises*. He is as modest when his vanquish'd Enemies fell at his Feet to implore his Pardon, as when being himself toss'd about by a Storm, and cast upon a strange Country, he was forc'd to implore the Favour of *Dido*.

Chap. XIII.

The Unity of the Character in the Poem.

IF the *Unity* of the *Character* seems hard to be made in the Person of *Æneas*, because this Hero is in so many different Encounters, which naturally require opposite *Characters*; this Difficulty is still greater in the Series of the whole Poem, since beside this Variety of Actions, the Poet introduces Personages whose Humours are contrary to that of the Hero. *Dido* is violent and passionate, *Turnus*, *Amata*, and *Mezentius*, who are the secondary Hero's, and

and who do all that is done on their ſide, are as oppoſite to *Æneas* in their Characters as in their Intereſts. And yet to maintain the Unity of the Character in the Poem, 'tis requiſite, that theſe oppoſite Characters ſhould centre in the Character of the Hero, and ſo ſubmit thereto, that it alone ſhould be predominant in both the Parties, as the Author of the *Iliad* makes *Anger* to be the commanding Paſſion as well in the City of *Troy*, as in the *Grecian Camp*.

All Poets have not been ſo circumſpect. We ſee *Claudian*'s Genius is not rais'd to this juſtneſs and Accurateneſs, nor has he made ſo exact Proportions. The furious and terrible Character of *Pluto* and the *Furies*, and all the Horror of Hell it ſelf is preſently metamorphos'd into the Character and the Pleaſure of the Graces, the Goddeſſes, the gilt Palaces, and the flowery Meads. All this Joy does again give way to the Sorrows, and Complaints of a Mother for the loſs of a Daughter. This Author has no Idea of his whole Work. When he compoſes one part of it, he never thinks on any thing elſe. He has begun with the Infernal Deities, and in all this beginning, one can ſee nothing but the Furies they are capable of. Afterwards he ſpeaks of the Viſit which *Venus*, *Diana*, and *Minerva* make to young *Proſerpine*, and this is wholly taken up with Joys and Pleaſures. Laſtly, he deſcribes the Fear and Sorrow of *Ceres*, and then he thinks on no other Paſſi-

on,

on, and he suits himself so well to each thing he treats on, independantly from the rest of the Poem, that in his three Books he has as many different, principal, and reigning Characters as there are in the threescore Books of our three Poems. There we see Anger, Dissimulation, and Meekness reigning each of them apart and singly in the *Iliad*, in the *Odysseis*, and in the *Æneid*. And in the three Books of the *Rape* of *Proserpine*, we meet with Terror, Joy, and Sadness. This is an Instance of an Error that corrupts the Unity of the Character in the Poem.

The Practice of our Poets is quite otherwise. They alter not the Soul when they form different Members to the same Body. They know that the Eye, which is the most delicate part, and the Hand, which is the most laborious and hardy, have yet the same Spirit in the same Person. So that they mind less the particular Incidents of their Action, and the Humour of each Personage, than they do the general Character of the Fable.

For this purpose, *Virgil* lays no Constraint upon the Character of the Hero, which ought to be predominant throughout. He gives it a full and entire Liberty, and on the contrary, he moderates the rest, and claps a Rein upon them to hold them in, either by some Passion or by some Dependance, the Persons that have them, are in to some Body else. *Æneas* is absolute Master of his Actions, he has none that he is oblig'd to accommodate himself to,

upon

upon what Occaſion ſoever. Nor is this peculiar to the *Latin Poet*; he imitates therein the *Greek Poet*, whoſe *Ulyſſes* is as independant as *Æneas*. *Achilles* has a General over him, but this General is only as the Chief among equal Princes. *Achilles* then is not his Subject; and take him from the Seige of *Troy*, he has no Orders to receive from him. Beſides, expecting no Favour or Good-will from him, and being Cholerick and Unjuſt, he has no Obedience to pay him, nor Meaſures to take to pleaſe him, and he thinks he has ſufficient Grounds to withdraw his Obedience from him. Nay, when he is reconcil'd to him, and enters again upon his Duty, yet he receives no Orders from him; on the contrary, without conſulting with this General, or any other of the Confederate Princes, he on his own Head makes a Truce with his Enemies in Behalf of them all. 'Tis therefore a great Artifice in *Homer*, when he makes *Achilles* the moſt valiant of the Confederates, but withal Unjuſt, and without Intereſt, and on the contrary, makes *Agamemnon* the General very much intereſted for the Honour of his Brother *Menelaus* and his own. This is what reſpects the Hero.

As for the other Perſonages, *Homer* has made the Unity of the Character eaſy, by giving Violence and Anger to the greateſt part of the Commanders on both ſides. The *Latin Poet* is harder put to it, becauſe he has made the Enemies of his Hero to have Humours

that

that are contrary to that of his Hero, but withal he has annexed to them ſuch Paſſions and Dependances that are no ſmall Advantage to his Unity.

Turnus has in truth no Dependance on King *Latinus*, either as his Subject or his Ally. This old Prince is neither his King, nor his General. He depends upon him after another way, as the Courtier of *Lavinia* his Daughter and ſole Heireſs. For under this Pretenſion he dares not diſoblige a Prince that owes him nothing, and from whom he would obtain ſo much. He is therefore obliged in many Reſpects to ſubmit to him, and to take ſuch Meaſures as take off much of his Fierceneſs and Paſſion. Beſides this, he ſees the Victories of his Rival, to whom he is oblig'd to yield the Glory of Arms in the Judgment of *Latinus* and *Amata* her ſelf; he ſees the ill Succeſs of all his Deſigns, the Death of thoſe he put moſt Confidence in, *Mezentius*, *Camilla*, &c. he ſees the *Latins* decreaſe, and hears the Reproaches they caſt upon him. All this muſt needs cauſe ſtrange Impreſſions on the Mind of this *Latin Achilles*; and hinder him from carrying on his *Character* ſo far as the *Grecian* did his.

Mezentius has a leſs part in the Poem than *Turnus*. But he is too conſiderable to admit of his furious and cruel *Character* in all its Force. The Poet makes this prophane Perſon much in love with his Son, as he was a Deſpiſer of the Gods. He ſo luckily makes

uſe

uſe of this natural Paſſion, that it renders his Tenderneſs conſpicuous, and makes the Character of *Æneas* Conqueror over the Fury of this *Barbarian*. His Deſign in renewing the Battel was only to rejoin his Son. * The Violence of his Paternal Love forces him to beſeech *Æneas* to favour him ſo far, as to let him be buried in the ſame Grave with his Son, and he dies full of the tender and ſad Idea he had of his dear *Lauſus*.

This ſame Artifice does likewiſe change the Violences of *Dido* into a more moderate Character by theſe two ways. The firſt is, the Inability wherein the Queen is plac'd, † *What, Can't I*, ſays ſhe, *tear his Body in Pieces, and ſcatter his mangled Limbs in the Sea? O! that I could but cut the Throats of his Comrades, butcher his dear* Aſcanius, *and ſerve him up in a Banquet to his Father*, &c. Theſe are the wildeſt Exceſſes of a moſt violent and terrible Fury. But ſhe is in ſuch

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*. Nec tecum meus hæc pepigit mihi fœdera Lauſus.

Unum hoc per, ſiqua eſt victis venia hoſtibus, oro;
Corpus humo patiare tegi. Scio acerba meorum
Circunſtare odia: hunc (oro) defende furorem,
Et me conſortem nati concede ſepulcro. *Æn.* 10.

†. Non potui abreptum divellere corpus, & undis
Spargere? Non ſocios, non ipſum abſumere ferro
Aſcanium? patriiſque epulandum apponere menſis. *Æn.* 4.

Circum-

Circumstances, that the Reader is not afraid any ill Effects will follow. He is not concerned for *Æneas*, and *Ascanius*, since they are no longer within her reach; and he only pities this poor Princess, from whose Mouth her Misfortunes had forc'd this Language. * The other Method, is the Love of this same Queen, which in the midst of her Rage and Fury tames her, and forces her to melt into Tears, and to abandon her self to the Tenderness of her Passions.

Another Method *Virgil* make use of, is to interrupt the Fights by calm and tender *Episodes*, which make the Character of the Hero still predominant. Thus the Assault made upon the Camp of *Æneas*, and the Fury of *Turnus* is moderated by the *Episode* of *Remulus* which is diverting: by that of the Ships chang'd into *Nymphs* which is admirable, and by that of *Nisus* and *Euryalus* which is soft and moving——We may reduce all that has been said of the Unity of the Character to these few Heads.

The first and the Foundation of all the rest, is to give the Hero a precise and sensible Character, which may appear in all sorts of Encounters.

Secondly, This Hero must be independent,

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* Improbe amor, quid non mortalia pectora cogis? Ire iterum in lacrymas, iterum tentare precando Cogitur, & supplex animos submittere amori. *Ibid.*

and

and left at full Liberty to carry on his Character and Humour in all the Force and Extent it is capable of.

Thirdly, The Poet may beſtow this very Character on the other Perſonages that are moſt apparent and active, whether they be on the Hero's ſide, or on the contrary Party, or whether they be Divine Perſons. This is the Practice of *Homer* in his *Iliad*.

Fourthly, When there is given to theſe other Perſonages ſome Character or other that is oppoſite to that of the Hero, it muſt not be carry'd on in all its Force. And as this Moderation cannot proceed naturally from Perſons themſelves, it is produc'd either by ſome Paſſion, or by ſome Dependance, as we have ſeen in *Dido*, *Mezentius* and *Turnus*.

The fifth way, is to interrupt the particular Actions which of themſelves require an oppoſite Character by ſuch *Epiſodes* as are ſuitable to the general Character. Thus the Death of *Lauſus* cauſes Pity and Tenderneſs to bear ſway amidſt the Furies of War, and has the ſame Effects which the *Epiſode* of *Niſus* and *Euryalus* has. To theſe five ways we might likewiſe join the Thoughts, Figures, and Expreſſions of which we ſhall ſpeak in the laſt Book of this Treatiſe.

CHAP. XIV.

Chap. XIV.

Of the Juſtneſs of the Character.

THis is a Point of the greateſt Difficulty as well as Importance, as well to thoſe that compoſe, as to thoſe that read and criticize. It depends not only on the Art, but likewiſe on the Goodneſs and Juſtneſs of the Genius, and on a profound Inſight into all Morality. With great reaſon then does * *Horace* carry the Neceſſity of this Doctrine ſo high, and teach us that the Principle and Source of all that is good in a Poem, is this Wiſdom which *Socrates* made Profeſſion of, that is the Knowledge, and the Practice of *Moral Philoſophy*. This teaches us what is Vertue, and what is Vice, and informs us that there are ſome Qualities which in their own Nature, being neither Vertues nor Vices, may be indifferently joined to either one or the other of them, and be met with in bad, as well as good Men.

The firſt thing we are to ſtudy, is the Nature of each Character and Habit wherein it preciſely conſiſts. What Good or Evil it is capable of, and how far it may riſe or fall without degenerating from its Nature, and without being confounded with any other

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* Scribendi recte ſapere eſt et principium & fons. Rem tibi Socraticæ poterunt oſtendere chartæ. *Poet.*

Habit

Habit that may perhaps bear ſome relation thereto. Wherein for Example conſiſts a ſolid Piety without Preciſeneſs, Grimace, and Libertiniſm; and without a certain Turbulency of Spirit, that is dangerous and of an ill Conſequence: how far one may extend ones Liberality without being prodigal: and how a Man ſhould manage his Expences, without being either too Liberal or too Sparing.

To this we likewiſe refer the Knowledge we ought to have of the Habits or Qualities in general; ſuch as they ſay are abſtracted and ſeparated from the particular Subjects, as alſo of the Qualities, that are particulariz'd by the Subjects wherein they are, for we ſhould rightly diſtinguiſh Valour in general from the Valour of *Achilles*, and not confound *that* with the Valour of *Æneas*.

What we ſay here, is not with a Deſign to exclude out of a Poem, whatever *Morality* condemns. A Poet ſhould never ſet bad Examples, but there's a great deal of difference between a bad Example, and the Example of a bad Action or a bad Perſon. The *Lacedæmonians* never intended to propoſe bad Examples to their Children, when, to deter them from Drunkenneſs, they expos'd to their view Slaves that they had made down-right drunk. It is therefore lawful for the Poet to make uſe of *Achilles*'s and *Mezentius*'s, as well as *Ulyſſes*'s and *Æneas*'s. He may repreſent Prodigality and Avarice, as well as Liberality and the wiſe Oeconomy of a good Husband,

and

and an honeſt Trades-Man. But whatever he deſigns, whether for Vertue, Vice, or any indifferent Quality, he muſt at leaſt be ſenſible of what he does, not only becauſe 'twould be a Diſgrace for him to be ignorant in the Caſe, but becauſe this Knowledge puts him upon acting with a great deal more Exactneſs.

'Tis ſo important, that without theſe Notices, he is in Danger too often of ſetting very bad Examples, and of offending againſt that which is eſſential to every Art, which is to be profitable, and in particular againſt the nature of the Fable and the *Epopea*, whoſe only Deſign is to lay down Inſtructions of Vertue. If then a Poet knows not what a ſolid and true Piety is, and how far it may extend without Exceſs, he will introduce a Perſonage that will paſs for a very good Man, he will give him ſuch Vertues and Qualities as are dazling and lovely, he will create for him the good Will and Eſteem of all his Auditors, and after he has arm'd him with ſo dangerous an Authority, he will put him upon venting gravely and in quaint Expreſſions, ſuch Maxims as are falſe, but fair and plauſible in all outward Appearance, and with a Turn that ſhall bewitch Men's Minds. Thus *Æneas* would have been a very bad Example, if being repreſented ſo prudent and honeſt a Man, he ſhould prefer the Endearments and Love of *Dido* before the Orders of *Jupiter*: Or if being perſecuted by *Juno*, he had ſlighted this Goddeſs as if 'twere allowable to be leſs ſubmiſſive

miſſive to God under the Croſſes that befall us, than when every thing happens as we would have it. Or laſtly, if this ſame Hero relying on the Credit of the Oracles, which could not deceive him, had ſpared himſelf the Travels and Dangers he underwent, as if the Favours and Promiſes of God who loves us, ſhould make us more lazy and negligent. *Virgil* commits none of theſe Faults. His Conduct teaches us, That the Promiſes of God, tho' infallible, ſhould yet ſerve only to put us upon endeavouring more ardently and faithfully to merit the Effects of them. And in this Oppoſition which he ſets between *Juno* and *Æneas*, he likewiſe gives us this admirable Leſſon: That when God ſeems to declare himſelf againſt us, we ſhould only contend againſt him with our Prayers, our Vows, our Oblations, our Submiſſion, and theſe are the only Weapons by which he ſuffers himſelf to be conquer'd.

But the Poet does not ſet any bad Example, when he ſhews in *Mezentius* Sentiments that are contrary to theſe Maxims. We are neither ſurpriz'd, nor offended that this Man, whom we know for an impious Perſon, ſeeing his Affairs ſucceed ſo ill, ſhould contemn the Gods, acknowledge no other but his own Arm and Javelin, prefer his Son *Lauſus* to all the Gods, which others ador'd, and make an Idol of him who is both the Object of his Vows, and the Trophee he would adorn with the Spoils of the vanquiſh'd *Æneas*.

No

No Body would live according to theſe Maxims, but ſuch as would be deliberately impious, barbarous, and an Odium to the reſt of Mankind. To cure this ſtrange Diſtemper of the Mind, the Poet preſents us with the miſerable end of this Atheiſt, whom the Death of *Lauſus* diſheartens and oppreſſes with very ſenſible Pains, raiſing in him a Senſe of all the Miſeries to which he was reduc'd, which his Brutality and the Hopes he had of being re-eſtabliſh'd, would not let him ſee till then.

Beſides theſe Vices and Vertues, one is in Danger of offending in the wrong uſe of ſome middle Quality, and the Danger will be greater, and the Error more conſiderable, if this Quality make a great Shew and Noiſe, ſuch as *Valour* in War. That of *Achilles* is vicious, and yet it ſo dazled the Eyes of Young *Alexander*, that to partake of that falſe Glory which he admires in this Hero, he has committed in cold Blood a more unworthy Brutality, than that to which the Anger and Revenge of *Achilles* carry'd him, when he drags the Body of *Hector* round *Troy*. *Hector* was dead, and * *Alexander* drags the live Governour of a Town he had won.

And likewiſe, without minding what is good and vicious in Valour, one may be deceived in not rightly diſtinguiſhing what is ſolid in it, from what is only glaring. The

* Q. *Curtius.*

Age

Age in which we begin to judge of these Characters, commonly casts us into this Error, and into that we mention'd before: Youth always fastens upon the very first Appearances, and never penetrates as far as to the Solidity of a thing, and when we are once prepossess'd, 'tis a hundred to one, that we ever get perfectly free from our Prejudices. One must be very fortunate, or have a clear Intellect and exact Judgment, and more than that, a Curiosity and Desire to be acquainted with that which perhaps one does not judge important enough to deserve a long and serious Study. Very often likewise the Customs of the Country, and Education, produce these bad Effects upon the Mind, and entertain them in this Ignorance, and in such Judgments as are very disadvantageous to Vertue. If we see Duels fought upon every slight Offence, we shall imagine that a Man has no Valour, if he puts up an Affront without fighting, and he will meet with too many of his Friends who will prompt him to this sort of Revenge, as criminal as it is. This is what a Person would never do, who, according to the Precepts of * *Horace*, had learnt the Duty of a faithful Friend and a good Subject. And a Poet would never put this Maxim into the Practice, or Mouth of a Personage, he has a Mind to represent as a Man of Honour.

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* Qui didicit patriæ quid debeat, & quid amicis.

But

But to return to what we were ſaying about the Diſtinction that ought to be made between the Luſtre and the Solidity of Valour; we will make this one Remark, that ſeems to me very important: 'tis this, That theſe two things are oft times oppoſite in the Eſſence of the Character. Violent and tranſporting Characters give a great deal more Luſtre to the Actions they animate, and to the Perſons that have them; and on the contrary, the moſt mild and moderate are often without any Luſtre and Glory, yet theſe laſt are a great deal more proper to Vertue.

Perhaps I inſiſt too much on this Subject; but 'tis of ſome moment both in general, and in the Inſtance I propos'd juſt now of a Warlike Valour, ſince this Quality is moſt uſual in all *Epopeas*, and the moſt capable of dazling both the Poets and the Readers. I will therefore explain this Inſtance by the Valour that is in the *Æneid*.

How many are there, that put a higher Value on the warlike Vertues of *Achilles*, and I will add even on thoſe of *Turnus*, than on thoſe of *Æneas*? Yet *Achilles* is but a Soldier, and *Æneas* a Commander. How then comes it to paſs that they judge thus? Unleſs 'tis becauſe they take the Noiſe, the Show, and the Tranſports of a furious Man for true Valour.

If after the ſame manner we compare *Turnus* with *Æneas*, the pious Hero will doubtleſs ſeem inferior to his Rival. But whoever will

will ſit down here, and will take the Conſequences and the ordinary Attendance of a Quality for the Quality it ſelf, he will fall into the ſame Impertinence as *Numanus*, who in reproach to the *Trojans*, ſays, they deſerve not the Name of Soldiers, and that they had no more Courage than Women, becauſe their way of Dreſs is gaudy and delicate. This is doubtleſs for want of being well acquainted with the Vertues of War, and what the exact Character of a valiant Man is.

Valour is the fineſt Ornament of the Character of *Turnus*, and one might add, that 'tis all the Goodneſs that is in it; and this Quality in *Æneas* gives place to ſeveral others, and principally to his *Piety*. Therefore *Piety* is the thing that ſhould be conſpicuous in *Æneas*, his Valour ſhould appear much leſs, and on the other hand Valour ſhould be very illuſtrious and very ſhining in the Perſon of *Turnus*: So that he ſhould be as much in love with War, as *Æneas* is in love with, and deſirous of Peace. Whatever *Turnus* does in the Battles, or in preparing for them, is uſually done with Deſign, with Pleaſure, and with Diſcourſes that are magnificent, very pompous, and cogent. *Æneas* commonly acts without Noiſe and Affectation, he ſpeaks little, and if he falls into a Paſſion, 'tis not ſo much to fight, as becauſe he is forc'd to fight and defend himſelf; 'tis not ſo much to conquer, as to put an end to the War.

But if the Luſtre and the dazling Show make the Valour of *Turnus* more conſpicuous than that of *Æneas*, yet the Actions ſhew that in Truth and Reality, the Valour of *Æneas* is infinitely ſuperior to that of *Turnus*. We need only conſider them without this Luſtre, and without this outward Appearance, which a bold Bragadocio and a raſh young Man may have as well as the trueſt Bravo.

Turnus, during the Abſence of *Æneas*, aſſaults his Camp, being deſign'd, prepar'd, and arm'd with Malice, and in three or four Days he could not force it. He breaks in by a Paſſage his Bravery had opened for him, he is conſtrain'd to break out again, and at laſt, after an Engagement of two Days, he is routed and vanquiſh'd by *Æneas* with a bloody Slaughter. *Æneas* on the other hand in the ſight of *Turnus*, and in view of an Army of Enemies, aſſaults an ancient Town well built, and well fortified, and in a few Hours becomes Maſter of its Ramparts and Towers. He is not forc'd thence by his Enemies, * but he comes down to make an end of the War by the Death of *Turnus*, whom he forces to a Battel.

Pallas is conquer'd and kill'd by *Turnus*, and *Lauſus* by *Æneas*. Theſe young Princes were equal in Valour, but there is a great deal

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* At Pius Æneas, audito nomine Turni,
Deſerit & muros, & ſummas deſerit arces. *Æn.* 12.

of

of difference between the Bravery of their Conquerors. *Turnus* ſeeks this Battle; * he makes his Boaſts and Brags of it, and inſults over this young Enemy, who never fought a Battle before. He wiſhes *Evander* were preſent, he would butcher the Son before his Father's Face. This is the Valour of another *Achilles*. † *Æneas* is far from engaging with *Lauſus* after this manner, who expoſes himſelf for his Father's ſake. He on the contrary would ſave his Life, he drives him off, threatens him, and becomes terrible and furious only, becauſe he was forc'd to kill him. This is an Anger worthy of *Æneas*, and the exact Character of an Hero more valiant than *Turnus*, but withal more pious than valiant. The extream Danger wherein he was, being aſſaulted not only by *Lauſus*, but by a great many others at the ſame time, does not yet hinder him from taking notice of that Affection which this Enemy (who deſign'd his Death) had for his Father. Certainly it muſt needs argue greater Valour and Bravery to ſpare an Enemy at ſuch a time, than *Turnus* ever made appear in any of his Actions.

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* Solus ego in Pallanta feror, ſoli mihi Pallas
Debetur; cuperem ipſe parens ſpectator adeſſet.
Æneid 10.

† Quo moriture ruis, majoraque viribus audes?
Fallit te incautum pietas tua. Nec minus ille
Exultat demens. Sævæ jamq; altius iræ
Dardanio ſurgunt ductori. *Æn.* 10.

Æneas and *Turnus* do the ſame Action of Generoſity in returning the Bodies of theſe two Princes. But *Turnus* with his uſual Noiſe and Show inſults over *Pallas* and *Evander*, and ſeems as if he ſent back the Body of the Son to his unfortunate Father, only to increaſe his Sorrow. * *I ſend him back his* Pallas (ſays he) *juſt ſuch a one as he deſerves to ſee him.* This is a very cruel Generoſity, and very becoming an *Achilles*. That of *Æneas* is all vertuous, all ſincere. *Turnus* inſults o'er *Pallas*, ſets his Foot upon him, ſtrips him of part of his Armour, and decks himſelf with it: † *Æneas* laments the Death of *Lauſus*, makes his Elegy, lifts him from the Ground himſelf; takes him between his Arms, and reprimands the *Tyrrhens* for being ſo backward in carrying off their Prince.

You may ſee then how in the Diſtribution of the Valour *Virgil* gives *Æneas* and *Turnus*, he allows the laſt all that this Quality has of Beauty and Splendor in Appearance: and how in giving to *Æneas* that which was without all Diſpute greater and more real, he is ſatisfied with the ſolid part of it, and makes what is glaring and dazling in it to give place to the ſweet Temper and the Piety of his

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* Qualem meruit Pallanta remitto.

† Ingemuit miſerans, dextramque tetendit,
Et mentem patriæ ſubiit pietatis imago.
Quid tibi nunc, miſerande puer, &c.

Hero.

Hero. Becauſe Piety makes up the Goodneſs of *Æneas*'s Character, as Valour makes up all that *Turnus* has of good in his Character.

But whatever we diſcommend here in the Character of this laſt Hero, yet 'tis only an Evil in Morality, which does not make it the leſs good in a Poetical Senſe. Theſe Reflections are not deſign'd to baniſh it out of Poems, but ſo to diſtinguiſh Vertue from Vice, that a Poet may know what he does, when he gives his Perſonage the one or the other; and that a Reader may judge of it without being miſtaken. That he confound not what a Quality (ſuch as Valour for inſtance) has of glaring, with what it has of Solidity. That he ſuffer not himſelf to be dazled with the Formalities of *Turnus*, as if *Æneas* were not in truth a great deal more valiant than he: And that he imagine not that any Man of Honour is capable of the Generoſity, and the War-like Vertues which *Virgil* beſtows upon *Turnus*, and *Homer* upon his *Achilles*.

Nor is it at all neceſſary to carry the Character of an exact and vertuous Hero, as far as *Virgil* has done that of *Æneas*. The Endeavours he uſes to avoid killing *Lauſus*, the Sorrow he ſhews for it, the Praiſes he beſtows upon him, and the reſt that we have taken notice of, exceeds the *Character* of a ſimple Generoſity, and is the Effect of that *Piety*, which is predominant in *Æneas*, and in the whole Poem. And it may be ſo contriv'd that theſe things, thus carried on, would not

only, not be a Perfection in a Man of Honour of another Poem, but alſo ſpoil the juſtneſs of the *Character*. So great a difference is there between *Generoſity* in general, the *Generoſity* of *Æneas*, and the Generoſity of every other particular Perſon.

Chap. XV.

Of falſe Characters.

I Call thoſe *true Characters* which we truly and really ſee in Men, or which may be in them without any Difficulty. No one queſtions but there have been Men as generous and as good as *Æneas*, as paſſionate and as violent as *Achilles*, as prudent and wiſe as *Ulyſſes*, as impious and atheiſtical as *Mezentius*, as paſſionate as *Dido* and *Amata*, &c. So that all theſe Characters are true. Poets may regularly make uſe of them. And when they do, theſe are not ſimple and imaginary Fictions, but juſt Imitations of ſuch things as really are or may be.

On the contrary, I affirm that a *Character* is falſe, when an Author ſo feigns it, that one can ſee nothing like it in the order of Nature, wherein he deſigns it ſhall ſtand. Theſe Characters ſhould be wholly excluded from a Poem, becauſe, tranſgreſſing all the Bounds both of Reaſon and Probability, they meet with

with no Belief from the Readers. They are by ſo much the more offenſive to them, by how much the Poet ſeems to ſlight them, and to take them for ſilly Perſons on whom he may impoſe what he pleaſes.

The deſire of amplifying, and making every thing that's ſaid, look great and marvellous, caſts young Poets into this Error, and all others who are not endued with a juſtneſs of Mind, and are not rightly informed. The Enthuſiaſtick Genius of *Statius* will afford us ſome Inſtances of this bad Conduct.

He would beſtow the *Character* of *Achilles* upon *Tydeus*, and inſpire him with his Paſſions, and his Anger ſuſtained by his Valour. * But is ſuch an exceſſive Anger tolerable which puts him upon eating the Head of his Enemy? Upon drinking the Blood that guſh'd from him? Upon devouring his very Brains? Which repreſents him with his Face horribly beſmeared with his Blood and Brains, ſo that his Friends could never pluck this Rage from his Heart, nor this Head from between his Hands and Teeth. He did not think he ſhould make him valiant enough, if he let him looſe to five or ſix Men only. He muſt needs make him kill fifty of them. This Exceſs is ſo much the more ridiculous, ſince

* Atque illum effracti perfuſum tabe cerebri
Aſpicit, & vivo ſcelerantem ſanguine fauces.
Nec comites auferre valent. *Stat.*

we know that it coſt the Poet nothing. A water Poet or a raw Scholar might as eaſily ſay, that his Hero kill'd a thouſand Men, as that he conquered two or three of them. There is neither Art nor Invention in this, but an ill grounded Fancy, and a perfect Ignorance of the *juſtneſs* of his *Character*.

This Poet has done the ſame in the Character he has given to *Capaneus*, he makes him valiant and impious. And perhaps he had a mind to imitate *Mezentius*, as he has imitated other Paſſages of the *Æneid*. But inſtead of making ſuch a Man as he ought, he has made only a Chimera. Indeed he was not oblig'd to make the Violences of this Perſonage to change into Mildneſs and Tenderneſs, as *Virgil* has done that of *Mezentius*, for the reaſons above mentioned: But what need had he to make him inſult o'er the Gods more like a Mad-Man than an Atheiſt?

This Hero dies on the Wall of *Thebes*, which he was beſieging. He was nigh makeing the whole Town tremble. * His Shadow only put them all into a Conſternation. He was ſo far from being touched with Vanity at ſo ſurprizing a Succeſs, that he thinks this Victory beneath him, and is aſhamed of ſuch

* Eminuit, trepidamque aſſurgens deſuper urbem
Vidit, & ingenti Thebas exterruit umbra. *Stat.*

a pitiful thing. * Theſe Towers which *Amphion* built are too low, he takes it ill that the Fictions of Fables ſhould ever dare to publiſh that thoſe Fortifications were the Work of a Harper. For where's the Difficulty to raze the Ramparts that were raiſed by a Harp? In truth there was neither need of Swords nor Machines. His Hands and his Feet are enough to deſtroy thoſe Walls and and thoſe Towers, and to break down Bridges. After he had thus demoliſh'd theſe Fortifications with his Feet and Hands, he takes the Ruines and hurles them at the City, and beats down the Houſes and Churches with them. This is what he does againſt Men.

He does not indeed do ſo much Miſchief to the Gods, but he frights them almoſt as much, and defies them to do him any harm. † *What*, ſays he to them, *is there none of the Gods*

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* Increpat attonitos: Humileſne Amphionis arces,
Proh pudor! Hi faciles carmenque imbelle ſecuti,
Et mentita diu Thebarum fabula muri.
Et quidnam egregium proſternere mœnia molli
Structa Lyra? Simul inſultans greſſuque manuque
Diruit obſtantes cuneas tabulataque ſævus
Deſtruit, abſiliunt pontes tectique frementis
Saxea fræna labant, diſſeptoque aggere rurſus
Utitur, & truncas rupes in tecta domoſque
Præcipitat, frangitque ſuis jam mœnibus urbem. *Stat.*

† Nullane pro trepidis, clamabat, Numina Thebis
Statis? ubi infandæ ſegnes telluris alumni

Gods dare defend Thebes *againſt me? Where art thou* Bacchus? *Or thou* Hercules? *The Daſtardly Offspring of this infamous City? But I am aſhamed,* continues he, *to defie the leſſer Deities:* Jupiter *do thou come, for who elſe is more worthy to cope with me? See the Tomb, ſee the Aſhes of thy dear* Semele. *Come, and defend them, and forget not to bring any thing that may aſſiſt thee.* * Heaven preſently is in Arms againſt this ſimple Man, and ſeems to be all on fire. *Capaneus* ſees all this without being mov'd, and was ſo far from abating any thing of his Fierceneſs, his Threats, and the Hopes he had of taking the City, ſpite of all the Gods that declare War againſt him, that he was for ſnatching the Weapons from Heaven it ſelf, and caſting its Fires to burn the City. If *Statius* had not imagin'd theſe Extravagancies, one could never have believed they ſhould enter into the Mind of any Author.

The Gods of this Poet do not take theſe for Extravagancies. † They are really affraid

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Bacchus & Alcides? Piget inſtigare minores:
Tu potius venias, (quis enim concurrere nobis
Dignior) en cineres Semeleaque buſta tenentur.
Nunc age, nunc totis in me connitere telis,
Jupiter.——

* Fulguraque attritis quoties micuere procellis:
His, ait, in Thebas, his jam decet ignibus uti.
Nunc renovare facem, laſſamq; accendere quercum.

† Ingemuit dictis ſuperum dolor, &c.

of

of them, and dread this Man alone more than all Mankind together. They betake themſelves to *Jupiter*. *Apollo* groans, *Bacchus* bemoans himſelf. *Hercules* much affrighted, with a Bow in his Hands, knows not on what to reſolve. *Venus* is all in Tears. To conclude, the Calamity is univerſal, and to the Diſgrace of *Jupiter*, (before whom they ſeem to prefer *Capaneus*) the Admiration they conceived for this great Hero had ſtruck them dumb, and made them fear this Sovereign of the Gods had not a Shaft ſufficient to conquer this ſingle Man. The Poet himſelf gives us to underſtand, that this Fear was not altogether groundleſs. For after *Jupiter* had ſhot his Thunder againſt him, with all his Force, and had ſhatter'd to Duſt the Armour *Capaneus* wore, this Bravo had ſtill Power left him, to ſtand upon his Feet ſo long, that *Jupiter* thought he muſt ſhoot another Bolt at him.

One would fanſy the Fear is now over: But ſo great a Poet is not contented with ſo little. *Capaneus* during his Life made only the *Thebans* tremble and fly; and now at his Death, when he was deſtroyed by Thunder, he fills his own Men with Conſternation, and puts both Parties to flight, becauſe they know not on which ſide he would fall, nor whoſe Troops he would cruſh into Pieces thereby.

This is an Inſtance of theſe falſe *Characters*, wherein Men fall for want of Judgment and Knowledge. An Author by theſe great-

great Amplifications thinks he shall be a great Poet. But he even degrades himself from the very name of Poet; since these Fictions being of such things as cannot be in Nature, are no Imitations. And yet all Poesy is essentially an Imitation.

The Remedy for this is to believe * *Horace* herein, and to be perfectly instructed in Morality. 'Tis to know that all things have their Limitations: 'Tis to know these Limitations, and to keep within them: 'Tis lastly to be convinc'd, that those that transgress these Bounds, as in the Examples we have been proposing, in Propriety of Speech, make neither Characters nor Personages, but meer Chimeras, which were never any where but in the imaginary Spaces of these Authors Brains.

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* Scribendi recte sapere est & principium & fons.
Est modus in rebus, sunt certi denique fines,
Quos ultra citraque nequit consistere rectum.

The End of the Fourth Book.

Monsieur

Monſieur Bossu's TREATISE OF THE EPICK POEM.

BOOK V.

Concerning the Machines.

CHAP. I.

Of the ſeveral ſorts of Deities.

IN the former Book concerning the *Manners*, we diſcourſed concerning the *Terreſtrial*, and *Moral* Perſons, and in this, under the name of *Machines*, we ſhall treat concerning the *Divine* and *Immortal* Perſons: So that this will be nothing elſe but a Conſequence

quence of what has been ſaid about the *Manners* and the Perſons; ſince the *Gods* as well as Men are Actors in the *Epopea*. We ſhew'd the Neceſſity of this in our firſt * Book, where we likewiſe took notice that all theſe Divine Perſonages are *Allegorical*.

We obſerved that there are three ſorts of them. Some are *Theological*, and were invented to explain the Nature of God: Others are *Phyſical*, and they repreſent natural things: The laſt are *Moral*, and they are the Repreſentations of Vertues and Vices. Theſe three ſorts of *Divinities* or *Allegories*, are ſometimes to be met with in one and the ſame Perſon. Now for Inſtances of each, and firſt we will begin with the *Theological*.

In the Convention of the Gods, by which *Virgil* opens his tenth Book, *Jupiter*, *Juno*, *Venus*, and (we might add) *Fate*, are Perſonages of the firſt ſort; that is, ſuch as repreſent the *Divine Nature* divided into four Perſons, as into ſo many Attributes. † *Jupiter* is the Power of God, *Fate* is his abſolute *Will*, to which his very *Power* ſubmits; becauſe God never acts contrary to his *Will*. § *Fate* therefore determines *Jupiter*, who of himſelf is indifferent, and might as well act in Behalf of *Turnus*, as in favour of *Æneas* and

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* Chap. 2.

† Hominum Divumque æterna poteſtas.

§ Fata viam invenient, Rex Jupiter omnibus idem.

his

his Party. *Venus* is the *Divine Mercy*, and that Love which God bears towards vertuous Men; by which he is induced, never to forget them in the Miſeries they endure upon Earth, but to help them out of 'em, and finally to reward them. Laſtly, *Juno* is his Juſtice: This puniſhes even the leaſt Offences; ſpares not even the very beſt of Men, who not being wholly innocent, are puniſhed ſeverely for their Defaults in this Life, where the Juſtice and the Temporal Wrath of God is often declar'd againſt them, and ſo perſecutes them, that there might be nothing left in them but what was vertuous, meritorious, and matter of Reward. This Reward is reſerved for them in Heaven, where this vindictive Juſtice has nothing to do, and from whence it cannot exclude them, as * *Jupiter* tells *Juno*, when he mention'd *Æneas*.

The Poet ſuits himſelf to our groſs way of conceiving Divine things; and to the Infirmity of our Minds, which makes us look upon theſe Qualities in God as oppoſite to one another. † *Mercy* upbraids *Juſtice* of its Severity, that it is never ſatisfied let good Men ſuffer never ſo much, and that it never allows them any Repoſe here on Earth: whilſt *Ju-*

* Indigetem Æneam ſcis ipſa, & ſcire fateris
Deberi cœlo. ——————

† Nulla eſt regio Teucris quam det tua conjux
Dura. ——————

ſtice

ſtice on the other hand accuſes Goodneſs and Mercy of its being the Cauſe of all the Sins that are committed, becauſe it ſhelters Criminals, and puts them in hopes of going off unpuniſhed

The *Deities* of the ſecond ſort, that are purely *Phyſical*, are employ'd in the firſt Book in raiſing the Storm againſt *Æneas*. *Æolus* is the Power of Nature, which gathers together about Hills and in their Caverns, the Vapours and Exhalations, whence Winds are form'd: And having digeſted theſe Matters to a certain degree of Heat and Dryneſs, puts them upon thoſe Motions and Agitations which we call the *Winds*. 'Tis thus that *Æolus* is their Maſter: Theſe Vapours and Exhalations ariſe in the Air, which is repreſented by *Juno*: 'Tis therefore to this Goddeſs that the God of the Winds is beholden for his heavenly Chear. There's no need of taking notice what is meant by the Perſons of *Eurus* and *Zephyrus*, nor that of *Neptune*, who ſpeaks to them.

We have one inſtance of the *Moral Deities* in the Engagement of *Turnus* with *Æneas*. The *Furies* which *Jupiter* ſends againſt *Turnus*, are nothing elſe but the Reproaches of his Conſcience, which ſhew him his Crimes and Impiety: King *Latinus* foretold him of this at the very beginning of the War, giving him to underſtand, that if he was ſo inſolent as to deſpiſe the Gods, when 'twas at his Choice not to oppoſe their Orders, he would

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at laſt be oblig'd, when too late, to own that he had offended, and they were powerful. The *Roman Orator* plainly confirms the truth of this Interpretation. * *Never think* (ſays he in his Speech before the Senate againſt *Piſo*) *never think, Gentlemen, that the Gods ſend the* Furies *with their burning Torches to frighten Criminals, as Poets upon the Theatre repreſent them. No: The Injuſtice, the Villany, and the Crimes of each Miſcreant, are his Tormenters. Theſe are the Furies, the Fires, and the Flames, that make them faint away, and fill them with ſuch Horrour and Amazement.* 'Tis thus that *Turnus* is repreſented in his laſt Battle. † *Statius* has likewiſe in few Words very well expreſſed the Nature of theſe diſmal *Deities:* Which are no where but within our own Breaſts, there tormenting us by the View of the Crimes we have committed.

There are two things obſervable in the Practice of *Virgil* that confirm this Doctrine. The firſt is, that theſe *Furies* are never ſent but againſt ſuch as merit them: They are the only

* Nolite putare ut in ſcena videtis, homines conſceleratos impulſu Deorum terreri. Furiarum tædis ardentibus ſua quemque fraus, ſuum ſcelus, ſua audacia de ſanitate & mente deturbat. Hæ ſunt impiorum furiæ, hæ flammæ, hæ faces.

——† Dii me terrent, & Jupiter hoſtis.
Nec ſe cognovit euntem:
Scelerumque in pectore Diræ. *Statius.*

only Perſons that are terrified by them. The ſecond thing is, that thoſe to whom they are ſent, muſt neceſſarily own there is ſuch a Being as a God, that takes Vengeance upon the Criminal: For Atheiſts, that acknowledge no God, are not liable to the Checks of Conſcience; nor are they uſed to be troubled at the Offences they commit againſt the Deity; nor can they be ſuppoſed to be daunted with the Apprehenſion of another Life. So that the *Furies* have nothing to do with them. This is the Reaſon why the Poet employs none againſt *Mezentius*, although much more criminal than *Turnus*.

Chap. II.

Of the Manners *of the* Gods.

HOMER and the ancient Poets have beſtowed upon their Gods the *Manners*, the *Paſſions*, and the *Vices of Men*; and ſome are bold to add, that they have given them ſuch *Manners* as turn them into meer Swine. But if we would interpret what they have ſaid about them, according to the Diviſion I have propoſed, and by the *Allegories* that are neceſſarily to be underſtood of them, we ſhall ſee that theſe Reproaches have often more of Shew than Solidity in them.

'Tis true, the learned Men of Antiquity have gone upon wrong Grounds in a thing

of

of the higheſt Importance, when their Writings have been ſuch, that ordinary Capacities, or Men of a ſhallow Reach, that is almoſt all Men, have not been able to break the Shell, and look through the Veil, with which they have covered the Truth; and they have been miſerably abuſed in taking the Shadow for the Subſtance, and deformed and dangerous Figures for neceſſary and ſolid Truths. Whether it proceeded from Pride, Envy, Error, or a bad Conduct, 'tis doubtleſs a great Fault, and ſuch as we can by no means excuſe. But in our Deſign, we may omit, and paſs over ſuch Interpretations as a Poet is not obliged to give in his Verſes, and we may only conſider the Poems, as Works and Inſtructions that ſhould be all *Allegorical*.

In this Senſe, 'tis much eaſier to defend than accuſe *Homer*; and more juſt to praiſe than blame him. One can find no fault with him for having made mention of many Gods, nor for his beſtowing Paſſions on them, as we hinted in ſpeaking of *Juno* and *Venus*. He might likewiſe bring them in fighting againſt Men. For have we not Examples of theſe Expreſſions and Figures in *Sacred Writ*, and the true Religion? And if 'tis ſometimes allowable to ſpeak thus of the Gods in *Theology*, there is a great deal more Reaſon for doing ſo in the Fictions of *Natural* and *Moral Philoſophy*.

When

When in theſe two ſorts of Learning we deſcribe the Nature of things, 'tis as eaſy to deſcribe their Defects, as the contrary. It would argue a Man's being a Novice in Poetry, and that he underſtood but little of the way of Expreſſion in this ſort of Writing, did he imagine, when he ſees the Name of a God or Goddeſs, that he muſt needs meet with nothing, but what is fine, good, and commendable in theſe Perſonages. As if *Virgil* could not have ſaid of *Fame*, that ſhe is a very foul mouth'd Goddeſs; nor of *Sleep*, that this God was ill-natur'd, when he deceiv'd good *Palinurus*, and tumbled him over-board. 'Tis no more a Soleciſm to ſpeak thus in Verſe, than 'tis to ſay in Proſe, that *Fame* publiſhes very ſhameful things; and that *Palinurus* was aſleep and fell over-board.

'Tis true we meet with more offenſive Paſſages, ſuch as the Adultery of *Venus* and *Mars* in the *Odyſſeis*. But beſides the *Phyſical* and *Moral Allegories*, which may in ſome ſort excuſe theſe too bold Figures; to ſay no worſe of them; and beſides, that we meet with ſomething very like it, written in the Simplicity of theſe ancient times by Authors which we cannot condemn; I add further, that though there was no *Allegory*, yet *Homer* is not leſs excuſable. And to make this out, 'tis to be conſider'd, that 'tis neither the Poet, nor his Hero, nor any other Perſon of Probity, that makes this Recital: but the *Phæacans*, a ſoft, effeminate People, ſing it amidſt

amidſt their Feſtival. Now 'tis always allowable in a Poem, and in other grave and moral Writings, to introduce vicious Perſons, who deſpiſe the Gods, profane Sacred things, and ſeek in that which is moſt holy for Excuſes and Examples to countenance their Diſorders. *Homer* then by the Example of theſe idle People, who could do nothing but ſing, dance, eat and drink, gives us this Leſſon, "That theſe ſoft and lazy Exerciſes are the "Source of all vicious Pleaſures; and that "the Perſons who live thus, are uſually pleaſed to hear theſe Tales, and to make the "Gods themſelves Partners in their Goatiſhneſs. *Horace* learned this Maxim by theſe Words of *Homer*, as well as by the Diſorders of his times; when he ſays, *That a Girl that learns to dance betimes, learns betimes likewiſe to play the Whore.* So likewiſe, we may ſuppoſe that *Horace* ſays of this Place of the *Odyſſeis*, as much as of any other, that this Poem is an excellent piece of *Philoſophy*, whereby we may learn to be Men of Vertue and Probity, and to avoid all that is baſe and vicious. From whence we may conclude, that the Recital of *Homer* we are ſpeaking of, is not ſo much a pernicious Example of Adultery and Impiety, as 'tis a very uſeful Leſſon, which he gives to thoſe that would live well; namely, *That if they would not be guilty of theſe Crimes, they muſt fly the Arts and Methods that lead thither.*

But

But in ſhort, a Poet had need be very cautious of medling with ſuch dangerous Incidents as theſe are, if he would not do more hurt than good by his Poems. He ſhould ſtudy the Wants, the Intereſt, the Humour of his Auditors, and the Effects which ſuch Subjects may have upon their Minds. And to ſpeak truth, we live no longer in an Age wherein Simplicity might render ſuch a Subject tolerable among honeſt Men: And wherein one might propoſe it without corrupting the better part of the Audience, and without countenancing that Corruption and Vice which the reſt are but too much inclined to. So that how judicious or excuſable ſoever *Homer* has been in this Invention; yet a Poet now-a-days would be neither judicious nor excuſable, if he ſhould venture to imitate him therein. It is good to teach what he taught: But 'tis very bad teaching it his way.

However things are, yet this is a particular Caſe, which ſhould not hinder us from concluding, That *Vertue* and *Goodneſs* do no more belong to the *Manners* and *Character* of the *Poetical Gods*, than to the *Manners* and *Character* of *Men*.

If a Poet ſpeaks of the *Gods* in *Natural Philoſophy*, he will give them ſuch *Manners*, Speeches and Actions, as are conformable to the Nature of the things they would repreſent under theſe Divine Perſons. He will ſay, that the God of *Sleep* is good, bad, true, a cheat, &c. becauſe we have pleaſant Dreams, and

we

we have offenſive ones, ſometimes they inſtruct us, ſometimes deceive us, very often are vain, &c.

The Caſe is the ſame in *Moral Deities*. *Minerva* is wiſe becauſe ſhe repreſents *Prudence*. *Venus* is both good and bad, becauſe the Paſſion we enjoy under her Name is capable of theſe two oppoſite Qualities.

Theology likewiſe has its Variety. The moſt ſound part of it ſhould ſay nothing of the Gods but what is good: *But it may likewiſe attribute ſeveral Paſſions to them, ſuch as Anger, Revenge, Sorrow, &c. Not that they have any ſuch in Reality, but only in Condeſcenſion and after the Language of Men they are ſaid to have ſuch, as we hinted before in ſpeaking of *Virgil's Juno* and *Venus*. But there are ſeveral Sects, and a Poet ſhould take care who thoſe are that he brings in ſpeaking. For an *Epicurean*, for inſtance, cannot give any Paſſion to the Gods. His *Theology* teaches him that they enjoy a perfect Repoſe, and do not ſo much as concern themſelves with any of the Affairs of Mankind.

We might likewiſe add that the Paſſions and the Vices of each Perſon form to him his particular *Theology*. The debauch'd *Pagans* thought the Gods could not be happy without enjoying the Pleaſures of Senſe. And

* Domine, ne in furore tuo arguas me: neque in ira tua corripias me. *Pſal.* 6.

they

they charg'd upon them their Laſciviouſneſs, as we before obſerv'd in the Example of the *Pheacans*. There are others who think there is no God at all: Or at leaſt would perſwade themſelves that he does not regard us. *Virgil* has given us an Inſtance of this deplorable Change in the Perſon of *Dido*. This Princeſs at firſt entertains *Æneas* with Vows and Prayers which ſhe puts up to the Gods with a ſincere Piety. Becauſe then ſhe was innocent and at Quiet. She begins to love *Æneas* contrary to the Vow ſhe had made to the *Manes* of her firſt Husband; which to her was a kind of Deity. She begins at the ſame time to ſuppoſe that theſe * *Manes* are no longer concerned about her, and lay no Obligation upon her to keep her Vow. Laſt of all, being more corrupted, ſhe becomes guilty of Impiety againſt the Gods: And ſeeing that *Æneas* was about to leave her by their Order, ſhe would perſwade him, that they are ignorant of what is done here on Earth. Not that ſhe was really and abſolutely perſwaded of ſo impious a Maxim: The Poet was too judicious to make ſo great and ſo ſtrange an Alteration in the *Manners* of this Queen, in ſo ſhort a time. 'Tis her Paſſion that makes her ſpeak thus. But ſtill 'tis true

* Id cinerem, aut Manes credis curare ſepultos?
Scilicet is ſuperis labor eſt, ea cura quietos
Sollicitat —— *Æn.* 4.

to

to affirm that theſe Words are not abſolutely Jargon in her Mouth, but have ſome Foundation in her Heart. This therefore is a Beginning of Impiety, which naturally happens to thoſe, whoſe Vices and Paſſions are violent, and which at laſt leads them into downright Atheiſm. Atheiſts ſpeak neither well nor ill of the Gods. They deſpiſe this Belief, and laugh at thoſe who adore and worſhip them. Such a one is *Virgil*'s *Mezentius*.

All that we have ſaid here concerning the *Manners of the Gods*, ought to be applied to that which we have ſaid concerning the *Morals* or *Manners of Men*. The Manners of the Gods are capable of the four Qualifications which we have given to the others. They may be *Poetically Good*, ſince they may appear in the Speeches and Actions of the Divine Perſons we introduce. They will be *ſuitable*, if we give to theſe Perſons ſuch Manners, as the nature of the things we repreſent requires: And if, as we make a King magnificent and jealous of his Authority, ſo we make *Fame* to be a lying and malignant Goddeſs. They will be *likely*, if we ſpeak of *Venus*, *Mercury*, &c. conformable to that which is reported of them in *Fable*, and which the firſt Poets have invented about them. And they will be *even* or *equal*, if in a long Series we ſee the ſame *Character* maintain'd.

Chap. III.

How the Gods act in a Poem.

SInce among the Gods, there are ſome *good*, ſome *bad*, and ſome between both; and ſince of our very Paſſions we may make ſo many *Allegorical Deities:* To the Gods one may attribute all the Good or Ill that is done in a Poem. But theſe Deities do not always act after the ſame manner. Sometimes they act inviſibly, and by meer Inſpirations; and this has nothing in it extraordinary or miraculous. This is no more than what we ſay every Day, *That God has aſſiſted us upon ſuch or ſuch an Occaſion, or that the Devil has inſpir'd a bad Action into this or that Man.* 'Tis thus that * *Juno* helps *Turnus* in the ninth Book of the *Æneid*, when he was engaged in the *Trojan* Camp; and thus † *Venus* in the twelfth Book inſpires *Æneas*, and puts him upon aſſaulting the Town of the *Latins*, that ſo *Turnus* might be forced to the Combat, which he induſtriouſly avoided. The Poet may make the *Gods* act thus, even among Atheiſts: For though theſe impious Wretches acknowledge no God, yet they

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* Juno vires animumque miniſtrat. *Æn.* 9.

† Hic mentem Æneæ genitrix pulcherrima miſit, Iret ut ad muros. *Æn.* 12.

cannot

cannot withdraw themſelves from his Power. He diſpoſes of them as he thinks fit, and without their perceiving it, can turn their Thoughts and Deſigns as he pleaſes. This is *Virgil*'s Practice in the Perſon of *Mezentius*. * 'Tis *Jupiter*, who, minded at laſt to puniſh him for all his Crimes, engages him in a fight with *Æneas*. To this way of the *Gods acting* we might likewiſe refer, that which they inſenſibly contribute to an Action, for which they are thank'd. The God *Mars* does not appear at all in the Fight of the tenth Book of the *Æneid*: Yet *Æneas* owns he was obliged to him therein: † And to him dedicates the Trophy which he raiſed of the Arms of *Mezentius*. Theſe Divine Actions are ſimple and deſerve not the Name of *Machine*. And they are ſuch as are allowable in the moſt exact *Tragedies* and *Comedies*.

The other way whereby the Gods act is altogether miraculous and extraordinary; and this, whether they preſent themſelves viſibly, and make themſelves known to Men, as when § *Mercury* diſcovered himſelf to *Æneas* in the fourth Book: Or whether they diſguiſe them-

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* At Jovis interea monitis Mezentius ardens
Succedit pugnæ. —— *Æn.* 10.

—— † Tibi magne Trophæum
Bellipotens —— *Æn.* 11.

§ Ipſe Deum manifeſto in lumine vidi
Intrantem muros, vocemque his auribus hauſi.

ſelves under ſome human Shape, without making themſelves known, as when * *Cupid* under the Form of *Aſcanius* makes *Dido* ſenſible of his Power, who careſſes him without knowing who he is; or whether without any viſible Appearance, they make us only ſenſible of their Power by ſome miraculous Action, as *Venus* in the twelfth Book, when ſhe cures the Wound of *Æneas*. § The Phyſician, who had it in hand, acknowledges that the Cure is all Divine, and that he has no ſhare in it. The *Machines* that are prohibited in *Dramatick Poems* are of this ſecond ſort: No Body cares for ſeeing Gods or Miracles upon the Stage.

There is likewiſe a third way that has ſomething of both the other; 'tis indeed a *Miracle*, but yet has very frequently been refer'd to that way whereby the Gods act, which we mentioned firſt. This third comprehends the *Oracles*, *Dreams*, and extraordinary *Inſpirations*. *Virgil* in his third Book has Inſtances of all this. *Apollo* utters an *Oracle*, the *Gods* interpret it to *Æneas* in a *Dream*, and the Divine *Helenus* informs him Poetically of very many things. The Speech of *Sibyl* to *Æneas*, and all that ſhe diſcovers

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——— * Inſcia Dido,
Inſideat quantus miſeræ Deus.—— *Æn.* 1.

——— § Neque te Ænea, mea dextera ſervat:
Major agit Deus.—— *Æn.* 12.

to

to him of the *Infernal Shades*, and of his Poſterity, is likewiſe nothing elſe but one of theſe *Demi-Machines*. We might to theſe add the *Hell* of the *Odyſſeis*: which conſiſts in nothing elſe but the conjuring up the Ghoſt of *Tireſias*, and of ſeveral others that were his Attendants.

All theſe Ways muſt be probable: And though the Probability in *Machines* is of a very large Extent, ſince 'tis founded upon Divine Power, yet it is not without ſome Limitations. We may apply to the *Epopea* thoſe that *Horace* preſcribed to the *Theatre*. He propoſes three ſorts of *Machines*. The firſt is of thoſe which we can not only believe, but alſo endure the ſight of: Such is a God preſent and viſibly converſing with the Actors. * He does not abſolutely forbid this; but he admits it only in a Plot that requires an Actor of this Importance. † The ſecond ſort comprehends ſuch Machines as are more incredible and extraordinary: Such as the *Metamorphoſis* of *Progne* into a Swallow, and of *Cadmus* into a Serpent. § He does not whol-

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* Nec Deus interſit, niſi dignus vindice nodus
Inciderit. —— *Hor. Poet.*

† Aut in avem Progne vertatur, Cadmus in anguem.

—— § Non tamen intus
Digna geri, promes in ſcenam, multaque tolles
Ex oculis, quæ mox narret facundia præſens. *Ibid.*

ly condemn this Machine, nor exclude it from the Poem, but he baniſhes it the Stage, and the ſight of the Spectators. * Theſe Sights, repreſented thus, are odious; becauſe a Man can never be perſwaded, that he ſees ſo ſtrange a *Metamorphoſis*. So that 'tis only allow'd to make a Recital of it. † The third ſort of *Machines* is altogether abſurd. *Horace* rejects it entirely. The Inſtance he propoſes is of a Child drawn alive out of the Bowels of a Monſter that had devour'd it.

This third ſort is likewiſe to be baniſh'd the *Epopea*, ſince there is no Recital that can make the Auditors believe it. The two others are equally allowable, and without the Diſtinction which *Horace* makes, which is only of uſe for the *Theatre*: Becauſe, 'tis only in *Dramatick* Poems, that there is any difference to be made between that which is acted upon the Stage in view of the Audiences, and that which is done behind the Scenes, which afterwards is recited. Our two Poets have Inſtances of theſe two ſorts of allowable and probable Machines. All ſorts of Deities ſpeak often in the *Epopea*, and are no leſs the Perſonages thereof than Men are, among whom they are often mix'd. Therein are likewiſe re-

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* Quodcunque oſtendis mihi ſic, incredulus odi.

† Nec quodcunque volet, poſcat ſibi fabula credi:
Neu pranſæ Lamiæ vivum puerum extrahat alvo.
Ibid.

hearſed

hearſed ſeveral *Metamorphoſes*, as that of *Ulyſſes's* Fleet into a Rock, and that of *Æneas's* Fleet into as many Nymphs as there were Ships.

'Tis true theſe *Metamorphoſes* are very rare, becauſe they are a great deal leſs credible than the reſt. This ſhews that one muſt ſuit one's ſelf to the Guſt of the Audience in this ſort of Probability. That which was allowable in the Ages *Homer* and *Virgil* liv'd in, may be leſs regular in other times.

This puts me upon making a Reflection on the Method of making uſe of thoſe Machines probably, that are not of themſelves probable enough. The Machines which only require Divine Probability (as that for inſtance which we have been diſcourſing of) ſhould be ſo diſengaged from the Action of the Poem, that one may ſubſtract them from it, without deſtroying the Action. But thoſe that are neceſſary, and which make the eſſential Parts of it, ſhould be grounded upon human Probability, and not on the ſole Power of God. Now the *Epiſodes* of *Circe*, the *Syrens*, *Polypheme*, and the like, are neceſſary to the Action of the *Odyſſeis*, and yet they are not humanly probable. *Homer* artificially brings them under the *Human Probability*, by the Simplicity of thoſe before whom he cauſes theſe fabulous Recitals to be made. He ſays very pleaſantly, * *That the* Phæacans *liv'd in*

* Ἔισεν δ' ἐν Σχερίῃ ἑκὰς ἀνδρῶν ἀλφηστάων. Odyſſ. lib. 6.

an Iſland at diſtance from thoſe Countries where Men of a Genius dwelt. Ulyſſes knew them before he made himſelf known to them; and having obſerv'd that they were ſimple and credulous, and that they had all the Qualities of thoſe lazy People, that admire nothing ſo much as to hear of Romantick Adventures: He pleaſed them by theſe Recitals that are ſuited to their own Humour. But even here the Poet is not unmindful of his more underſtanding Readers. He has in theſe Fables given them all the Pleaſure that can be reaped from *Moral Truths*, ſo pleaſantly diſguiſed under theſe miraculous *Allegories*. 'Tis by this Means that he has reduced theſe Machines to Truth and a Poetical Probability.

Virgil likewiſe relates ſome of theſe Fables. He does not allow himſelf the ſame Pretence; he has others to fly to: One of the principal is, that he is not the Author of them. He relates them after *Homer*, whoſe Authority had already eſtabliſh'd them: So that he had leſs meaſures to take.

Chap. IV.

When one muſt make uſe of Machines.

THIS Queſtion is eaſily reſolved by the Practice of our Poets. We may in ſhort affirm, that Machines are to be made uſe of all over, ſince *Homer* and *Virgil* do nothing without

without them. They conſtantly put their Gods upon Duty. * *Petronius* with his uſual Vehemency orders that it ſhould be thus. "He "would have his Poet converſe leſs with "Men than with the Gods: Leave through-"out ſome Signs of his prophetical Tranſ-"ports, and of the Divine Fury that ſwells "him: He would have his Thoughts be full "of Fables, that is, of thoſe Allegories and "ingenious Figures, which, like *Ænigma's* "put the Invention of the Readers upon a "pleaſing Rack, and leave them to gueſs in "their Turns what the Poet himſelf has "written like a Prophet. Laſtly, he would "have a Poem be diſtinguiſhed from Hiſtory "in all its Parts, not only by the Numbers, "but by this Poetical Fury, which expreſſes "it ſelf only by Allegories, and does nothing "but by the Aſſiſtance of the Gods.

He therefore that would be a Poet, muſt leave *Hiſtorians* to write, that a Fleet was ſhattered by a Storm, and caſt upon a ſtrange Coaſt: And muſt ſay with *Virgil*, That *Juno* went to *Æolus*, and that this God upon her inſtance unkennel'd the Winds againſt *Æneas*.

* Non enim res geſtæ verſibus comprehendendæ ſunt, quod longe melius Hiſtorici faciunt: Sed per ambages Deorumque miniſteria, & fabuloſum ſententiarum tormentum præcipitandus eſt liber Spiritus; ut potius furentis animi vaticinatio appareat, quam religioſæ orationis ſub teſtibus fides.

Let him leave an Hiſtorian to write, That a young Prince behaved himſelf upon all Occaſions, with a great deal of Wiſdom and Diſcretion: And let him ſay with *Homer*, that *Minerva* led him by the Hand in all his Enterpriſes. Let an Hiſtorian relate, that tho' *Agamemnon* fell out with *Achilles*, yet he could not but acknowledge that he ſtood in need of his Aſſiſtance for the taking of *Troy*: And let a Poet ſay, that *Thetis*, diſguſted at the Affront offered to her Son, goes up to Heaven, demands Satisfaction of *Jupiter*; and that this God, to ſatisfy her, ſends the *God of Sleep* to *Agamemnon*, who puts the Cheat upon him, by making him believe he muſt take *Troy* that very Day.

Plutarch, *Livy*, and other Authors of the *Roman Hiſtory*, will tell us, that he who preſcribed Laws to the *Romans*, ſhut himſelf up in a Wood, and feign'd that a Nymph dictated ſuch Laws to him, as afterwards he ſhould propoſe to his Subjects. A Poet will ſay, that *Æneas* being alone with *Sibyl* of *Cumæ* in the Foreſt of *Averna*, ſhe makes him go done to the *Infernal Shades*, and there ſee the Rewards of good, and the Puniſhments of bad Actions; and that the *Manes* of *Anchiſes* informed him what ſort of Genius he ſhould inſpire that State with, which he was going to eſtabliſh in *Italy*. And if we would Poetically reduce this Fiction into the Probability of Hiſtory; let us not like an Hiſtorian ſay, that as *Numa* feigned he had

had Conferences with *Egeria*, ſo *Æneas* feigns that *Sibyl* made him ſee in a Dream all that we read of in the ſixth Book: But let us ſay that this Hero was let out of Hell by that Gate which was appointed for the ſending out of *Falſe Dreams*.

'Tis thus that our Poets make uſe of Machines in all the parts of their Works. We might take a more particular view of them, if we would but examine all the parts of the Poem and the Narration. The Propoſition in each of our three Poems makes mention of the Gods; the Invocation is addreſſed to them, and the Narration is full of them. The *Gods* are the Cauſes of the Actions. They make the *Plots*, and diſpoſe the *Solution* of them too. This is ſo plain that it needs no farther Proof. I will inſiſt only on the unravelling of the Plots, which we may look upon as that part of the Poem, which is the moſt important in this Point, eſpecially if we conſider that *Ariſtotle* and *Horace* have treated of Machines more expreſly in this, than in any othe part of the Poem.

* *Ariſtotle* ſpeaking of *Tragedy* tells us, That the Solution of the Fable ſhould proceed from the Fable it ſelf, and not from any *Machine*, as in the *Medea*. *Horace* ſeems

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* Φανερὸν ἓν ὅτι καὶ τὰς λύσεις τῶν μύθων ἐκ αὐτῶ δεῖ μύθω συμβαίνειν, καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ μηχανῆς ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ Μηδείᾳ ἀπὸ μηχανῆς. Ariſt. Poet. c. 15.

leſs

leſs ſevere. He only ſays, *That the Gods ſhould not appear, but when the Dignity of the Plot requires their Preſence.* But this is only deſigned for the Theatre. This is obſervable by the Conſequence of theſe Quotations. If *Ariſtotle* had intended in this to ſpeak of the *Epopea*, he ſhould have produced for his Inſtances the unravelling of the *Iliad*, and that of the *Odyſſeis*, in both of which the Gods are concerned. *Minerva* fights cloſe to *Ulyſſes* againſt the Gallants of *Penelope*; ſhe helps him to kill them, and on the Morrow claps up a Peace between *Ulyſſes* and the *Ithacans*, and ſo concludes the *Odyſſeis*. In the *Iliad*, the Gods meet to appeaſe the Anger of *Achilles*, and *Jupiter* ſends *Iris*, *Thetis*, and *Mercury*, on this Errand. *Minerva* likewiſe helps *Achilles* in his laſt Fight with *Hector*. She ſtops *Hector* that fled from him, and when both had caſt their Javelins at each other without doing the leaſt Hurt, the Goddeſs takes up the Lance of *Achilles*, and gives it him, whilſt *Hector* is upon unequal Terms, arm'd only with his Sword. *Virgil* has imitated theſe Examples. *Æneas* as well as *Achilles* is clad in Divine Armour. *Juturna* gives *Turnus* his Sword agen, and *Venus* helps *Æneas* to his Spear: And at laſt *Jupiter* ſends a *Fury*, which drives away *Juturna*, and frightens *Turnus* ſo, that he ſcarce knew where he was, nor what he did in this laſt Battle.

CHAP. V.

Chap. V.

How the Machines *are to be us'd.*

THe uſe of the *Machines* in the *Epopea* is quite contrary to that which *Horace* preſcribes for the Theatre. This Critick would not have them be made uſe of in Tragedy, but when needs muſt: And on the contrary, 'tis requiſite that an *Epick Poet* ſhould not make uſe of them, but when they might be let alone, and then he ſhould order them ſo, that his Action ſtand in no need of them. How many Gods and Machines does *Virgil* make uſe of to raiſe the Storm, which caſts *Æneas* upon *Carthage?* And yet this does not hinder but that this miraculous Action may be look'd upon as the ordinary Effect of a meer natural Cauſe. * He makes one of his Perſonages ſay, that the Cauſe of this Storm, which ſurpriz'd the *Trojans*, was the Riſing of the bluſtring Conſtellation of *Orion*. Upon this the † Commentators have well obſerv'd; that the *Poetical Gods* can do no harm, unleſs they have ſome favourable Opportunity of doing it. 'Tis never to be ſup-

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* Cum ſubito aſſurgens fluctu nimboſus Orion
In vada cæca tulit. *Æn.* 1.

† Et ſciendum quod Dii niſi data occaſione nocere non poſſunt.

pos'd

pos'd that there are any Storms during the *Halcyonian Days*. This would be an Affront to the Power of the Gods, by aſcribing to them ſuch a Force as contradicts *Poetical Probability*. So that, tho' beſide this ſhort Seaſon, there is ſcarce any part of the Year, but when very probably, and without a Miracle, one might be toſs'd about with a Storm, yet *Virgil* raiſes his Storms only in a Seaſon that is more particularly ſubject to them. The four we read of in the *Æneid*, do all happen during the Riſing of *Orion*. The firſt caſts *Æneas* upon *Carthage*; the ſecond ſurprizes him a hunting with *Dido*; the third obliges him to put into *Sicily*, where he celebrates the Anniverſary of *Anchiſes*; and the fourth cloſes the fine Day he had choſe for the Sports, and quenches the Fire that burnt his Fleet. The Poet informs us that all theſe Storms which ſurpriz'd *Æneas*, were the Effects of one and the ſame Cauſe. * For *Dido* chides *Æneas* for preparing to leave her, whilſt this dangerous Conſtellation had ſtill an influence o'er the Sea; and ſhe conjures him (tho' in vain) to ſtay till this bad Seaſon was over.

According to this Practice, a Poet will be very cautious how he makes uſe of a *Machine* to help him out of a Difficulty, wherein his

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* Quin etiam Hyberno moliris ſidere claſſem.
Expecta facilemque fugam, ventoſque ferentes.
Æn. 4.

own

own Unskilfulneſs has caſt him. But he will call in the Aſſiſtance of the Gods to honour his Poem and Hero, and no one will object againſt him, that 'tis for want of Art and Invention, that he is oblig'd to implore the Aid of theſe ſupernatural Powers. No one will caſt theſe Reproaches upon *Virgil* in the Examples we have cited, nor in his other Machines. It was not for want of Skill or Invention, that he had recourſe to *Juno* and *Neptune*, either to raiſe a Storm upon the Fleet of *Æneas*, or to lay it again. So likewiſe, a Woman ſtabb'd to the Heart with a Ponyard, as *Dido* was, might very well die of the Wound, without *Iris*'s being ſent by *Juno* to clip a Lock of Hair off her Head. A Ship well mann'd, and near the Haven, might without any Miracle enter in before another that was farther off. 'Tis therefore without any Neceſſity that the Poet makes uſe of the Gods therein, and ſays that *Mneſtheus* would have gain'd the Prize perhaps, had not *Cloanthes* put up ſo many Vows, and had not ſo many *Sea-Gods* that heard him, lent him a helping hand.

Virgil makes uſe of ſeveral ways, from whence one may diſcover there was no Neceſſity for Machines. Sometimes the thing that is done by a God is neceſſary, but it might as well have been done by a Mortal. *Æneas* ſhould be inform'd of what had happen'd to *Dido*: But there was no need that *Venus* ſhould diſguiſe her ſelf under the Shape

of

of a *Tyrrhenian* Damſel, that was hunting in a Wood. A mere Damſel might have informed him: And 'tis thus that we ought to interpret the Changes of the Gods into Men. Theſe are the ways whereby Poets expreſs themſelves. An Hiſtorian would ſay that *Beroe* excited the other *Trojan* Dames to fire their Fleet: And a Poet ſays, that *Iris*, ſent expreſs by *Juno*, takes upon her the Shape of *Beroe*.

Sometimes the Action aſcrib'd to a Deity cannot be done by a mere Man: But then this Action ſhall not be at all neceſſary. A mere Mortal cannot transform the Ships of *Æneas* into Nymphs. But then whether they are thus transform'd, or whether they are deſtroy'd by Fire, ſtill they are loſt. Nor can any one ſee what Alteration one of theſe two Incidents would have caus'd in the Affairs of *Æneas* more than the other.

I have already mention'd the *Infernal Shades* of the ſixth Book, the *Fury* that was ſent by *Jupiter* to *Turnus*, and ſeveral other.

We may therefore conclude that a *Machine* in the *Epick Poem* is not an Invention to wind ones ſelf out of any Difficulty, that is intricate, affected, and proper to ſome parts of the Poem: But that 'tis the Preſence of a Deity, and ſome ſupernatural, extraordinary Action, which the Poet inſerts into almoſt all the Incidents of his Work, to make it look more majeſtical and ſurprizing, and to give his Readers a Leſſon of Piety and Vertue.

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This Mixture ſhould be ſo made, that one might retrench the *Machines* without cutting off any thing from the Action.

CHAP. VI.

Whether the Preſence of the Gods is any Diſparagement to the Heroes.

THE Care of our Poets in making the Actions and Deſigns of their Hero's to ſucceed by the Aſſiſtance of the Gods, puts me upon adding the following Reflections to what has been already ſaid. One would think there was no queſtion to be made whether the Love and Favour of God was an Honour or a Diſparagement to thoſe he thus loves and favours. And yet, we ſuffer our ſelves to be ſo far preposſeſs'd with ſenſible and ordinary things, that we become liable to more extravagant Thoughts. We judge of the Juſtice, the Favours, and (if I may ſo ſay) of the Duties of God; juſt as we do of the Juſtice, the Favours, and the Duties of Men. In a Fight between two Perſons, if a third ſteps in, and aſſiſts one of them to kill the other, we blame that third Perſon, and with him condemn his Friend, who was ſo much a Coward as to ſtand in need of Succour. To protect them both from Diſgrace, theſe Thoughts are proper, and this Indignation juſt.

juſt. But Men treat God after the ſame manner. "*Jupiter*, ſay they, ſhould not have "aſſiſted *Æneas*. Was not this Hero brave "enough to fight *Turnus* alone, and valiant "enough to conquer him? Where is there "any need then of this foreign Aſſiſtance? "Does it not reflect upon the Hero and the "God too? And would *Turnus* have done "leſs, had he had the ſame Advantage? This is their way of arguing: from whence it muſt be inferr'd, that the Love and Favour of God will ſerve only to make thoſe, that he would aſſiſt, and that venture to make uſe of that Aſſiſtance, appear weak, impotent, cowardly, and not worthy of being Conquerors. One ſhould thereupon never pray to him, nor thank him for any happy Succeſs. And by this means the Character of *Mezentius* will be the Character of a perfect Hero, and of a truly valiant Man. This Bravo is not for having his Glory eclipſed by the Aſſiſtance of any Deity: His Sword and his Arm are the only Gods he acknowledges and invokes. He vows a Trophy to his Victory; but this Vow is only addreſſed to his Son *Lauſus*, whom he deſigns to adorn with the Spoils of vanquiſh'd *Æneas*. Theſe are the Prayers he makes for his Victory, and theſe the Thankſgivings he deſigns to make. And theſe are likewiſe the Heroes thoſe Men would make, who find fault with *Jupiter* and *Minerva* for having beſtowed the Victory on *Æneas*, *Achilles*, and *Ulyſſes*.

'Tis

'Tis true, it would reflect upon an Hero, if himſelf did nothing; if the Hope and the Confidence he plac'd in the Promiſes and Favour of God rendring him more negligent, he ſhould wait for the Effect with his Hands in his Boſom; or elſe, if expoſing his Weakneſs and his little Valour, and being juſt upon the Point of yielding, he ow'd his Preſervation and his Victory only to Gods and Miracles. But the Practice of our Poets removes this Inconveniency, and we have fully ſatisfied the World as to this Point, when we obſerved, that the Preſence and the Action of the Gods ſhould be ſo order'd, that one might retrench ev'ry thing that was extraordinary and miraculous, without making any Alteration in the Action of the Humane Perſonages. By this means the *Epopea* will be neither a School of Impiety and Atheiſm, nor of Idleneſs and Sloath. But Men will there learn to adore God, and acknowledge him as the only and neceſſary Principle of all the Good that can be done, and without whom the moſt puiſſant Princes, and the moſt accompliſhed Heroes cannot ſucceed in any of their Deſigns. 'Tis he that inſpires Men with good Deſigns, gives them Courage to undertake them, and Power to execute them. Men will learn to reſpect, and ſubmit to him; becauſe this Submiſſion and Humility, which makes even Great Men ſtoop to their God, is the Cauſe and the Occaſion of their being elevated above the reſt of Mankind. They will

will learn to fear him, by conſidering the Misfortunes thoſe Men bring upon themſelves who abandon him: And becauſe when our Paſſions have ſhut our Eyes and ſtop'd our Ears to his Orders and Inſtructions, we are too ſlow in apprehending what a dreadful thing it is to make him our Enemy. They will put an entire Confidence in his Words and Promiſes: But withal knowing that they ſuppoſe one ſhall merit the Effects of them by uſing ones utmoſt Endeavours, an Hero will ſo behave himſelf in all his Actions, as if he ought to gain the Succeſs alone, without the Aſſiſtance of the Deity: Becauſe, as the Ancients ſay, the Gods do not abſolutely give us what they ſeem to give us, but they ſell it at the Price of our Labours.

But if on one hand God be the Author of all the good we do; 'tis true likewiſe to ſay that 'tis our ſelves that really do, whatever God does in and by us: And ſince theſe Actions which God inſpires into us, procures for us, and for which he gives us all the Courage and Strength that is neceſſary, are truly and properly our own Actions; it follows that the more God helps and favours us, the more Glory and Honour he does us. And this is the difference that is between the Aſſiſtance of God and that of Men. The Actions of Men belong only to thoſe that do them: So that their Aid diminiſhes our Glory, as much as the Divine Aſſiſtance heightens it. Our Poets inform us thus much; and

Achilles

Achilles who was ſo jealous of his Honour, knows well enough how to make the Diſtinction we have here propoſed. He was too high ſpirited to admit of the leaſt Aſſiſtance which might leſſen his Glory: He charges the *Grecians* to keep off from *Hector*, whom he purſues. But when *Minerva* offers to aſſiſt him in this Purſuit, and to help to conquer and kill him, he was ſo far from rejecting this Divine Aid, that he thinks it an Honour to him, and brags of it ev'n to *Hector* himſelf.

Monſieur *Cornouille* will allow me to end this Point with what he has ſaid about it in his *Andromeda*: *Phineus* caſts the ſame Reflections upon his Rival *Perſeus*, as one might upon *Æneas*. But he is young, paſſionate, and impious, and has the Character of *Mezentius*, * in that he acknowledges no other Gods but the Eyes of *Andromeda*; ſo that he is very fit to act that Part. Queen *Caſſiopea* makes the Anſwer to him.

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* J'en jure par ſes yeux, & mes uniques Rois, & mes uniques Dieux.

PHI-

PHINEUS.

WHAT has he done, that's worthy to be (prais'd,
But what another might, if Jove *had pleas'd?*
Let him be arm'd like us, what Enterprize
Dare he then undertake, all Hero as he is?
Ten thouſand might have been than him more (brave,
Had Heav'n but deign'd to help them like this (Slave:
They would have been more generous and great,
The Monſter ſlain, the Danger at their Feet.
'Tis eaſy vent'ring, when the Fear is o'er,
To fight a Foe, that can offend no more;
To ſeize the certain Conqueſt, when 'tis won:
And this is all th' Exploit that he has done.
Now what Reward, what Praiſe, I can't conceive,
So mean a Conqueſt merits to receive.

CASSIOPEA.

WHAT merits praiſe, you ſcorn: A (Blindneſs this
~~*None can conceive.*~~
Heav'n than our ſelves knows better what we (are;
As Men deſerve, ſo they its Favours ſhare.
You might have had as great an Aid Divine,
Had Jove *but ſeen, like his, your Vertues ſhine.*
But theſe are ſpecial Favours, plac'd on high,
Which vulgar Souls can ne'er expect to ſee.
The Gods, being juſt, reſerve this ſpecial grace
Only for noble Souls, and for the Heav'n-born (Race.

The End of the Fifth Book.

Monſieur Bossu's TREATISE OF THE EPICK POEM.

BOOK VI.

Concerning the Thoughts *and the* Expreſſions.

Chap. I.

The Foundation of this Doctrine.

THE Doctrine of the Thoughts, and that of the Expreſſion, ſtand upon the ſame Foundation. Both this and that is nothing elſe but the Art of imprinting on our Auditors ſuch Ideas as we would have them

them receive. It ſeems as if this Notion belonged rather to the Expreſſions than the Thoughts; ſince the Thoughts being nothing elſe but Ideas, one would imagine that if they were well expreſſed, that would be ſufficient to imprint them on the Minds of the Hearers. But you will ſee that this is not enough, if you reflect, that there is a great deal of difference between making any one comprehend what we think and have a mind to, and the inſpiring into him the ſame Inclinations, and the ſame Thoughts. A good Expreſſion is enough for the firſt. But it often happens, that if I would give another the ſame Inclinations, which I have my ſelf, I ſhall ſucceed better, if I expreſs quite contrary Thoughts, than if I clearly diſcovered the Ideas of my Mind, and my real Thoughts. If we pretend an Eſteem and Friendſhip for any one in the Preſence of a jealous and envious Rival, we ſhall not make him conceive any of thoſe good Thoughts for him, but, on the contrary, we ſhall render the Perſon, in whoſe Behalf we ſpeak, odious and contemptible to him. Figurative Speeches may likewiſe furniſh us with Inſtances of this Nature. We expreſs not our preciſe Thought in an Hyperbole, we ſay a great deal more of a thing than we conceive of it, and more than we would have others conceive of it; and the *Irony* does the contrary.

Therefore this part of *Elocution* we are ſpeaking of, does not conſiſt in expreſſing ones

ones Ideas, or in making others apprehend the Ideas we propoſe; but in propoſing ſuch Ideas as may imprint thoſe that we would have imprinted, let them be the ſame with thoſe we propoſe, or the contrary, or any other. So that three things are expedient for this Purpoſe. Firſt, to have a right Conception of the Idea we would imprint on the Minds of the Auditors, it muſt be pure and diſengag'd from all thoſe that may prejudice our Deſign. Secondly, to know what *Thoughts* are moſt proper to imprint this Idea, by conſidering the preſent Humour, Intereſt, and Diſpoſition of our Audience. And thirdly, to make a good Choice of ſuch Expreſſions as are moſt proper and ſuitable.

That which is moſt commonly prejudicial to the firſt of theſe, namely, to the Purity of the Ideas, is, that beſide each particular Idea which we imagine, there is likewiſe a general Idea, which ſeldom fails mixing with almoſt all the reſt: 'Tis that Idea which we conceive of our ſelves, and which we would fain repreſent as great, fine, excellent, and in a word, ſuch as we our ſelves conceive it. This is evident, eſpecially in that kind of Oration which the Rhetoricians have ſtil'd the *Demonſtrative*. It ſeems as if an Orator in ſuch an Harangue ſpeaks more to entertain us with a vaſt Idea of himſelf than of his Hero: And when we go away from hearing the *Panegyrick* of any Saint or Perſon of Quality; 'tis ſeldom that we praiſe or diſpraiſe either

the one or the other of them upon the Account of what the Orator has ſaid: But we only cry, That this Orator has an eloquent Tongue, or that he is but ſo, ſo: As if we went to hear his Speech, only to paſs a Judgment upon his, not the Hero's Perſon. The two other kinds of *Oratorical Diſcourſes* are not wholly free from this Vice. Some are ſo vain, as to attempt it upon all Occaſions, and at ev'ry turn. They are full of this vaſt Idea of themſelves, that they cannot keep it in, but out it muſt come, ſpread every where, and like a Deluge overflow all the Judgment, and little Senſe they have. We can produce Inſtances enow, even in the *Juridical Kind*, though that is more confin'd than the other two.

Beſides, did theſe Perſons underſtand wherein a true Praiſe does conſiſt, and were they Maſters of the ſecond Quality we requir'd, which is, to know what Thoughts and Sentiments a Man ſhould propoſe in order to raiſe a great Idea of himſelf in the Minds of thoſe that hear him; they would then correct this firſt Default, they would ſpeak correctly, and ſay nothing but what was of Conſequence and to the Purpoſe. But ſince their firſt Error proceeds from a Defect in Judgment, it cannot be alone. They imagine that the true Eſteem of an *Orator* or a *Poet* conſiſts chiefly in fine Thoughts, in ſtrong and lofty *Expreſſions*, in Paſſions carry'd on to an Extream, or in other ſuch like things, which

in

in truth belong not to Eloquence, and ſometimes produce Effects quite contrary to the Deſign of an unjudicious Author.

A Lawyer, for inſtance, will imagine that his Eſteem depends upon making a ſet Speech, adorn'd with Figures, and full of a great many pretty *Antitheſes:* He will be ſure to heap Figure upon Figure in his Pleading: And chuſe rather to enervate a good Argument, and cloſe his Cauſe by an unpardonable Flight, than not give his *Antitheſes* all the Embelliſhments he judges they are capable of. This is what *Pedius* did according to *Perſius*'s Account of him.

* *Theft (ſays th' Accuſer) to thy Charge I lay,*
O Pedius! *What does gentle* Pedius *ſay?*
Studious to pleaſe the Genius of the Times,
With Periods, Points, and Tropes, he ſlurs his Crimes.

[*Engliſh'd thus by Mr.* Dryden.]

Martial's *Poſthumus* was troubled with another kind of Whim. He had a vaſt Eſteem for the Knowledge of Hiſtory, and thought this *Science* muſt needs make him paſs for a very learned Man. He therefore ſoon quits

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* Fur es, ait Pedio. Pedius quid? Crimina raſis
Librat in Antithetis. Doctus poſuiſſe figuras
Laudatur. *Perſ. Sat.* 1.

his Subject, to declaim againſt *Hannibal*, and *Mithridates*, and to plead the *Romans* Cauſe: As if the Matter in Debate were concerning their being Conquerors of the World, whereas in truth the Controverſy was only about *three Kids*. It was not ſufficient to inform this Pleader of the Proceſs of his Cauſe, and of the Buſineſs on Foot; 'twas likewiſe requiſite he ſhould be inform'd of what he was to have no hand in.

* *With Poiſ'nings, Murders, Rapes, we've*
nought to do;
The Judge impatiently expects that you
Should prove how contrary to Roman *Laws*
My Neighbour ſtole my Kids: *For that's the*
Cauſe.
But you with ſtretch'd out Hands and clamorous Bawl
Thunder the Punick War *around the Hall;*
Who fought with Mithiridates; *how much Blood*
Was ſpilt at Cannæ; *how that* Sylla *ſtood*

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* Non de vi, neque cæde, nec veneno;
Sed lis eſt mihi de tribus *Capellis.*
Vicini queror has abeſſe furto.
Hoc Judex ſibi poſtulat probari.
Tu *Cannas*, *Mithridaticumque* bellum,
Et perjuria *Punici* furoris,
Et *Syllas*, *Marioſq*; *Mucioſq*;
Magna voce tonas, manuq; tota:
Jam dic, *Poſthume*, de tribus *Capellis.* Mar. Lib. 6. Epig. 19.

Competitor

Competitor with Marius, *ſought his Doom;*
And how bold Scævola *protected* Rome.
Enough of this.—Now, prithee, Lawyer, tell
What ſad Miſhap to my three Kids *befell.*

The more Vanity any Man has, the more ſubject he is to theſe Vices. Therefore Poets ſhould be more upon their Guards, than Orators. The Compoſures of the laſt are only to be ſpoken, and to eſtabliſh for their Authors a preſent Fame. But a Poet has Immortality ſo much in his Thoughts, that he fanſies he has enough and to ſpare on't; and promiſes it with ſo much Confidence to others, as if his own where indiſputable, and as if all his Enemies were deſtroy'd to the very laſt Rat and Butter-Wiſe. Theſe Poets will ſtuff a Poem with *Deſcriptions* either ill placed, or ill manag'd, with affected and uſeleſs Figures, with forc'd and inſipid Sentences, with Similes more fine than juſt, and with other ſuch like Ornaments: And by this means they deſtroy the Idea they ought to give of their Subject, by imprinting on their Readers Minds nothing elſe but the Idea of their Knowledge, Eloquence, and fine Genius, becauſe they forſooth fanſy that the Politeneſs of a Genius, and the Honour of an Author conſiſts in theſe things. They judge of the *Ancients* and *Moderns* according to theſe Ideas; and ſuppoſe they have excell'd *Homer* and *Virgil*, and all other Poets, when

(without minding the *Character*, or any thing elſe that is peculiar and proper to each Poem) they have heap'd up in that, which they compoſe, whatever appear'd beautiful in all the reſt; and when they have tranſplanted theſe pretended Beauties with as little Skill, as if the Noſe or the Lips of an handſom Perſon, had the ſame Comelineſs upon all ſorts of Faces, without any Diſtinction of Age, Sex, or Proportion.

This was not *Virgil*'s Opinion, when he imitated the *Greek* Poet. He has given another ſort of Character to his *Æneid*; and he well obſerv'd, that this oblig'd him to give the things he borrow'd, a quite different Turn. This made him ſay, "That 'twas harder to "ſteal one Verſe from *Homer*, than to rob "*Hercules* of his Club. This great Man had juſt and pure Ideas, and perfectly knew how to inſpire his Audience with them, without quitting his Deſign, to run after falſe Lights, and glittering Thoughts, by an indiſcreet Vanity, more pardonable in the Rawneſs of a Scholar, than in the Maturity of a Maſter. Let us apply this to ſome general Thoughts.

CHAP. II.

Chap. II.

Concerning Deſcriptions.

Deſcriptions are properly ſuch Speeches as explain the Parts and Properties of ſome thing or other. This Term ſometimes extends even to Actions: But that of a Recital or Narration is more proper to them, eſpecially when theſe Recitals are of ſome Length, ſuch as is that of the Tempeſt in the firſt Book of the *Æneid*, the Sports of the fifth, the *Infernal Shades* of the next Book, the Battles of the ſecond Part, with ſeveral others which I was willing to comprehend under what I ſaid concerning the Narration. They are too conſiderable to be mention'd here under the Name of *Sentiments* or ſimple *Thoughts*. The *Deſcriptions* we now ſpeak of, are only Parts of theſe long Recitals. They therefore muſt be ſhort; and moreover, neceſſary and ſuited to the general *Character* of the Poem, and to the particular *Character* of the Subject matter that is deſcribed, as far as poſſible.

The Deſcription of *Carthage*, which *Virgil* makes the Frontiſpice of his *Æneid*, is contained in ſix Verſes. It tells us that this City is ſeated over againſt *Italy*, facing the very Mouth of *Tiber*; that it is powerful in War, and that *Juno* had a mind to make it the Seat of the Univerſal Monarchy. This is

the Cauſe of the Anger of this Deity, and that which makes the *Plot* of the Poem.

The Readers would not have imagined how *Æolus* could keep in and let looſe the Winds as he thought fit, if they had not been informed, that they are incloſed in Caverns. The Poet ſpends twelve Verſes upon it.

The Ships of *Æneas*, ſo roughly handled by a Tempeſt, and at a Seaſon when the Sea was liable to frequent and unforeſeen Storms, had need of an Harbour, that was free from this Danger, and very ſtill; and ſince it was in a ſtrange and unknow Country, 'twas requiſite this Haven ſhould be in a private and ſecret Place. This is what *Virgil* deſcribes in Eleven Verſes.

Venus preſents her ſelf to her Son, diſguiſed like a Maid. The Poet is obliged to tell how this Maid happen'd to be in a wide Foreſt. He repreſents her in a hunting Habit. He is likewiſe obliged to reduce to Probability ſuch an extraordinary thing as that of a Maid in Armour. A *Deſcription* of ſeven Lines does it compleatly.

Deſcriptions ſometimes are mix'd with ſome Paſſion or other. In this Caſe not only the Thread of the Diſcourſe ſhould make them very natural; but they ſhould likewiſe be in ſome meaſure aſſiſting to the Paſſions to which they are join'd. That fine *Deſcription* of a calm and quiet Night in the Fourth Book, renders the cruel Diſturbances of *Dido* a great deal more moving, ſince they rob her of

of that Reſt which all Nature enjoy'd, to the very vileſt and moſt deſpicable Creatures.

* *'Twas Night, each weary Creature took its Eaſe;*
Huſh'd were the Woods, and ſilent were the Seas:
Pois'd in their Height the Stars did ſeem to reſt,
Each Field was ſtill, whilſt ev'ry Bird and Beaſt,
The Monſters of the Deep, the ſavage Bears,
Were laid to ſleep, and dos'd away their Cares.
Only unhappy Dido *finds no Reſt,*
Poor Queen! So tortur'd is her Love-ſick Breaſt.

If inſtead of this admirable Turn, † *Only unhappy Dido*, the Poet, carrying his *Deſcription* farther, had ſaid:

§ Whilſt the *Dardanian* does ſecurely reſt
In his tall Ship for ſudden Flight prepar'd:

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* Nox erat, & placidum carpebant feſſa ſoporem
Corpora per terras: Sylvæque & ſæva quierunt
Æquora: cum medio volvuntur ſydera lapſu.
Cum tacet omnis ager, pecudes pictæque volucres,
Quæq; lacus late liquidos, quæq; aſpera dumis
Rura tenent: Somno poſitæ ſub nocte ſilenti,
Lenibant curas & corda oblita laborum.
At non infœlix animi Phœniſſa, nec unquam
Solvitur in ſomnos. ———

† At non infœlix.

§ Æneas celſa in puppi, jam certus eundi,
Carpebat ſomnos, rebus jam rite paratis.

Then the whole would have been cold and inſipid.

The Deſcription of the *Trojans* being hard at work, and eager to leave *Carthage*, is likewiſe extreamly well manag'd. On one hand it ſhews what good Effect the Preſence of a Lord and Maſter has; for 'tis the Preſence of *Æneas* that haſtens their Work:

* *He does his Fleet without Delay prepare.*
The Trojans *ply the Work, the buſy Main*
Is fill'd with Noiſe, the Ships now float again.
" Whole Oaks, the Leaves unſtrip'd, for haſte unwrought,
" Down from the Wood for Oars and Maſts they brought.
On ev'ry ſide are ſeen deſcending down
Long Troops which bring Proviſions from the Town.

[*Engliſh'd thus by* Edm. Waller *and* Sidney Godolphin *Eſquires.*]

And on the other ſide the Conſequence is ſuch, that the Poet ſeems to expoſe this their Eagerneſs not ſo much to the Readers, as to

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——— * Claſſemque reviſit.
Tum vero Teucri incumbunt, & littore celſas
Deducunt toto naves, natat uncta carina.
Frondenteſque ferunt remos & robora ſylvis
Infabricata fugæ ſtudio. ———
Migrantes cernas, totaque ex urbe ruentes. Æn. 4.

Dido's

Dido's view. She there ſaw the Preparative of her Death; and ev'ry Blow the Ax and Hammer ſtruck, went like ſo many Stabs of a Dagger to her very Heart. Can any thing be more moving than the ingenious Application *Virgil* makes?

† *What were thy Thoughts, ſad* Dido! *on that Day?*
How deep thy Sighs? When from thy Tower above
Thou ſawſt the Phrygians *in ſuch Order move,*
And heardſt the Tumult of the clamorous Sea?

[Engliſhed thus by the ſame Perſons.]

If in the middle of a great Action, any thing is deſcrib'd, that ſeems to interrupt and diſtract the Reader's Mind; 'tis requiſite that the Effect of theſe Deſcriptions declare the Reaſon and Neceſſity of them, and that by this means they be embody'd, if I may ſo ſay, in the Action. We have one Inſtance of this in the Battle of the Eleventh Book of the *Æneid*, where the Poet runs out into ſo curious a Deſcription of the Arms and Dreſs of *Chloreus*.

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† Quis tibi tunc, Dido, cernenti talia ſenſus?
Quoſve dabas gemitus, cum littora fervere late
Proſpiceres arce ex ſumma? *Ibid.*

* Chloreus

* Chloreus, *the Prieſt of* Cybele, *did glare*
In Phrygian *Arms remarkable afar.*
A foaming Steed he rode, whoſe Hanches caſe,
Like Feathers, Scales of mingled Gold and Braſs.
He clad in foreign Purple, gall'd the Foe
With Cretan *Arrows from a* Lycian *Bow.*
Gold was that Bow, and Gold his Helmet too:
Gay were his upper Robes which looſly flew.
Each Limb was cover'd o're with ſomething Rare,
And as he fought he gliſtred every where.
[*Engliſh'd thus by Mr.* Stafford *in* Dryden's *Miſcellanies.* Part II. p. 491.]

The judicious Readers might perhaps have been diſguſted at this Beauty ſo carefully deſcribed in the very Heat of Battle, if the Poet had only made it for their Sakes. But 'tis not deſign'd ſo much for them as for *Camilla.* This Maid is ſo charmed at the ſight of his Accoutrements, that ſhe is wholly intent up-

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* Forte ſacer Cybele Chloreus, olimque Sacerdos
Inſignis longe Phrygiis fulgebat in armis;
Spumantemque agitabat equum, quem pellis ahenis
In plumam ſquamis auro conſerta tegebat.
Ipſe peregrina ferrugine clarus & oſtro,
Spicula torquebat Lycio Cortynia cornu:
Aureus ex humeris ſonat arcus, & aurea vati
Caſſida; tum croceam chlamydemque ſinuſque crepantes
Carbaſeos fulvo in nodum collegerat auro.
Pictus acu tunicas, & barbara tegmina crurum.

on

on the Conqueſt of them. The deſire of having them coſts her her Life, gives the Victory to the *Trojans*, and breaks all the Meaſures *Turnus* had taken againſt *Æneas*. Theſe are ſuch Diſcriptions as are juſt and manag'd with Diſcretion. They were not made for their own ſakes only, nor are they meer Ornaments.

Seneca is far from this Method. If he has any Recital to make, tho' never ſo melancholy and frightful, he begins it with ſuch Deſcriptions as are not only uſeleſs, but trifling and fooliſh. 'Tis requiſite we ſhould produce an Inſtance of it. *Creon* has a Story to tell *Oedipus*, that was the moſt melancholy, the moſt frightful, and the moſt ungrateful that ever could be told a King. He is intreated, he is threatned, and after great Signs of Grief for being forc'd to tell him ſuch terrible and afflicting things, he begins his Narration with the *Deſcription* of a *Grove*, which *Oedipus* knew as well as the *French King* knows the Forreſts of *Vincennes*, *Boulogne*, and S. *Germain*. But ſuppoſe *Oedipus* had never heard of it, was he then at Leiſure to be told, that it was full of Cypreſs Trees, Oaks, Laurel, Myrtle, Alder, and Pine Trees? That the Cypreſs Trees are always green, that the Laurel Trees bear bitter Berries, that the Alder Trees were proper to build Ships, which ride on the wide Ocean, *&c.* That the Oaks of this Grove had their Branches diſtorted and eat up with Age; that Time had gnawn the Bark

Bark off this; that the Roots of that could no longer ſupport it, and that it would tumble down, were it not prop'd up by the Trunk of another Tree. His Deſcription of all this is in theſe Words:

* *Far off from* Thebes, *where* Dirce's *ſacred Well*
With ſilent Streams bedews the neighbouring Plain,
There is a Grove *with darkeſt Shades o'er ſpread.*
Here Cypreſs lifting up its buſhy Head
Graces the Wood with never fading Green.
Here quite worn out with Age an Oak diſplays
Its crooked ſapleſs Arms; the Bark of This
Devouring Time has gnawn; The Root of that
Sits looſe, and throws it 'gainſt another Tree.
Here bitter Lawrel, limber Oſiers grow,
Soft Myrtle to the Paphian Goddeſs ſacred,
Tough Alder fit for Ships and maſſy Oars,
The lofty Pine that dares the ſtrongeſt Storm,
And turns its knotty ſide againſt the Wind.
I'th' middle ſtands a Tree of mighty Bulk
Protecting all the leſſer Under-wood,
And throwing all abroad its ſpreading Boughs,
Defends at once, and ſhades the ſubject Grove.

[*Engliſh'd thus by* J. Hoadley *of* Cath. Hall.]

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* Eſt procul ab urbe lucus ilicibus niger, Dircæa circa, &c. *Sen. Oedip. Act.* 3.

CHAP.

Chap. III.

Of Comparisons or Similes.

WE very commonly explain our selves by *Similes*, and make use of them, the better to make others apprehend what we propose, and to give them a just Idea thereof. There are two essential Qualities belonging to them; the first is, that the thing we make use of be better known, and easier to apprehend, than that we would make known by its Assistance; and the second is, that there be an exact Relation between them.

As for that which concerns the Knowledge of the thing we make use of in a *Simile*, there is no need that we should have seen it with our Eyes. 'Tis enough that we have the Testimony of common Opinion only on our side; tho' we know at the same time 'tis either false or fabulous. The *Phœnix*, the *Harpyes*, and the Adventures of *Hercules*, are as proper for this purpose, as a *Cock*, or a *Dog*, or the Actions of *Julius Cæsar*. Nor should we condemn such Excesses that are commonly to be met with in these *Similes*, as if they destroyed the justness of them: but we should consider that in this Case there is an *Hyperbole* added to the *Simile*. 'Tis therefore allowable to liken a valiant Captain to a Torrent that bears down all before it; to a Thunderbolt that meets with no Resistance, and to a

Lyon

Lyon in the midſt of a Flock of Sheep. But we are moſt liable to be deceiv'd in this Juſtneſs, if we look upon *Similes* only as Ornaments; for then we may neglect the Juſtneſs which is eſſential to them, and mind nothing elſe but a Luſtre and Beauty, which has nothing to do with the Eſſence. That we may not be deceived therein, we muſt be acquainted with the Deſign of the Poet, and the nature of the things he makes uſe of. Without this, one is in danger to be miſtaken, and to imagine that a juſt and ſuitable *Simile* is both falſe and vicious. Let us now ſee ſome Inſtances of this.

Virgil deſcribing the Beauty of *Aſcanius*, compares him to a precious Stone ſet in Gold, and to Ivory enchac'd in Box. It is true, that whoever imagines *Virgil* would ſay this young Prince was as handſome as a Piece of Ivory enchac'd in Box, would find this *Simile* to be very flat: and would have reaſon to complain that the Poet leſſens an Idea that he ought to raiſe. But we ſhall find that this *Simile* is juſt, if we would diſcover wherein it conſiſts, and obſerve, that the Author has diſtinguiſh'd two Things in *Aſcanius*. The one is the ſhining of his comely Head when bare: And the other is the Colour of his Complexion, and that of his Hair. The firſt is compared to a precious Stone enchac'd in Gold.

* *See*

* *See how the* Trojan *Youth, his Head all bare,*
Does like a Gem enchas'd in Gold appear.

This is both juſt and noble. But the whiteneſs of a Face would have been but pitifully expreſſed by a precious Stone. It is with a great deal more Juſtice compar'd to the whiteneſs of Ivory, and the Colour of his Hair to that of Box.

† *Or like to Ivory inclos'd in Box:*
So ſhine the Youth's diſhevel'd Yellow Locks
Upon his milky Neck.

In the ſixth Book there is a Compariſon very like this laſt. A Bough of Gold, which grew upon an Oak, the Poet compares to *Miſleto.* He would have taken off very much from the Luſtre of this precious Bough, if his Deſign had been to expreſs this Luſtre by that of the *Miſleto.* But this Property of Gold is very well known, and the bare naming of this Metal raiſes in us an Idea of it that is lovely and dazling enough: It ſtands in no need of being heightened by a Compa-

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* Dardanius caput ecce puer detectus honeſtum,
Qualis gemma micat fulvum quæ dividit aurum.
Æneid. 10.

——* Vel quale per artem
Incluſum buxo aut Oricia terebintho
Lucet ebur: fuſos cervix cui lactea crines
Accipit. —— *Ibid.*

riſon.

riſon. 'Tis a great deal more wonderful and extraordinary to ſee a Tree ſhoot forth a Branch of Gold, of ſo different a Nature from its own. This therefore calls for a *Simile:* and is the Subject of that which *Virgil* made. He does not fail making mention of the Diverſity of Natures that is between green and yellow *Miſleto*, and the Oak which produces it at a time when it has the leaſt Strength, and looks more like a dead Trunk than a living Plant.

* *Juſt as upon ſome ſapleſs Oak does grow*
I'th' midſt of Winter verdant Miſleto:

We may likewiſe ſay that this *Simile* is a Proof that Nature produces ſome things extraordinary, and renders the Fiction more probable. For *Virgil* does ſometimes make this uſe of the *Similes* he employs. This is manifeſt from *Æneas*'s accidental meeting with a *Carthaginian* Damſel, that was in Armour and a hunting. The Poet compares her to an *Amazon*, and to a *Spartan* Laſs. Theſe two Quotations prove that the meeting with a Damſel hunting in the Foreſt of *Carthage* is to be allow'd as exactly probable. This Simile then is a great deal better, more juſt, and more ingenious than if he had compared this Damſel to *Diana*; tho' this laſt

* Quale ſolet Sylvis, &c. *Æn.* 6.

would

would have ſeemed more noble, and have preſented it ſelf ſooner to the Mind.

If it ſeems natural to compare a Huntreſs to *Diana*, it ſeems no leſs ſo to compare a valiant Commander to a Lyon. Should not *Virgil* have done his Hero rather than *Turnus* this Honour? Yet he does the contrary. Perhaps 'tis becauſe the Character of the Lyon is Anger. He is the Emblem of it: And * *Horace* informs us that when *Prometheus* formed Man out of that which was proper to each Animal, that which he borrow'd from the Lyon was his Anger. The Similitude then of this Animal is not at all ſuitable to the Valour of *Æneas*, but a great deal more proper for that of *Turnus*. So that when the Poet did it, he was not at all ignorant of the Terms, *Anger* and *Fury*. He makes uſe of theſe very Expreſſions, when he likens *Turnus* to *Mars*, to whom he never compares *Æneas*.

We ſhould not make Compariſons between noble and ignoble, between great and inconſiderable things. But what is baſe and ignoble at one time and in one Country, is not always ſo in others. We are apt to ſmile at *Homer's* comparing *Ajax* to an Aſs in his

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* Fertur Prometheus addere principi
Limo coactus particulam undique
Deſectam, & inſani Leonis
Vim ſtomacho appoſuiſſe noſtro. *Lib.* 1. *Od.* 16.

Iliad.

Iliad. Such a Compariſon now-a-days would be indecent and ridiculous; becauſe it would be indecent and ridiculous for a Perſon of Quality to ride upon ſuch a Steed. But heretofore this Animal was in better Repute: Kings and Princes did not diſdain the Beaſt ſo much as meer Tradeſmen do in our times. 'Tis juſt the ſame with many other Similes which in *Homer's* time were allowable. We ſhould now pity a Poet, that ſhould be ſo ſilly and ridiculous as to compare a Hero to a piece of Fat: Yet *Homer* does it in a Compariſon he makes of *Ulyſſes*. And the *H. Ghoſt* himſelf, which cannot be ſuppoſed to have a wrong Senſe of things, begins the Encomium of *David* by this Idea. * *As is the Fat taken away from the Peace Offering, ſo was* David *choſen out of the Children of Iſrael.* The reaſon of this is, that in theſe Primitive times, wherein the Sacrifices of the true Religion as well as of the falſe, were living Creatures; the *Blood* and the *Fat* were reckon'd the moſt noble, the moſt auguſt, and the moſt holy things.

Compariſons do not leſſen the Paſſion of thoſe that hear them, but in the Perſons that ſpeak them they generally denote ſuch Reflections, as do not uſually proceed from a diſturb'd and unquiet Mind. So that it rarely happens that they ſeem natural and

* Eccl. 47. 2.

pro-

probable in the Mouth of a paſſionate Perſon. Yet obſerve what the enrag'd *Medea* ſays in *Seneca*.

* *Not time it ſelf ſhall cool my glowing Rage,*
Which grows in Strength ſtill as it grows in Age;
Cruel as Beaſts, or Scylla, *it ſhall be,*
Or as Charybdis *whoſe devouring Sea*
Sucks up th' Ionian *and* Sicilian *Main,*
Which meet, and ſhove each other back again;
So ſcorching and ſo hot ſhall be my Ire,
Titan *from* Ætna *ne'er belch'd half the Fire.*
[*Engliſh'd thus by* J. Hoadly *of* Cath. *Hall.*]

Such learned Paſſions are ſeldom violent. A Woman that takes notice that *Charybdis* ſwallows up the two Seas of *Ionium* and *Sicily*; and that the Flames which *Ætna* throws out, are belched by a Giant that is overwhelmed with the Weight of that Mountain, thinks upon ſomething elſe beſide her *Anger*.

Chap. IV.

Concerning Sentences.

THis Word *Sententia*, in Latin is very ambiguous. It ſignifies that part of Poetry, which we now treat of in this Book under

* Nunquam meus ceſſabit in pœnas furor, Creſcetq; ſemper, &c. *Med. Act.* 3.

the

the Name of *Sentiments* or *Thoughts*. It likewiſe ſignifies a *Sentence* of few Words, that contains ſome profitable *Thought* or other for the Conduct of human Life; ſuch as in theſe Inſtances: * *Learn to be juſt, and don't the Gods contemn. The Habits we contract in our Youth are of great Moment*, &c.

The Word *Sentence* in our Language does not fall under the firſt of theſe two Significations. Therefore in this Chapter we ſhall only take it in the latter Senſe, and underſtand by it, a Moral Inſtruction couch'd in a few Words.

Sentences then render Poems very uſeful, and beſides that, they have I know not what kind of Luſtre that pleaſes us. So that it ſeems natural to imagine, that the more any Work is embelliſh'd with them, the more it deſerves that general Approbation, which *Horace* promiſes to thoſe, that have the Art to mix the *Profitable* with the *Pleaſant*. But there is not any one Vertue, but what is attended with ſome dangerous Vice or other.

Too many Sentences make the Poem ſink into a Stile that is too *Philoſophical*; and caſt it into a Seriouſneſs that is leſs becoming the Majeſty of a Poem, than the Study of the Learned, and the Gravity of the Dogmatical. Theſe Thoughts have in their own Nature

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* Diſcite Juſtitiam moniti, & non temnere Divos. *Æn.* 6.

a cer-

a certain kind of calm Wiſdom, that is contrary to the Paſſions, and with which they inſpire us: They are ſuch as make the Paſſions languiſh as well in the Auditors, as in the Speakers. To conclude, the Affectation of ſpeaking by *Sentences* is the Cauſe that many fooliſh and trifling ones are ſpoken, or that they are ſpoken by ſuch, whoſe preſent State and Condition does not allow them to be ſo prudent and learned. We have a great many of theſe vicious Inſtances in *Seneca's Tragedies.*

The Misfortunes of *Hecuba* in the Loſs of her Kingdom, Husband, Children, and Liberty, render'd her no longer capable of any thing elſe, but barking, howling, and biting, to uſe the Poets Dialect, who for this reaſon have judiciouſly transform'd her into a Bitch. From whence then proceed theſe grave and moderate Sentences, and theſe fine Moral Reflections?

* *Let thoſe, who ſit on Thrones, and bear a Sway*
In Courts, who think the Gods will always be
Propitious to them, and maintain their State,
Look down on mine, and Troy's *unhappy Fate.*
From theſe ſad Turns of Fortune they may learn
Themſelves may die like Slaves, tho' Monarchs born.

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*. Quicunque regno fidit, & magna potens
Dominatur Aula, &c. *Troas. Act.* 1.

Certainly

Certainly theſe are not the *Thoughts* of this *Hecuba*, whoſe Name is borrow'd here. They are the *Thoughts* of *Seneca* the *Philoſopher* writing at quiet in his Study, and meditating upon the Misfortunes to which the Height of Fortune expoſes us. The only intereſt he takes upon him, is to draw from thence uſeful Maxims, and this fine Moral, which the glittering Thrones, and the dreadful Fall of the moſt puiſſant Monarchies ſupply'd him with.

Theſe are ſuch *Sentences* as are ill manag'd: Let us now take notice of others that are as ill employ'd, and yet are moreover cold, ridiculous, and abſurd.

Oedipus ſeeking out for a Remedy to ſuccour *Thebes*, that is reduced to the very Brink of Ruin, is forc'd at laſt to conjure up the Ghoſt of King *Laius*. He orders *Creon* to be preſent at that Ceremony, and afterwards to come and give him an Account of it. The Ghoſt appear'd, diſcover'd the Remedy according as it was requir'd, and *Creon* comes to give the King an Account of it. He begins with declaring, that he cannot tell how to utter his Mind; and by *Sentences* he makes this fooliſh Declaration to him:

* *We're loth to live, when by the nauſeous Pill*

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* Ubi turpis eſt medicina, ſanari piget, &c. *Oedip. Act.* 3.

Our

Our Health muſt be reſtor'd. Kings take it ill
They ſhould be told, what they ſometimes require.
Let me be ſilent: That's a ſmall Deſire
No King can well refuſe. If that's deny'd,
What can be granted me?

A Man muſt have a ſtrange Fancy to ſpeak *Sententiouſly*, that makes his Perſonages ſpeak thus upon ſuch an Occaſion. When he is upon declaring the only Remedy that could ſave a State, which his Silence would certainly ruin; is it not a great piece of Impertinence to ſay, *That the leaſt Favour that could be begged of a King, is to hold ones Peace; and that if it be not lawful to conceal this Remedy, nothing is lawful?* Yet *Oedipus*, who at the firſt Denyal made him by *Creon*, was ſo incenſed againſt him, * as to threaten him with Death; when he ſhould have been incenſed more againſt him for his perſevering in ſo unreaſonable a Denyal, and for his alledging ſuch fooliſh Reaſons, as would make one believe he jeer'd him to his Face: Yet, I ſay, as if *Oedipus* were of the Poets own Mind, and had a greater Inclination for *Sentences*, than for the Safety of his Subjects; he

* Itane & ſalutis publicæ indicium obrues. . . .
Mitteris Erebo vile pro cunctis caput,
Arcana ſacri voce ni relegis tua. *Ibid.*

ſeems to be wholly pacified, ſince he has the Patience to hear *Creon* ſay ſo many fine ones, and is willing to utter ſuch as well as he. And they too are of the ſame Stamp with thoſe we have already ſeen. This is his Anſwer, *That* **Oftentimes Silence does more Harm to Kings and States, than even ſpeaking does*; and that laſtly, † *he is no obedient Subject, that ſpeaks not when commanded.*

The firſt Remedy to cure theſe Indecencies, is to imagine we hear the true Perſons talking naturally together, and to ſuppoſe our ſelves in their Places, and ſee what we would ſay upon ſuch an Occaſion. By this means a Man may learn to uſe *Sentences* ſeldomer, and to retrench thoſe, that being not neceſſary to raiſe the Idea of that which he would repreſent, are only dreſs'd up for a Show. He will likewiſe learn to ſtrip a great many Thoughts of that ambitious Air, which forms a general Precept out of a Trifle. And he will ſay upon theſe Occaſions; *I command you to ſpeak, do you obey*: And not like *Seneca, he that does not ſpeak when commanded, does not do as we command him.* In ſhort, he will know how to manage the *Sentences* he makes uſe of better, and how to render them more juſt.

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* Sæpe vel lingua magis, Regi atque regno muta libertas obeſt.

† Imperia ſolvit, qui tacet juſſus loqui.

The

The ſecond Remedy is, ſo to expreſs theſe Sentences, that they be not too apparent; and that the Effect of them be felt before they are diſcern'd. This is § *Petronius*'s Opinion. He is in the right in referring us to our *Virgil:* For this Poet is admirable in the Art of inſerting Sentences.

But before we ſpeak of theſe *diſguiſed Sentences*, let us make this Reflection upon the others: That they are generally ſpoken either by a grave and tragical Perſon, or elſe by one of the common People.

Hitherto we have ſpoken concerning the firſt of theſe. And to that which we have already ſaid about it, we add, that the Poet ſhould make Choice either of ſuch as may excite to Action, and encourage thoſe to whom they are ſpoken, ſuch as this for inſtance;

* *Fortune aſſiſts the Brave and Daring Souls:*

Or ſuch as may augment the Paſſion, ſuch as theſe two figurative ones, of the ſame Stile;

† *Vile Avarice! What bold Attempts doſt thou*
Excite poor Mortals too?

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§ Curandum eſt, ne ſententiæ emineant extra corpus orationis expreſſæ, ſed intexto veſtibus colore niteant. Homerus teſtis & Lyrici, Romanuſque Virgilius, & Horatii curioſa felicitas. *Petron.*

* Audentes fortuna juvat. *Æn.* 10.

† Quid non mortalia pectora cogis
Auri ſacra fames? *Æn.* 3.

§ *All conquering Love! Who can reſiſt thy Sway?*

They are made uſe of quite another way with reſpect to the Vulgar, and the Perſons of *Comedy*. They are often brought in ſpeaking ſententiouſly, or (to ſpeak more properly) in *Proverbs* and *Punns*. The reaſon of this Difference is, that the grave Perſons invent what they ſay, according as the preſent Occaſion requires; ſo that their Sentences are ſo many nice or judicious Reflections, which ſhould be inſpir'd into them by Objects that are preſent. Now it ſeldom happens, that Objects which are preſent, inſpire theſe ſorts of general Thoughts into paſſionate and intereſted Perſons. 'Tis this that ought to regulate the uſe of them in Poems; and which Art and Nature have taught *Virgil* to practice. But the Vulgar never invent, they only ſay over again by rote what they have heard others ſay often, and what one may ſuppoſe they themſelves have ſaid an hundred times over. So that their *Sentences* coſt them no Reflection, nor the leaſt Premeditation. Beſides, they meet with no Paſſion, which they interrupt contrary to Art: But they only raiſe Laughter, and that is more conformable to the Art and Air of *Comedy*.

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§ Improbe Amor quid non mortalia pectora cogis? *Æn.* 4.

CHAP.

Chap. V.

Of Diſguis'd Sentences.

WE are now come to ſhew that the *Sentences* ſhould be diſguiſed; we ſhall in ſome Inſtances of *Virgil* propoſe the Methods whereby he has made theſe Diſguiſes. The moſt general Method is, not to declare the Moral Inſtruction in univerſal Terms, but to make an Application of it to the Action on foot. This, for inſtance, is a pure Sentence, and declar'd in univerſal Terms: *Thoſe who hate their Brethren in this Life, ſhall be ſeverely puniſh'd for't in Hell.* *Virgil* applys it to his Action by ſaying, that *Æneas* being in Hell, met there among the damn'd ſuch as had hated their Brethren here on Earth.

There are ſeveral ways of diſguiſing Sentences, and of applying them to the Action. ſometimes the Conſequence alone has this Effect, when the Poet has Skill enough to manage it well. In the ſecond Book of the *Æneid*, the *Trojans* were at a ſtand what they ſhould do with the Wooden Horſe, that the *Grecians* had left behind them. *Æneas* that tells the Story, relates the Opinions of ſeveral conſiderable Perſons, of *Thymœtes*,

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* Hic quibus inviſi fratres dum vita manebat,
Incluſi pœnam expectant. *Æn.* 6.

Capys, *Laccoon*, and others, and therewith he mixes the Diſcourſes of the People, *who in the Contrariety of their Opinions knew not on what to reſolve.* We here ſee nothing but a bare Recital of that which happen'd among the *Trojans* upon this Occaſion; this may be conceiv'd without a Sentence, and without a general and univerſal Propoſition. But if this *Thought* be taken from what follows and conſider'd alone, it is without doubt a Sentence, and a Diſcourſe that ſhews us in general the Nature and reſtleſs Inclinations of a People, that deliberate in a Hurry, and know not on what to reſolve:

* *The wavering Mob can't in their Votes agree;*
Some are for this, ſome that.

It is no matter by whom, and how many theſe Sentences are utter'd:

† *Ne're faint beneath the weight of any Ill:*
But boldly go, where're thy Fortune calls.
§ *Let's follow Fate where-ere it leads the way;*
Let what will come, Patience will take away
The Preſſure of it.

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* Scinditur incertum ſtudia in contraria vulgus.
† Tu ne cede malis, ſed contra audentior ito
Quo tua te fortuna ſinet. *Æn.* 6.
§ Quo Fata trahunt retrahuntque, ſequamur.
Quicquid erit, ſuperanda omnis fortuna ferendo eſt.
Æn. 5.

A Sentence is well expreſſed any of theſe ways: And theſe Thoughts taken from the Places where they are, and conſider'd without the Conſequence, as I here repreſent them, are true Sentences, and Moral Precepts, which fortify us againſt all manner of unlucky Accidents, and againſt the Oppoſitions of Fortune. But in the Series of the Poem, they are properly ſpeaking, neither Sentences, nor general Precepts, but Advices given to *Æneas* upon particular Occaſions.

The *Latin* Tongue has an Advantage over ours in this, by means of the *Ellipſis*. In *Latin* 'tis often as elegant to ſuppreſs, as 'tis to expreſs a Word. So that, ſuppreſſing the Word that makes the particular Application, one leaves the Thought in that kind of ingenious Ambiguity, which we obſerv'd in the foregoing Examples, where there is nothing to be underſtood. Here you have an inſtance of this *Ellipſis*. The *Trojans*, reduc'd to their laſt Shifts by *Turnus*, ſee *Æneas* advancing to ſuccour them. The Poet ſays, *Spes addita ſuſcitat iras.* This Expreſſion ſignifies equally, either in particular, that *the Hope they received rally'd and increas'd their Courage*; or in general, that *the Hope of approaching and certain Succour raiſes Men's Courage, and arms them with new Vigor.* If the Poet had added but one Word, and ſaid, *Ollis ſpes addita ſuſcitat iras*; The firſt Senſe would have been clearly expreſſed, and it would not have been a pure Sentence, but the Application of a

Sentence. The leaving out of this Word makes it a perfect Sentence. But this leaving out of a Word being ſo natural, that we can eaſily underſtand it, reduces the Sentence into the Body of the Diſcourſe, and prevents it, as I may ſo ſay, from being upon the ramble. This is one of thoſe fine and delicate Unions which *Perſius* requires.

The ſecond way of diſguiſing the Sentences, is by applying them ſenſibly to the particular Action. This is done by drawing a particular Concluſion from an Argument founded upon a general Propoſition, which we do not expreſs. An inſtance thereof is this: *Dido* complains, becauſe ſhe did not ſet upon *Æneas*, whilſt it was in her Power; and ſhe ſtarts this Objection againſt it: That *ſuch an Aſſault would have been as dangerous to her as to her Enemy. Verum anceps pugnæ fuerat fortuna.* One may anſwer her in this Argument: He that is reſolv'd to die, has nothing to fear; I have nothing then to fear, ſince I am reſolved to die. It would have been ridiculous to have expreſſed all this in a Poem, and to make one as paſſionate as *Dido* then was, to argue the Caſe thus. 'Twas requiſite then that one or other of theſe Propoſitions ſhould be made choice of; each of them is intelligible enough. The Mind of the Compoſer does uſually determine this without Reflection, and he takes either that ſide to which his over ſerious Wiſdom, or to which his own Imagination judiciouſly warm'd,

and

and transformed into that of the Perſon who acts and ſpeaks, inclines him. Thus the ſage and ſententious *Seneca* would not have fail'd taking the general Propoſition. *What ſignifies?* He would have ſaid, *He fears nothing that is reſolv'd to die. Virgil* has follow'd his ordinary Flame and Stile, and ſays, *Fuiſſet! Quem metui moritura.*

Seneca very frequently in his Tragedies, where the Moral ſhould be leſs apparent than in the *Epopea*, utters his Thoughts morally and ſententiouſly; and *Virgil* on the other hand, in the *Epick Poem*, and in Places that are deſign'd for Morality, conceals his Sentences under Figures, and particular Applications. This *Tragedian* in his Deſign of joining what is profitable to what is pleaſant, has ſo manag'd things, that he quite hides the *Pleaſant*, and ſtifles the Paſſion that ſhould be predominant, that he may foiſt in a Sentence, the Effect whereof is frequently nothing elſe but the offending thoſe that make impartial Reflections thereon; as in that we have already taken notice of in his *Oedipus*. Whilſt *Virgil*, retaining in the Sentence he makes uſe of, all that is profitable and inſtructive according as he is oblig'd, mixes therewith the Luſtre and the Tenderneſs of the Paſſions with a Judgment and Skill that is peculiar to him.

If any thing lays us under an Obligation of embracing Vertue, and abandoning Vice, 'tis doubtleſs this Maxim, *viz. That the chiefeſt.*

and beſt Recompence of a good Action is Vertue it ſelf, and the good Habits we contract by our good Actions; as on the contrary, *vicious Actions imprint on us the Love of Vices, and the Habits of committing them, which ſometimes lead us into a kind of fatal Neceſſity.* The Habits take ſuch deep rooting in us, that Death it ſelf does not make us relinquiſh them: We preſerve to Eternity the Affections and Inclinations which we have contracted in our Life-time, and with which we die. So that thoſe who are ſo unhappy as to leave this World with their vicious Inclinations about them, are afflicted with unſpeakable Torments, when they come to ſee the Deformity of thoſe Vices which they cannot diveſt themſelves of, and the Beauty of Juſtice and Vertue, from which they are baniſh'd for ever. *Virgil* teaches us all this in ſeveral Sentences that he diſguiſes after a more admirable manner.

The firſt thing is: That the Manners and the Habits are the beſt Reward of good Actions. He tempers this excellent Precept with ſo much Tenderneſs, that 'tis hard to ſay, whether in this Paſſage he makes uſe of the *Profitable*, or the *Pleaſant*. A young Nobleman, *Euryalus*, the moſt amiable, and the moſt beloved of all the *Trojans*, meets with an important Occaſion of ſerving his Prince, to which nothing but his own Vertue obliges him. He embraces the Opportunity with all Earneſtneſs, and is going to expoſe himſelf to a Death

a Death, that perhaps might be the heart-breaking of his Mother. She loved this Son ſo paſſionately, that ſhe was the only Woman that followed him into *Italy*, without fearing the Dangers and the Fatigues which kept all the reſt behind at *Sicily*. *Euryalus*, that lov'd his Mother as dearly, dares not take his leave of her, becauſe he could not away with the Tenderneſs of her Tears. He therefore recommends her to young *Aſcanius*. *Aſcanius* receives her into his Protection: And on both ſides they expreſs all the Paſſion, which a great Poet was able to inſpire them with. 'Tis in the midſt of theſe Paſſions, that a grave old Man with Tears in his Eyes, embraces *Euryalus*, and his dear Friend *Niſus*; prays for their Succeſs, and for a Reward of ſo much Vertue, promiſes them ſuch a one as we have been diſcourſing of.

* *With this he took the Hand of either Boy,*
Embrac'd them cloſely both, and wept for Joy.
Ye brave young Men, what equal Gifts can we,
What Recompence for ſuch Deſert, decree?
The greateſt ſure, and beſt you can receive,
The Gods, your Vertue, and your Fame will give.

[*Engliſh'd thus by Mr.* Dryden *in his Miſcellan.* Part II. pag. 15.]

——— * Humeros dextraſque tenebat
Amborum, & vultum lacrymis atque ora rigabat.
Quæ vobis, &c. *Æn.* 9.

The

The ſecond Sentence is this, that when we die, we carry along with us the Habits we have contracted here. The Poet makes mention of the troubleſome and tormenting Habits, upon the Occaſion of thoſe Lovers which *Æneas* meets with, labouring under the ſame Miſeries they did before their Death.

Curæ non ipſa in morte relinquunt.

And he ſays as much concerning the pleaſant Inclinations, when in the *Elyſian* Fields *Æneas* meets with Heroes that had the ſame Diverſions there; which they enjoy'd whilſt here on Earth.

——— *Quæ gratia Currum*
Armorumque fuit vivis, quæ cura nitentes
Paſcere equos: eadem ſequitur tellure repoſtos.

The Poets make a particular Application of this laſt Paſſage by adding the Words *Chariots* and *Horſes*. One might entirely retrench them, and that which remains be a pure and perfect Sentence. *Quæ gratia fuit vivis, quæ cura, eadem ſequitur tellure repoſtos.* The preceding Paſſage is pure and general in the Terms, and in the Expreſſion. *Curæ non ipſa in morte relinquunt.* 'Tis the Conſequence alone that renders it ſingular, and reduces it into the Body of the Action. Theſe two particular Applications do in the general ſay the ſame thing, and teach us; that

we

we eternally preſerve the ſame Paſſions and Habits, which we have contracted whilſt living, unleſs we relinquiſh them before we die.

This is likewiſe what our Poet teaches us, when among the Torments of his Hell, he mentions that which the Damn'd ſuffer there at the ſight of the Juſtice and Vertue they have deſpis'd, and of which they have eternally depriv'd themſelves. * The miſerable *Theſeus*, ſays *Virgil*, is in Hell, and there will for ever be; and *Phlygias* more miſerable than he, is always calling to thoſe about him; *Hark ye*, cries he to the Damn'd, *learn what 'tis to be juſt and pious.* This Paſſage preſents us with a Sentence diſguis'd a quite different way from thoſe we have been diſcourſing of. For the former are concealed under the Expreſſion that contains them: But this laſt, on the other hand, is not contained in the Expreſſion that preſents it to us. Who is there but at firſt ſight will take this Verſe of *Virgil* for a Sentence, and for an Admonition to be juſt and pious?

Learn to be juſt, and don't the Gods contemn.

——* Sedet æternumque ſedebit
Infœlix Theſeus: Phlegyaſque miſerrimus omnes
Admonet, & magna teſtatur voce per umbras:
Diſcite Juſtitiam moniti, & non temnere Divos.
Æn. 6.

In

In truth a Man would not queſtion but this was the Poet's Deſign, if he only conſiders his Perſon, and that of the Readers; and he cannot ſay but that he has given it full Force: For to cauſe this Sentence to be ſpoken in this frightful place of Torment, where Men are puniſh'd ſeverely for neglecting to practiſe it, muſt needs render it very moving and convincing.

But when, without conſidering the Perſon of the Reader, one reflects upon the Conſequence, and minds only him that ſpeaks, and the Perſons to whom he ſpeaks: 'Tis no ſuch eaſy matter to imagine, that *Virgil's* Deſign was to inſpire Piety and Juſtice into Souls, that are no longer capable thereof, being condemn'd to ſuffer Eternal Torments in a Place from whence they muſt never depart. The Poet's Meaning then is ſomething elſe, ſince he makes theſe Words be ſaid in a Paſſage where nothing but Crimes and Puniſhments are his Theme. The Torments of Senſe, denoted by the Chains, the Whips, the Wheels, and the Flames, are not the greateſt. The Conſcience forms ſuch, to which the others are not to be compar'd. And as our Author has ſaid, that external things are not even in this Life the higheſt Recompence of vertuous Actions; he would have us likewiſe underſtand, that 'tis the ſame Caſe with Puniſhments, and that our Soul has no greater a Tormentor than its own ſelf.

* *Perſius*,

* *Perſius*, who has taken many things from *Virgil*, may as well have taken this Thought from him too. This Poet could not imagine any dreadfuller Torment, than for a Man to have a view of Vertùe, when he lies under ſuch a fatal Neceſſity, as to be no longer able to purſue it. *Plato* ſays, if Vertue could be ſeen with the Eyes of the Body, it would charm all the World. What Torment then muſt thoſe Men needs ſuffer, who ſee it more evidently than with their bodily Eyes, and are ſo far from being able to enjoy its Charms, that they ſee themſelves ty'd down inſeparably to the contrary Vices, with which they are forc'd to make this Compariſon, when in the midſt of their Torments they are called upon,

Learn to be juſt, and don't the Gods contemn?

CHAP. VI.

Concerning ſeveral other Thoughts.

THe *Points* and the neat *Turns* are in the *Pleaſant*, what the *Sentences* are in the *Profitable*. Their Luſtre dazles young Poets,

* Magne pater Divum, ſævos punire Tyrannos
Non alia ratione velis, &c. *Sat.* 3.

and

and others too that have more Fancy than Judgment. The Sentences cool the Action, and retard its Motions by an unſeaſonable Gravity: And the *Points* deſtroy the Majeſty of a Poem by pretty Conceits that are unbecoming it. Sometimes theſe fine Words produce forc'd and ridiculous Thoughts, when a Poet would prepare them, and ſtart up Occaſions to make uſe of them. In the *Troad* of *Seneca*, *Agamemnon* falls out with *Pyrrhus*, and hits him in the Teeth, * that *the Place of his Nativity was ſurrounded with Water.* † *Pyrrhus* the Grandſon of *Thetis* replies, that *theſe Waters were his Grandmothers:* From whence 'tis concluded that they cannot prejudice his Iſland, nor ſet Bounds to his Empire; ſince in ſome ſort they belong to it. This was an ingenious Repartee: But upon what Account does *Agamemnon* upbraid *Pyrrhus* for being born in an Iſland? This King of Kings would never have ſaid thus to *Pyrrhus*, had not the Poet foreſaw, what this Youngſter would have anſwered him.

'Tis eaſier redreſſing this Fault, than 'tis that of the Sentences; becauſe the Sentences and the Precepts of Morality are neceſſary to the *Epopea*, whoſe ſole Deſign is to inſtruct Men, which cannot be done without theſe Sentences. They therefore cannot be excluded. One muſt learn how to make uſe of

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* Incluſa fluctu.

† Nempe cognati maris them,

them, and this requires a great deal of Art, a great deal of Fancy, and a mature and ſolid Judgment. But the *Points* are ſo little neceſſary, that one may quite exclude them from a Poem. Our Poets have done ſo: Among ſo many Sentences, there are ſo few Points, and pretty Conceits, that one may ſuppoſe that even thoſe that happen to be there, are ſuch as crept in without the Poets being aware of them. *Virgil* was too ingenious not to meet with a great many *Points* that lay in his way, but he has made no uſe of them, and by Conſequence one may preſume he wholly rejected them.

The Amplification of the things one ſpeaks of, belongs likewiſe to the ſame Genius; and thoſe that are in love with glaring and fine Thoughts, are ſubject to a vicious Amplification. In the *Thebaid* of *Seneca*, *Oedipus* renounces the Innocency he had retain'd even in the midſt of the Crimes he had committed, and he takes them all upon himſelf, only upon a Deſire he had of expreſſing his great Kindneſs for his Daughter *Antigone*. He had murder'd his Father, and marry'd his Mother without knowing it. He was ſeverely puniſhed for it. But when he ſaw *Antigone* did not abandon him in his Miſeries, he cries out: *O my dear Daughter, I am well enough ſatisfied with my Commiſſion of Parricide and Inceſt, ſince 'tis to theſe that I am beholden for ſuch a Daughter.* The Genius of *Statius*, and the frantick Deſire he had of making all

all things look great, is ſuch, that he chuſes rather to contradict himſelf, than not have his Humour. When he would amplify the Valour of *Capaneus*, *Jupiter* ſcarce thinks his whole Godhead to be Match enough for this great Man: And after he had darted one Thunder-bolt at him, he is ready to caſt another. And when he comes to ſpeak of the great Power of *Jupiter*, this very God ſmiles at the Vanity and Weakneſs of *Capaneus*, and diſdains him ſo much, that he could ſcarce perſwade himſelf to take his Bolt in his Hand to cruſh him with it in Pieces.

The affected *Study* and *Knowledge of all Arts and Sciences*, is another dangerous Rock to the Vanity of Writers. Though a Poet ſhould know ev'ry thing; yet 'tis not with a Deſign he ſhould vent his *Science* by retail, and let the World ſee the Extent of his Mind: But that he may ſay nothing that ſhould argue him ignorant, and that he may ſpeak correctly upon ſeveral Occaſions. 'Tis requiſite likewiſe that theſe Occaſions be natural, and ſuch as appear unavoidable, and unſought for. We have ſeen one Inſtance of this in the Doctrine of the *Immortality of the Soul*, which *Virgil* has ſo judiciouſly and neceſſarily placed in his ſixth Book.

'Tis ſo eaſy to make uſe of all manner of Terms of Art in a Poem, that a Man muſt be one of little Thought, and a mean Soul, that ſhall be ambitious of the Praiſe of having done it. There needs only reading over a Book

Book of the Art one would ſpeak of; or converſing with an Artificer: And after that to make ſome one or other that underſtands it, ſee what we have writ about it. An Author will be a pitiful Creature, if he does not attain his end by this Means: But he will not be much the more learned for having ſucceeded therein. A great Poet will never ſtoop to ſo low and uſeleſs a Vanity in an *Epick Poem.* Let him indeed learn, and know every thing; but then let him make uſe of this his Knowledge as we before advis'd; and let him do it by uſing the moſt common, and the moſt intelligible Terms he can. The Minds of his Readers muſt never be burden'd, when there is no Occaſion for it: The Paſſions and the Pleaſure of a Poem require an entire Freedom from every thing elſe.

The deſire of appearing learned, makes a Poem ſmell of it from one end to the other. We ſhall ſee Women, that in a violent Paſſion will make Reflections on things, which in all Probability they are wholly ignorant of; and on which, though they were acquainted with them, they ought not in the Condition they are in, to ſpend the leaſt Thought. Theſe Poetical *Heroines* are vers'd in *Hiſtory*, *Mythology*, a great many curious Properties of Nature, and very fine Leſſons in Morality: In a word, they are not ignorant, in their very Paſſions, of whatever the Poet knows in his Study amidſt his Books and common Places. If they complain of any Cruelty, they

name

name ye all the cruel Tyrants that ever were, and know without the leaſt Miſtake, wherein the wicked Inclination of each Perſon did conſiſt. † 'Tis not enough for them to mention *Buſiris* and *Diomedes*; they muſt needs add the *Altars* of the one, and the *Horſes* of the other. They would think it a Shame only to know that the *Scythians* are cruel; they muſt likewiſe know that they have no fix'd Habitation, but are here to Day, and there to Morrow. This is what *Seneca*'s *Andromache* knew; and on which ſhe reflected even during the ſad Recital of the Death of her only Son, little *Aſtyanax*, who was thrown from the Top of a Tower. If one conſiders on all this, one can never be affected with theſe learned Complaints: And if the Audience never think thereon, to what Purpoſe are they us'd?

The Madneſs of *Medea* is no leſs learned than the *Sadneſs* of *Andromache*. This Mad Woman threatens to burn the King of *Corinth*'s Palace: The Flame whereof ſhould be ſeen off the Promontory of *Malea*, which lies at the farther end of the *Peloponneſus*. But this is not all; this Paſſion would not have been learned enough, had not *Medea* added, that this Promontory is inacceſſible, that the Rocks which ſurround it with Water-Lilies,

† Quis Colchus, aut quis ſedis incertæ Scytha Commiſit? &c. Troas, Act. 5.

oblige

oblige the Ships to go a great way about, and that they are forc'd to ſail at ſuch a Diſtance off it, that their Voyage by this means is ſo much the longer. Sometimes likewiſe, not being able to expreſs theſe things by *Circumlocutions*, ſo as to be underſtood, all ſhall be included in an *Epithet*, an *Adverb*, or ſome other Word, and then let the Reader gueſs at the Meaning. But Poems are not invented for this.

I ſhall here make this one Reflection more; that though we are to avoid *Oſtentation*, and never to affect appearing Learned: Yet we muſt not fall into the contrary Fault, and appear ignorant, as *Statius* has done in the beginning of his *Thebaid*. He undertakes the War of *Eteocles* and *Polynices*, and before he enters upon the Matter, he relate all that happen'd at the founding of *Thebes*, and from thence down to their Times. He expreſſes this in a Doubt; and he asks his *Muſes* whether he muſt begin his Recital with the Rape of *Europa*. This Doubt is a Sign of ſo groſs an Ignorance in the Art, that it betrays a Man's want of Judgment, when he gives his Readers ſuch a diſadvantageous Character of himſelf.

CHAP.

Chap. VII.

Of the Expreſſion.

THe Expreſſion ſhould be ſuitable to the Subjects one treats on, and conſequently ſhould be beautiful, noble, and auguſt in the *Epick Poem*, as well as in *Tragedy*. But 'tis very obſervable that this Beauty, and this Grandeur is of a very large Extent, and like a *Genus* divides it ſelf into ſeveral Species. This will be eaſily conceiv'd, if one recollect what we have already ſaid in the fourth Book concerning the Character of the *Hero*, and of the whole Poem in general. The Characters of *Achilles*, *Ulyſſes*, and *Æneas*, are very great, and yet differ very much from each other. The *Iliad* conſiſts altogether in Battles, in Anger, and in a continual Commotion without Bounds ahd Meaſure. The *Odyſſeis* on the contrary is full of nothing elſe but Prudence, Patience, and Wiſdom. So that the Learned obſerve there is a conſiderable difference in the Stile and Verſes of theſe two Poems. There is a great deal of Flegm in the *Odyſſeis*: But the *Iliad* is all over one continual Flame. The *Æneid* ſhould be a great deal ſofter than the two *Greek Poems*.

Beſides this firſt Diſtinction, each part of which comprehends an entire Poem, there are likewiſe inferiour Diſtinctions, which divide

vide each Poem into its *Epiſodes* and leſſer Parts. For though the ſame Character ſhould be predominant, yet it ſhould not take up the whole of the Poem, there are many Paſſages very different from one another. This alters the Stile ſo far, that * ſometimes *Anger* makes *Comedy* wear the *Buskin*, and ſometimes *Sorrow* makes *Tragedy* throw it off. This puts me in mind of a Queen I ſaw once upon the Stage, who complain'd of her long Misfortunes in a Stile that was quite oppoſite thereto. She made a Compariſon between them, and the Happineſs of her former Years: And ſhe compar'd theſe different States to the ſeveral Seaſons of the Year; but in ſuch a manner, that ſhe only inſiſted on the Deſcription of the Beauty and Pleaſantneſs of the Spring. And when after a long Train of theſe fine things, which inſpir'd nothing but Pleaſure and Joy, ſhe paſs'd on to the Deſcription of *Winter*, and when one would have expected to hear at laſt ſomething that was conformable to the preſent Condition of this unfortunate Princeſs, ſhe gave us the Reverſe of it. She made a Deſcription of *Winter*, not by repreſenting the melancholy part of it, but by making an elegant *Amplifi-*

* Interdum vocem Comœdia tollit,
Iratuſque Chremes tumido delitigat ore:
Et Tragicus plerumque dolet ſermone pedeſtri.
Hor. Poet.

cation

cation on all the Beauties of *Spring*, which the *Winter* wanted. All this was expreſſed in ſuch choice Phraſes, which certainly coſt the Poet thoſe Studies and ſleepleſs Nights, which * *Horace* condemns in thoſe that make Complaints.

'Tis not enough to expreſs the *Paſſion* one treats of well; 'tis moreover requiſite that one prevent it not by any *Deſcription* that may at firſt give quite contrary *Sentiments*. I will not make *Aurora* riſe with a Smile, to ſee the ſad Paſſions which *Dido* had abandon'd her ſelf to, when the firſt break of Day preſents her with the Flight of *Æneas*. This concerns the Doctrine of the Thoughts as much as that of the Expreſſion; and oft times the Turn and the Expreſſion make all the Beauty of a Thought. A Fable, an Alluſion, a point of Doctrine, a Metaphor, or ſome other Figure, ſhall be wholly contain'd in one Word. That which we are now ſpeaking of, is more particularly deſign'd for the Expreſſion.

Poets are oblig'd to keep up to the Rules of Art: But they are not to diſcover them openly. Oftentimes theſe very Reflections prejudice, and hinder the Pleaſure and the Paſſion. In this Caſe they have recourſe to ſome Expreſſion and Phraſe, which being of

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——— * Nec nocte paratum
Plorabit qui me volet incurvaſſe querela. *Hor. Poet.*

it

it ſelf indifferent to the matter that is treated on, and not obliging the Reader to any Reflection that leſſens his Attention to the main thing, does yet give thoſe an Occaſion of finding out the Rules and the Artifice, who have a mind to look after them. Here is one Inſtance of this, taken from the Suppoſition of thoſe that ſuppoſe that *Æneas* did not ſpend the Winter in *Africk*. The Poet repreſents the Haſte which the *Trojans* made to equip their Ships for a ſudden Voyage into *Italy*, and he expreſſes it thus:

Frondentesque ferunt remos, & robora Sylvis
Infabricata fugæ ſtudio.

Virgil's Meaning will ſeem ſufficiently explain'd, if one ſhould ſay, That *the* Trojans *prepar'd for their Departure with ſo much Earneſtneſs and Precipitation, that they brought the Trees almoſt juſt as they found them, without giving themſelves the Leiſure to ſquare them, to take the Bark, or ſo much as to ſtrip the Branches off them.* And yet the Word *Frondentes* is not mentioned, which denotes expreſly that theſe Trees had their Leaves on: From whence one may conclude, that this time was not the *Winter Seaſon*; and that this other Expreſſion, *Hyberno Sidere*, which *Virgil makes uſe of* upon the ſame Occaſion, cannot denote that *Seaſon*, but only ſignifies the tempeſtuous Conſtellation of *Orion*, which is predominant in the *Summer*.

The two Remarks I have made in this Chapter, are ſo much the more neceſſary, becauſe that thoſe who never invent any thing of their own, but make it their only Buſineſs to tranſlate, do never ſufficiently reflect thereon. One of the beſt Tranſlators of the *Æneid* into *French*, has in one ſingle Verſe given us an Example of theſe two things. 'Tis in that of the fifth Book.

Septima poſt Trojæ excidium jam vertitur Æſtas.

This ſignifies that *'twas the End of the ſeventh Summer ſince the Ruine of* Troy. By this the Poet gives us to underſtand, that *Æneas* did not ſpend the Winter in *Carthage*, ſince he came thither about the Solſtice of the ſeventh Summer; and at the end of the ſame Summer he is upon his Return to *Sicily*. This likewiſe makes it appear that *Anchiſes*, whoſe Anniverſary they then celebrated, dyed at the end of the Summer. Laſtly, this ſerves to give an account what the Time and the *Duration* of the *Epick Poem* in the *Æneid* is. All theſe Proofs then are enervated, and the quite contrary are brought in their ſtead by this Tranſlation:

Le Septieme Printemps peint la terre de fleurs.
The Seventh Spring now paints the Earth with Flowers.

Beſide

Beſides, this pleaſant Expreſſion, and theſe Terms of *Spring*, *Flowers*, and *painted Earth*, are entirely oppoſite to the Deſign of him that ſpeaks, and to the Occaſion upon which it is ſpoken. The *Trojan Matrons* did not lament the Death of *Anchiſes*, whoſe Anniverſary they then kept, ſo much as they did the Miſeries they had already ſuffer'd on the Sea, and thoſe they were ſtill to ſuffer. They had not their Thoughts then upon the Flowers of the *Spring*, nor upon the Beauties of the Earth, but upon the ſad and frightful Scenes the Sea preſented to them; which they look'd upon with Tears in their Eyes, and with Sighs and Complaints in their Mouths:

**With weeping Eyes the Deep they all ſurvey'd;*
And fetching hideous Sighs, Alaſs! they ſaid,
Muſt we poor wearied Souls endure again
The Rage and Fury of the Savage Main?

CHAP. VIII.

How we ought to judge of Elocution.

WHatever Rules we have laid down in this Treatiſe, and howſoever we have expreſſed our Thoughts, yet it has been far

* ——— Cunctæque profundum
Pontum aſpectabant flentes: Heu! tot vada feſſis,
Et tantum ſupereſſe maris. *Æn.* 5.

from our Deſign to form a Poet, and to teach Men how to make an *Epopea:* But only to give the World a clearer Inſight into the *Æneid.* So that we muſt look upon the whole only as the way whereby one ſhould judge of that excellent Piece. 'Tis upon this Conſideration that we ſhall here add ſome general Reflections to thoſe we have already made.

The Juſtneſs of the Judgment one paſſes upon the Thoughts and *Elocution* of an Author, depends on the Nature of the Poem one reads, and which one ſhould be throughly qualified with, and beſide that, it depends upon the Qualities of the Mind of him that reads it.

* *Horace* touches upon the firſt point in the Compariſon he makes between *Poetry* and *Painting. Pictures* have their *Shadows*, their *Diſtances*, and their *Point of Sight*, without which they loſe all their Grace and Regularity. The Images that adorn the Arch of a very high *Cupola*, are very large where they are, and to thoſe who view them pretty near, repreſent only Members that are monſtrous in their Proportions. A Man would render himſelf ridiculous, if he ſeriouſly found

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* Ut Pictura Poeſis erit; quæ ſi propius ſtes,
Te capiet magis, & quædam ſi longius abſtes.
Hæc amat obſcurum: volet hæc ſub luce videri.
Hor. Poet.

fault

fault with thoſe miſhapen Poſtures, which Men of Underſtanding greatly admire. Becauſe in truth theſe irregular Figures are harder to draw well, than all the ordinary Decorations, where every thing is juſt and regular.

'Tis juſt ſo with the Works of the Poets. It is eaſy after the ſame manner to find fault with the moſt excellent and admirable Touches of them. One ſhall inveigh againſt *Homer* for carrying on the Bravery of *Achilles* even to Brutality; and for degrading the Patience of *Ulyſſes*, even to the making him a Beggar. He will laugh at the Meekneſs and Piety of *Æneas*; and prefer the Valour of *Turnus* before him. And yet that which appears defective in theſe Poetical Heroes, is juſt in the ſame manner as certain Pictures ſeem irregular, when one takes them out of their proper place, and conſiders them alone, without their Circumſtances. Theſe pretended Faults have more Juſtneſs and Artifice in them, and are a great deal harder to manage, than the pitiful Beauties, and the cold and languiſhing Perfections, which the meaneſt Poets may ſteal from *Morality*, and give to their chief Perſonages.

Poetry then has its *Shadow*, and its *Point of Sight* as well as *Painting*. And to diſcover the Beauty and Artifice of each Paſſage, a Man muſt not examine it alone and without its Circumſtances; for then he will be liable to Miſtakes. He ſhould read it with

the ſame Paſſions with which it was penn'd. And he muſt entertain theſe Motions in the whole Series of the ſubject Matter, and of the Body of the Poem. To do otherwiſe, is to deceive ones ſelf, or upon deſign to deceive others. 'Tis to do as *Æſchines*, when he upbraids *Demoſthenes*, and ſays, the Phraſes he made uſe of were more like *Monſters* than Words in a Speech. That they might appear ſuch, he propoſes them out of their due place, and without that Patheticalneſs with which they are ſpoken and heard. *Cicero* ſays this is no ſuch hard matter. Nor is there any Difficulty to find fault with ſeveral Beauties of *Homer* and *Virgil*, and to turn them into Ridicule, either by being ignorant of the Art, or by the Wit of an Enemy, or by the Spite of an envious Humour, or laſtly, by the Buffooneries of a Railer.

We may likewiſe fall into theſe falſe *Criticiſms* for want of Learning, and a deep Reach. We would fain have *Homer* and *Virgil* form the Cuſtoms and Manners of their Perſonages according to the modern Mode. We think their ways of Speaking fantaſtical, becauſe they would be ridiculous, if turn'd *Verbatim* into our Language. We fanſy there's an extraordinary Meanneſs in the Words *Pots* and *Kettles*, *Blood*, *Fat*, the *Inteſtines*, and other parts of Animals, becauſe all this is now nothing elſe but *Butchers* and *Kitchen-girls* Language, and we are apt to laugh at it. And we never conſider that in *Homer* and

Virgil's

Virgil's time all this was agreeable to the Senſe of the * *Holy Ghoſt* himſelf, which could never be in the wrong; that God had very carefully enjoyn'd *Moſes* all theſe things, as the moſt Auguſt and Venerable that he would have us'd in the Religion and Worſhip he requir'd of Men; and that laſtly, Queens, and Princeſſes, and Perſons of the fineſt Make, obſerv'd them with Care, Reſpect, and Veneration. 'Tis therefore according to theſe Ideas that our Poets were bound to ſpeak of theſe things. They would have been impious had they treated theſe Subjects with Contempt. And perhaps a *Chriſtian* would do little better, ſhould he dare to ridicule them, eſpecially if we reflect that the Books of *Homer* and *Virgil* have us'd them leſs than they are made uſe of in ſeveral Books of the *Holy Bible*, which a Man by thus doing will expoſe to the Buffoonery of *Libertines* and *Atheiſts*.

The *Expreſſion* in its kind is of no leſs Extent, and requires no leſs Study. The *Greek* and *Latin* are two dead Languages, of which we are no longer Maſters. They have their Turns, their Delicacies, and their Beauties, which we ought to ſtudy in the beſt

* Moab *is my Waſhpot*, Pſal. 60. v. 8. *Now the Sons of* Eli *were Sons of* Belial, *they knew not the Lord. And the Prieſts Cuſtom with the People was*, &c. 1 Sam. 2. from v. 12. to v. 17.

Originals. It would be a piece of Vanity, if we pretended to understand the Languages which we no longer speak, as well as those who have improv'd them for so many Ages together, and as well as those that have brought them to their highest Perfection, and have come off with the greatest Success. Shall a *French* Man, or any Man now-a-days pretend that he is better qualified to criticise upon *Homer* than *Aristotle* was? If not, then we should credit him *, when he assures us, that this Poet has surpass'd all others in the Art of writing well, whether we consider his *Sentiments* and *Thoughts*, or whether we consider his *Expression:* And that he has not only excell'd all others, but met with perfect Success.

We may therefore shut up all by ending as we began. Languages as well as Poems are the Inventions of Art, and a Genius, which gives them their Form and Perfection. If we have a mind to know them throughly, and to pass a right Judgment upon the *Ancients*, we must before every thing rectify our Judgment. If a Man has a mind to know whether a Line be strait or no, he does not take the next piece of Wood he can find to clap to it, but this piece of Wood must in the first

* Λέξει καὶ διανοίᾳ ὑπερβέβληκε. Τὰς διανοίας καὶ τὴν λέξιν ἔχειν καλῶς, οἷς ἅπασιν Ὅμηρος κέχρηται καὶ πρῶτος καὶ ἱκανῶς, Poet. c. 24.

place

place be made perfectly ſtrait, if he would have it ſerve for a Rule: Elſe, if he applys it, and it does not touch all the parts of the Line, he will not gueſs whether the Fault be in the Line, or in the piece of Wood. Juſt ſo likewiſe, before we judge of a Poem, we ſhould rectify our Judgment, and prove it by the excellent Works of the beſt Maſters. If they do not pleaſe us, we ſhould rather think the Fault is in our own Judgments, than in thoſe Models; and if they do pleaſe us, we may rely upon our ſelves with the greater Aſſurance, according to that judicious Thought of *Quinctilian*: " That he whom *Cicero* " pleaſes, ſhould by that conclude, that he " has benefited himſelf very much.

The ſame thing we ſay of our four Authors. A Perſon may rely upon his own Judgment in that which concerns the *Epick Poem*, and may aſſure himſelf of its Rectitude and Straightneſs, when his Thoughts, his Genius, and his Reaſonings, are conformable to the *Precepts* of *Ariſtotle* and *Horace*, and to the *Practice* of *Homer* and *Virgil*.

The E N D.

AN ESSAY UPON SATYR.

Written by the Famous

MONSIEUR DACIER.

HORACE having entitled his Books of Satyrs, *Sermones* and *Satyræ* indifferently, and theſe two Titles giving different Idea's; I think it very neceſſary to explain what the *Latins* underſtood by the Word *Satyr*. The learned *Caſaubon* is the firſt, and indeed the only Man, that has with Succeſs attempted to ſhew what the *ſatyrical Poeſy* of the *Greeks*, and the *Satyr* of the *Romans*,

mans, was. His Book is an ineſtimable Treaſure; and it muſt be confeſſed, I have had conſiderable Helps from it; which is the Uſe we ought to make of the Works of ſuch extraordinary Men, who have gone before us only to be our Guides, and ſerve us as Torches in the Darkneſs of Antiquity. Nevertheleſs, you muſt not ſo continually fix your Eyes upon them, as not to conſider whither you are led: for they divert ſometimes into Paths, where you cannot with Safety follow them. This Method is what my ſelf have obſerved in forſaking my Directors, and have ventured that Way which No-body before me has gone; of which the following Diſcourſe will convince you.

Satyr is a Kind of Poetry only known amongſt the *Romans*, having no relation to the ſatyrical Poeſy of the *Greeks*, tho' ſome learned Men have pretended to the contrary. *Quinctilian* leaves no room to doubt upon this Point, when he writes in Chap. 10. *Satyra quidem tota noſtra eſt.* The ſame reaſon makes *Horace* call it, in the laſt Satyr of Book 1. *Græcis intactum carmen.* The natural and true Etymology is this: The *Latins* called it *SATUR*, *quaſi plenum*, to which there was nothing wanting for its Perfection. Thus *Satur color*, when the Wooll has taken a good Dye, and nothing can be added to the Perfection of it. From *Satur* they have made *Satura*, which they wrote ſometimes with an *i*, *Satira*: They uſed in other Words the ſame

ſame Variation of the Letter *u* into *i*, as in *Maxumus, Maximus*; *optumus, optimus*. *Satura* is an *Adjective*, which has reference to a Subſtantive underſtood; for the ancient *Romans* ſaid *Saturam*, underſtanding *Lancem*: And *Satura Lanx* was properly a Baſon fill'd with all ſorts of Fruit, which they offer'd every Year to *Ceres* and *Bacchus*, as the firſt Fruits of all they had gather'd. Theſe Offerings of different Things mix'd together, were not unknown to the *Greeks*, who call'd em πάγκαρπον θυσίαν, *a Sacrifice of all ſorts of Fruit*, πανσπερμίαν *and* πανσπλίαν, *an Offering of all ſorts of Grain*, when they offer'd Potherbs. The Grammarian *Diomedes* has perfectly deſcrib'd both the Cuſtom of the *Romans*, and the Word *Satura*, in this Paſſage, *Lanx referta variis multiſq; primitiis, ſacris* Cereris *inferebatur, & a copia & Saturitate rei*, Satura *vocabatur: cujus generis lancium &* Virgilius *in* Georgicis *meminit, cum hoc modo dicit*,

Lancibus & pandis fumantia reddimus exta.
And —— *lanceſque & liba feremus.*

From thence the Word *Satura* was apply'd to many other Mixtures, as in *Feſtus*: *Satyra cibi genus, ex variis rebus conditum.* From hence it paſs'd to the Works of the Mind; for they called ſome Laws *Leges Saturas*, which contain'd many Heads or Titles; as the *Julian, Papian*, and *Poppean* Laws, which were called

called *Miſcellas*, which is of the ſame Signification with *Satura*. From hence aroſe this Phraſe, *Per Saturam legem ferre*, when the Senate made a Law, without gathering, and counting the Votes, in haſte, and confuſedly all together, which was properly call'd, *Per Saturam ſententias exquirere*, as *Saluſt* has it after *Lelius*. But they reſted not here, but gave this Name to certain Books, as *Peſcennius Feſtus*, whoſe Hiſtories were call'd *Saturas*, or *per Saturam*. From all theſe Examples 'tis not hard to ſuppoſe, that theſe Works of *Horace* took from hence their Name, and that they were call'd *Satura*, *quia multis & variis rebus hoc carmen refertum eſt*, becauſe *theſe Poems are full of a great many different Things*, as *Porphyrius* ſays, which is partly true. But it muſt not be thought it is immediately from thence; for this Name had been uſed before for other Things, which bore a nearer reſemblance to the Satyrs of *Horace*; in Explanation of which, a Method is to be follow'd, which *Caſaubon* himſelf never thought of, and which will put Things in ſo clear a Light, that there can be no place left for Doubt.

The *Romans* having been almoſt 400 Years without any *Scenical Plays*, Chance and Debauchery made them find in one of their Feaſts the *Saturnian* and *Feſcennine* Verſes, which for 120 Years they had inſtead of Dramatick Pieces. But theſe Verſes were rude, and almoſt without any Numbers, as being made

ex-

extempore, and by a People as yet but barbarous, who had little other Skill, than what flow'd from their Joy, and the Fumes of Wine. They were filled with the groſſeſt ſort of Railleries, and attended with Geſtures and Dances. To have a livelier Idea of this, you need but reflect upon the honeſt Peaſants, whoſe clowniſh Dances are attended with *extempore* Verſes; in which, in a wretched manner, they jeer one another with all they know. To this *Horace* refers in the firſt Epiſtle of his ſecond Book;

Feſcennina per hunc inventa licentia morem,
Verſibus alternis opprobria ruſtica fudit.

This licentious and irregular Verſe was ſucceeded by a ſort more correct, filled with a pleaſant Raillery, without the Mixture of any thing ſcurrilous; and theſe obtain'd the Name of Satyrs, by reaſon of their Variety, and had regulated Forms, that is, regular Dances and Muſick; but undecent Poſtures were baniſh'd. *Titus Livius* has it in his ſeventh Book. *Vernaculis artificibus, quia* Hiſter *Tuſco verbo* Ludio *vocabatur, nomen Hiſtrionibus inditum, qui non ſicut ante Feſcennino verſu ſimilem compoſitum temere, ac rudem alternis jaciebant; ſed impletas modis Satyras, deſcripto jam ad Tibicinem cantu, motuque congruenti peragebant.* Theſe Satyrs were properly honeſt Farces, in which the Spectators and Actors were rallied without Diſtinction.

Livius

Livius Andronicus found things in this Poſture, when he firſt undertook to make Comedies and Tragedies in Imitation of the *Grecians*. This Diverſion appearing more noble and perfect, they run to it in Multitudes, neglecting the Satyrs for ſome time, tho' they reviv'd them a little after; and ſome modell'd them into a purpos'd Form, to Act at the End of their Comedies, as the *French* Act their Farces now. And then they alter'd their Name of *Satyrs* for that of *Exodia*, which they preſerve to this Day. This was the firſt and moſt ancient Kind of *Roman* Satyr. There are two other ſorts, which tho' very different from this firſt, yet both owe their Birth to this, and are, as it were, Branches of it. This I ſhall prove the moſt ſuccinctly I can.

A Year after *Livius Andronicus* had caus'd his firſt Efforts to be Acted, *Italy* gave Birth to *Ennius*; who being grown up, and having all the Leiſure in the World to obſerve the eager Satisfaction with which the *Romans* receiv'd the Satyrs, of which I have already ſpoke, was of Opinion, that Poems, tho' not adapted to the *Theatre*, yet preſerving the *Gall*, the *Railings*, and *Pleaſantneſs*, which made theſe Satyrs take with ſo much Applauſe, would not fail of being well receiv'd: he therefore ventur'd at it, and compos'd ſeveral Diſcourſes, to which he retain'd the Name of *Satyrs*. Theſe Diſcourſes were entirely like thoſe of *Horace*, both for the Matter

ter and the Variety. The only eſſential Difference that is obſervable, is, that *Ennius*, in Imitation of ſome *Greeks*, and of *Homer* himſelf, took the Liberty of mixing ſeveral Kinds of Verſes together, as, *Hexameters*, *Iambics*, *Trimeters*, with *Tetrimeters*, *Trochaics*, or ſquare Verſe; as it appears from the Fragments which are left us. Theſe following Verſes are of the ſquare Kind, which *Aulus Gellius* has preſerv'd us, and which very well merit a Place here for the Beauty they contain:

Hoc erit tibi Argumentum ſemper in promptu (ſitum,
Ne quid expectes Amicos, quod tute agere (poſſies.

I attribute alſo to theſe Satyrs of *Ennius* theſe other Kinds of Verſes, which are of a Beauty and Elegance much above the Age in which they were made; nor will the Sight of 'em here be unpleaſant.

Non habeo denique nauci Marſum Augurem,
Non vicanos aruſpices, non de Circo Aſtrologos,
Non Iſiacos Conjectores, *non Interpretes Ho- (minum:*
Non enim ſunt ii aut ſcientia, aut arte Divini;
Sed ſuperſtitioſi vates, Impudenteſque harioli,
Aut inertes, aut inſani, aut quibus egeſtas (imperat:
Qui ſui quæſtus cauſa fictas ſuſcitant ſenten- (tias,
Qui

ſtrant viam,
Qui ſibi ſemitam non ſapiunt, alteri mon-
(petunt,
Quibus divitias pollicentur, ab iis Drachmam
(cætera.
De divitiis deducant Drachmam, reddant

Horace has borrow'd ſeveral things from theſe Satyrs. After *Ennius*, came *Pacuvius*; who alſo writ Satyrs in Imitation of his Uncle *Ennius*.

Lucilius was born in the time when *Pacuvius* was in moſt Reputation. He alſo wrote Satyrs. But he gave 'em a new Turn, and endeavoured to imitate, as near as he could, the Character of the old *Greek* Comedy, of which we had but a very imperfect Idea in the ancient *Roman* Satyr, and ſuch, as one might find in a Poem, which Nature alone had dictated before the *Romans* had thought of imitating the *Grecians*, and enriching themſelves with their Spoils. 'Tis thus you muſt underſtand this Paſſage of the firſt Satyr of the ſecond Book of *Horace*.

— Quid, cum eſt Lucilius auſus, (rem
Primus in hunc operis componere carmina mo-

Horace never intended by this to ſay, that there were no Satyrs before *Lucilius*, becauſe *Ennius* and *Pacuvius* were before him, whoſe Example he followed: He only would have it underſtood, that *Lucilius* having given a new Turn

Turn to this Poem, and embelliſh'd it, ought by way of Excellence to be eſteemed the firſt Author. *Quinctilian* had the ſame Thought, when he writ, in the firſt Chapter of the tenth Book, *Satyra quidem tota noſtra eſt, in qua primus inſignem laudem adeptus eſt Lucilius.* You muſt not therefore be of the Opinion of *Caſaubon*, who building on the Judgment of *Diomedes*, thought that the Satyr of *Ennius*, and that of *Lucilius*, were entirely different: Theſe are the very Words of this Grammarian, which have deceived this judicious Critick: *Satyra eſt Carmen apud* Romanos, *non quidem apud* Græcos *maledicum, ad carpenda hominum vitia, Archaæ Comœdiæ charactere compoſitum, quale ſcripſerunt* Lucilius & Horatius, & Perſius. *Sed olim Carmen quod ex variis Poematibus conſtabat, Satyra dicebatur, quale ſcripſerunt* Pacuvius & Ennius. You may ſee plainly that *Dionædes* diſtinguiſhes the Satyr of *Lucilius* from that of *Ennius* and *Pacuvius*; the reaſon which he gives for this Diſtinction is ridiculous, and abſolutely falſe. The good Man had not examin'd the Nature and Origin of theſe two Satyrs, which were entirely like one another, both in Matter and Form; for *Lucilius* added to it only a little Politeneſs, and more Salt, almoſt without changing any thing: And if he did not put together ſeveral ſorts of Verſe in the ſame Piece, as *Ennius* has done, yet he made ſeveral Pieces, of which ſome were entirely *Hexameters*, others

others entirely *Iambics*, and others *Trochaics*, as is evident from his Fragments. In ſhort, if the Satyrs of *Lucilius* differ from thoſe of *Ennius*, becauſe the former has added much to the Endeavours of the latter, as *Caſaubon* has pretended, it will follow from thence, that thoſe of *Horace*, and thoſe of *Lucilius*, are alſo entirely different; for *Horace* has no leſs refin'd on the Satyrs of *Lucilius*, than he on thoſe of *Ennius* and *Pacuvius*. This Paſſage of *Diomedes* has alſo deceiv'd *Douſa* the Son. I ſay not this to expoſe ſome light Faults of theſe great Men, but only to ſhew with what Exactneſs, and with what Caution, their Works muſt be read, when they treat of any thing ſo obſcure and ſo ancient.

I have made appear what was the ancient Satyr, that was made for the *Theatre*: I have ſhewn, that that gave the Idea of the Satyr of *Ennius*: and, in fine, I have ſufficiently proved, that the Satyrs of *Ennius* and *Pacuvius*, of *Lucilius* and *Horace*, are but one Kind of Poem, which has received its Perfection from the laſt. 'Tis time now to ſpeak of the ſecond Kind of Satyr, which I promiſed to explain, and which is alſo derived from the ancient Satyr: 'tis that which we call *Varronian*, or the Satyr of *Menippus* the Cynick Philoſopher.

This Satyr was not only compoſed of ſeveral ſorts of Verſe, but *Varro* added Proſe to it, and made a Mixture of *Greek* and *Latin*. *Quinctilian*, after he had ſpoke of the Satyr

of

of *Lucilius*, adds, *Alterum illud eſt, & prius Satyræ genus, quod non ſola carminum varietate miſtum condidit* Terentius Varro, *vir Romanorum eruditiſſimus.* The only Difficulty of this Paſſage is, that *Quinctilian* aſſures us, that this Satyr of *Varro* was the firſt; for how could that be, ſince *Varro* was a great while after *Lucilius? Quinctilian* meant not that the Satyr of *Varro* was the firſt in Order of Time; for he knew well enough, that in that reſpect he was the laſt: But he would give us to underſtand, that this Kind of Satyr, ſo mix'd, was more like the Satyr of *Ennius* and *Pacuvius*, who gave themſelves a greater Liberty in this Compoſition than *Lucilius*, who was more ſevere and correct.

We have now only ſome Fragments left of the Satyr of *Varro*, and thoſe generally very imperfect; the Titles, which are moſt commonly double, ſhew the great Variety of Subjects of which *Varro* treated.

Seneca's Book on the Death of *Claudius*, *Boetius* his *Conſolation of Philoſophy*, and that of *Petronius Arbiter*, are Satyrs entirely like thoſe of *Varro*.

This is what I have in general to ſay on Satyr; nor is it neceſſary I inſiſt any more on this Subject. This the Reader may obſerve, that the Name of *Satyr* in Latin, is not leſs proper for Diſcourſes that recommend Virtue, than for thoſe which are deſign'd againſt Vice. It had nothing ſo formidable in it as it has now,

now, when a bare mention of Satyr makes them tremble, who would fain ſeem what they are not; for *Satyr*, with us, ſignifies the ſame thing, as *expoſing* or *laſhing* of ſome Thing or Perſon: yet this different Acceptation alters not the Word, which is always the ſame; but the *Latins*, in the Titles of their Books, have often had regard only to the Word, in the Extent of its Signification, founded on its Etymology; whereas we have had reſpect only to the firſt and general Uſe, which has been made of it in the beginning, to *mock* and *deride*; yet this Word ought always to be writ in *Latin* with an (*u*) or (*i*) *Satura*, or *Satira*, and in Engliſh by an (*i*). Thoſe who have wrote it with a (*y*) thought with *Scaliger*, *Heinſius*, and a great many others, that the Divinities of the Groves, which the *Grecians* call'd *Satyrs*, the *Romans Fauns*, gave their Names to theſe Pieces; and that of the Word *Satyrus* they had made *Satyra*, and that theſe Satyrs had a great Affinity with the Satyrick Pieces of the *Greeks*; which is abſolutely falſe, as *Caſaubon* has very well prov'd it, in making it appear, that of the Word *Satyrus* they could never make *Satyra*, but *Satyrica:* And in ſhewing the Difference betwixt the Satyrick Poems of the *Greeks*, and the *Roman* Satyrs, Mr. *Spanheim*, in his fine Preface to the *Ceſars* of the Emperor *Julian*, has added new Reflections to thoſe which this judicious Critick had advanced; and he has eſtabliſh'd, with a great deal

of

of Judgment, five or ſix eſſential Differences between thoſe two Poems, which you may find in his Book. The *Greeks* had never any thing that came near this *Roman* Satyr, but their *Silli* [σίλλοι] which were alſo biting Poems, as they may eaſily be perceived to be yet, by ſome Fragments of the *Silli* of *Timon*. There was however this difference, that the *Silli* of the *Greeks* were *parodious* from one End to the other, which cannot be ſaid of the *Roman* Satyrs; where, if ſometimes you find ſome *Parodia's*, you may plainly ſee that the Poet did not deſign to affect it, and by conſequence the *Parodia's* do not make the Eſſence of a Satyr, as they do the Eſſence of the *Silli*.

Having explain'd the Nature, Origin, and Progreſs of Satyr, I'll now ſay a word or two of *Horace* in particular.

There cannot be a more juſt Idea given of this Part of his Works, than in comparing them to the Statues of the *Sileni*, to which *Alcibiades* in the Banquet compares *Socrates*. They were Figures, that without had nothing agreeable or beautiful, but when you took the pains to open them, you found the Figures of all the Gods. In the manner that *Horace* preſents himſelf to us in his Satyrs, we diſcover nothing of him at firſt that deſerves our Attachment. He ſeems to be fitter to amuſe Children, than to employ the Thoughts of Men; but when we remove that which hides him from our Eyes, and view him even to the bottom,

bottom, we find in him all the Gods together; that is to ſay, all thoſe Virtues which ought to be the continual Practice of ſuch as ſeriouſly endeavour to forſake their Vices.

Hitherto we have been content to ſee only his out-ſide; and 'tis a ſtrange thing, that Satyrs, which have been read ſo long, have been ſo little underſtood, or explain'd: They have made a Halt at the out-ſide, and were wholly buſied in giving the Interpretation of Words. They have commented upon him like Grammarians, not Philoſophers; as if *Horace* had writ meerly to have his Language underſtood, and rather to divert, than inſtruct us. That is not the End of this Work of his. The End of any Diſcourſe is, the Action for which that Diſcourſe is compos'd; when it produces no Action, 'tis only a vain Amuſement, which idly tickles the Ear, without ever reaching the Heart.

In theſe two Books of his Satyrs, *Horace* would teach us, *to conquer our Vices, to rule our Paſſions, to follow Nature, to limit our Deſires, to diſtinguiſh true from falſe, and Idea's from Things, to forſake Prejudice, to know throughly the Principles and Motives of all our Actions, and to ſhun that Folly which is in all Men who are bigotted to the Opinions they have imbibed under their Teachers, which they keep obſtinately, without examining whether they are well grounded.* In a word, *he endeavours to make us happy for our ſelves, agreeable, and faithful to our Friends, eaſy, diſcreet, and*

honeſt

honeſt to all, with whom we are oblig'd to live. To make us underſtand the Terms he uſes, to explain the Figures he employs, and to conduct the Reader ſafely thro' the Labyrinth of a difficult Expreſſion, or obſcure *Parentheſis*, is no great Matter to perform: And as *Epictetus* ſays, there is nothing in That beautiful, or truly worthy a wiſe Man. The principal and moſt important Buſineſs is, to ſhew the Riſe, the Reaſon, and the Proof of his Precepts, to demonſtrate that thoſe who do not endeavour to correct themſelves by ſo beautiful a Model, are juſt like ſick Men, who having a Book full of Receipts, proper to their Diſtempers, content themſelves to read 'em, without comprehending them, or ſo much as knowing the Advantage of them.

I urge not this becauſe I have my ſelf omitted any thing in theſe Annotations, which was the incumbent Duty of a Grammarian to obſerve; this I hope the World will be ſenſible of, and that there remains no more Difficulty in the Text. But that which has been my chief Care, is, to give an Inſight into the very Matter that *Horace* treats of, to ſhew the Solidity of his Reaſons, to diſcover the Turns he makes uſe of to prove what he aims at, and to refute or elude that which is oppoſed to him, to confirm the Truth of his Deciſions, to make the Delicacy of his Sentiments perceiv'd, to expoſe to open Day the Folly he finds in what he condemns. This is what none have done before me. On the contrary,

contrary, as *Horace* is a true *Proteus*, that takes a thouſand different Forms, they have often loſt him, and not knowing where to find him, have grappled him as well as they could; they have palm'd upon him in ſeveral places, not only Opinions which he had not, but even thoſe which he directly refutes: I don't ſay this to blame thoſe who have taken Pains before me on the Works of this great Poet; I commend their Endeavours; they have open'd me the Way; and if it be granted, that I have ſome little Advantage over them, I owe it wholly to the great Men of Antiquity, whom I have read with more Care, and without doubt with more Leiſure. I ſpeak of *Homer*, of *Plato*, and *Ariſtotle*, and of ſome other *Greek* and *Latin* Authors, which I ſtudy continually, that I may form my Taſte on theirs, and draw out of their Writings the Juſtneſs of Wit, good Senſe and Reaſon.

I know very well that there are now a-days ſome Authors who laugh at theſe *great Names*, who diſallow the Acclamations which they have receiv'd from all Ages, and who would deprive them of the Crowns which they have ſo well deſerv'd, and which they have got before ſuch Auguſt Tribunals. But for fear of falling into Admiration, which they look upon as the Child of Ignorance, they do not perceive that they go from that Admiration, which *Plato* calls the Mother of Wiſdom, and which was the firſt that opened Mens Eyes. I do not wonder that the Celeſtial Beauties,

which we find in the Writings of theſe incomparable Men, loſe with them all their Attractives and Charms, becauſe they have not the Strength to keep their Eyes long enough upon them. Beſides, it is much eaſier to deſpiſe than underſtand them. As for my ſelf, I declare that I am full of Admiration and Veneration for their Divine Genius's: I have them always before my Eyes, as venerable and incorruptible Judges; before whom I take pleaſure to fancy that I ought to give an Account of my Writings. At the ſame time I have a great Reſpect for Poſterity, and I always think with more Fear than Confidence, on the Judgment that will paſs on my Works, if they are happy enough to reach it. All this does not hinder me from eſteeming the great Men that live now. I acknowledge that there are a great many who are an Honour to our Age, and who would have adorn'd the Ages paſt. But amongſt theſe great Men I ſpeak of, I do not know one, and there cannot be one, who does not eſteem and honour the Ancients, who is not of their Taſte, and who follows not their Rules. If you go never ſo little from them, you go at the ſame time from Nature and Truth; and I ſhall not be afraid to affirm, that it would not be more difficult to ſee without Eyes, or Light, than 'tis impoſſible to acquire a ſolid Merit, and to form the Underſtanding by other means, than by thoſe that the *Greeks* and *Romans* have traced for us: whether it be that we follow them

them by the only Force of natural Happineſs, or Inſtinct, or that Art and Study have conducted us thither. As for thoſe who thus blame Antiquity, without knowing of it, once for all I'll undeceive them, and make it appear, that in giving all the Advantage to our Age, they take the direct Courſe to diſhonour it; for what greater Proofs can be of the Rudeneſs, or rather Barbarity of an Age, than in it to hear *Homer* called dull and heavy, *Plato* tireſome and tedious, *Ariſtotle* ignorant, *Demoſthenes* and *Cicero* vulgar Orators, *Virgil* a Poet without either Grace or Beauty, and *Horace* an Author unpoliſhed, languid, and without Force? The *Barbarians* who ravag'd *Greece*, and *Italy*, and who laboured with ſo much Fury to deſtroy all Things that were fine and noble, have never done any thing ſo horrible as this. But I hope that the falſe Taſte of ſome particular Men without Authority, will not be imputed to the whole Age, nor give the leaſt Blemiſh to the Ancients. 'Twas to no purpoſe that a certain Emperor declared himſelf an Enemy to *Homer*, *Virgil*, and *Titus Livius*. All his Efforts were ineffectual, and the Oppoſition he made to Works ſo perfect, ſerv'd only to augment in his Hiſtory the Number of his Follies, and render him more odious to all Poſterity.

OF

PASTORALS.

By Monſieur *De FONTENELLE*,

Engliſh'd by Mr. *MOTTEUX*.

OF all kinds of Poetry the Paſtoral is probably the moſt ancient, as the keeping of Flocks was one of the firſt Employments which Men took up. 'Tis very likely that theſe primitive Shepherds, amidſt the Tranquillity and Leiſure which they enjoy'd, bethought themſelves of ſinging their Pleaſures and their Loves; and then their Flocks, the Woods, the Springs, and all thoſe Objects that were moſt familiar to them, naturally came into the Subject of their Songs. They liv'd in great Plenty after their way, without any Controul by ſuperiour Power, being in a manner the Kings of their own Flocks; and I do not doubt but that a certain Joy and Openneſs of Heart that generally attends Plenty and Liberty, induc'd them to ſing, and to make Verſes.

Society

Society in time was brought to Perfection, or rather declin'd and was perverted; and Men took up Employments that ſeem'd to them of greater Conſequence; more weighty Affairs fill'd their Minds; Towns and Cities were built every where, and mighty States at laſt were founded and eſtabliſh'd. Then thoſe who liv'd in the Country became Slaves to thoſe who dwelt in Cities, and the Paſtoral Life being grown the Lot of the moſt wretched ſort of People, no longer inſpir'd any delightful Thought.

To pleaſe others in ingenious Compoſures, Men ought to be in a Condition to free themſelves from preſſing Want; and their Minds ought to be refin'd through a long uſe of Civil Society: Now a Paſtoral Life has always wanted one of theſe two Circumſtances: The primitive Shepherds, of whom we have ſpoken, liv'd indeed in Plenty enough, but in their Times the World had not yet had Leiſure to grow polite. The following Ages might have produc'd ſomething more refin'd, but the Shepherds of thoſe Days were too poor and dejected: So that the Country-way of living, and the Poetry of Shepherds muſt needs have been always very homely and artleſs.

And indeed nothing is more certain, than that no real Shepherds can be altogether like thoſe of *Theocritus*. Can any one think that 'tis natural for Shepherds to ſay like his?

* *Gods! When ſhe view'd, how ſtrong was*
the Surpriſe!
Her Soul took Fire, and ſparkled though her
Eyes!
How did her Paſſions, how her Fury move!
How ſoon ſhe plung'd into th' Abyſs of Love!

Let the following Paſſages be examin'd:

O that, to crown what e're my Wiſh can
crave,
I were that Bee which flies into your Cave!
There ſoftly through your Garland would I
creep,
And ſteal a Kiſs when you are faſt aſleep!

I know what Love is now, a cruel God,
A Tygreſs bore, and nurs'd him in a Wood,
A cruel God, he ſhoots through ev'ry Vein——

The Fair Caliſtris, *as my Goats I drove,*
With Apples pelts me, and ſtill murmurs Love.

The Paſtures flouriſh, and the Flocks improve,
All ſmiles, ſo ſoon as here reſorts my Love;
But Oh! When e're the dear one leaves the
Place,
At once there fade the Shepherds and the
Graſs.

[* Theſe Lines, and ſome in the following Pages, are taken out of *Engliſh* Verſions.]

Ye Gods, I wiſh not Heaps of Gold refin'd,
Nor rapid Swiftneſs to outſtrip the Wind;
But let me ſit and ſing by yonder Rock,
Claſp thee, my Dear, and view my feeding Flock.

I am of Opinion that there will be found in theſe Expreſſions more Beauty and more Delicacy of Imagination than real Shepherds have.

But I don't know how *Theocritus* having ſometimes rais'd his Shepherds in ſo pleaſing a manner above their native Genius, could let them ſo very often fall to it again: I wonder he did not perceive 'twas fit that a certain groſs Clowniſhneſs, which is always very unbecoming, ſhould be omitted. When *Daphnis* in the firſt *Idyllium* is ready to die for Love, and a great Number of Deities are come to viſit him, in the midſt of that honourable Company, he is reprov'd for being like the Goat-herds, who envy the Pleaſure of their copulating Goats, and are jealous of them; and 'tis moſt certain that the Terms us'd by *Theocritus* to repreſent this, are much of the kind of the Idea which they give.

Ah Daphnis, *looſe and wanton in thy Love!*
A Herdſman thought, thou doſt a Goat-herd prove:
A Goat-herd, when he ſees the Kids at Rut,
Sits down, and grieves that he's not born a Goat:
Thus, when you ſee the Virgins Dance, you grieve,
Becauſe refus'd, and now diſdain to live.

In another *Idyllium* the Goat-herd *Comatas*, and the Herdſman *Laco*, contend about ſome Theft, which they had committed againſt each other; *Comatas* ſtole *Laco's* Pipe, and *Laco* had ſtollen the Skin which *Comatas* us'd to wear to cover himſelf withal, ſo that he had left him bare. They rail at each other, and vent their Paſſion in reviling and abuſive Words, which might become a couple of *Gracians*, but certainly are not over civil; and then, after a gentle *Item* which one of them gives the other of ſmelling rank, they both ſing for a Wager; the one having challeng'd the other to that Muſical Fight, tho' it ſhould rather have been to a Rubbers at Fiſticuffs, conſidering what went before; and what ſeems the more odd, is, tha t whereas they begun with groſs Taunts and ill Language, now they are going to ſing againſt each other, they affect an uncommon Niceneſs concerning the Choice of a Place where they are to ſing; each propoſing one, of which he makes a florid Deſcription. For my part, I have much-a-do to believe that all this is very well ſet together. Their Songs are as odly diverſify'd; for among the things that relate to their Amours, and that are pretty, *Comatas* puts *Laco* in mind of a Beating which he beſtow'd upon him; and *Laco* anſwers him, that he does not remember it, but that he has not forgot how *Comatas* was bound and ſoundly laſh'd by his Maſter *Eumaras*. I do not fanſy that thoſe who ſay that *Venus*, the Graces,

Graces, and *Cupid* compos'd *Theocritus's Idyllia*, will pretend that they had a hand in theſe Paſſages.

There are ſome other Places in *Theocritus* that are not altogether ſo low, which yet are not very entertaining, becauſe they barely treat of Country Matters. His fourth *Idyllium* is wholly of this kind. The Subject of it is only a certain *Ægon*, who, being gone to the *Olympick* Games, has left his Herds to one *Corydon*. *Battus* tells the Truſtee, that the Herds are in a pitiful Condition ſince *Ægon* left them. *Corydon* anſwers, that he does his beſt, that he drives them to the beſt Paſtures he knows, and feeds them at a Rack of Hay. *Battus* ſays that *Ægon's* Pipe is ſpoil'd and mouldy in his Abſence; *Corydon* replys that it is not ſo, that *Ægon* when he went gave it him, and that he is a notable Piper. Then *Battus* deſires *Corydon* to pull a Thorn out of his Foot, and the other having advis'd him never to walk over Mountains without his Shooes, the *Idyllium* preſently concludes, a thing which thoſe who are not converſant with Antiquity, would ſcarce have believ'd poſſible.

When in a Paſtoral Striſe one ſays, *Ho! My Goats go on the Brow of yonder Hill*; and the other anſwers, *Go, my Sheep, feed on to the Eaſtward.*

Or; *I hate the bruſh-tail'd Fox, which comes at Night and devours our Grapes*; and the other, *I hate the Beetles that eat the Figs.*

Or, when one ſays, *I have made my ſelf a Bed with Cow's Skins near a cool Stream,*

And there I value Summer's burning Heats,
No more than Children do their Fathers Threats,
Their Mothers kind Complaints, &c.

And the other anſwers, *I live in a large ſhady Cave, where*

Soft Chitterlings afford me pleaſing Food,
And when the Winter comes I'm ſtor'd with Wood;
So that I value Cold no more, not I,
Than toothleſs Men do Nuts when Pap is by.

May not theſe Diſcourſes be thought too Clowniſh, and fitter to be ſpoken by real Country Fellows, than by ſuch Shepherds as are introduc'd in Eclogues?

Virgil, who having had the Example of *Theocritus* before his Eyes, has had an Opportunity to outdo him, hath made his Shepherds more polite and agreeable. Any one who compares his third Eclogue with that of *Laco* and *Comatas* in *Theocritus*, will eaſily find how well he cou'd rectify and ſurpaſs what he did imitate: Not but that he ſtill ſomewhat too much reſembles *Theocritus*, when he loſes ſome time in making his Paſtors ſay,

Beware the Stream, drive not the Sheep too nigh,
The Bank may fail, the Ram is hardly dry.

And

And, *Kids from the River drive, and ſling*
(your Hook,
Anon I'll waſh them in the ſhallow Brook.
And, *Boys, drive to Shades, when Milk is*
(drain'd by Heat,
In vain the Milk-Maid ſtroaks an empty Teat.

All this is the leſs pleaſing, conſidering that it comes after ſome tender things which are very pretty and genteel, and which have made the Reader the more unfit to reliſh ſuch things as altogether relate to the Country.

Calpurnius, a Writer of Eclogues, who lived almoſt three hundred Years after *Virgil*, and whoſe Works however are not wholly deſtitute of Beauty, ſeems to have been ſorry that *Virgil* did expreſs but with the Words, *Novimus & qui te*, thoſe injurious Terms with which *Laco* and *Comatas* treat one another in *Theocritus*; tho' after all, it had yet been better had *Virgil* wholly ſuppreſt that ſhort hint. *Culpurnius* has judg'd this Paſſage worthy a larger Extent, and therefore wrote an Eclogue which is made up of nothing but thoſe Invectives, with which two Shepherds ready to ſing for a Prize, ply each other with a great deal of Fury, till the Shepherd who was to be their Judge, is ſo affrighted that he runs away and leaves 'em. A very fine Concluſion!

But no Author ever made his Shepherds ſo clowniſh as *J. Baptiſta Mantuanus*, a *Latin* Poet, who liv'd in the foregoing Age, and who

who has been compar'd to *Virgil*, tho' he has indeed nothing common with him beſides his being of *Mantua*. The Shepherd *Fauſtus* deſcribing his Miſtreſs, ſays, that ſhe had a good big bloated red Face, and that, though ſhe was almoſt blind of an Eye, he thought her more beautiful than *Diana*. 'Twere impoſſible to gueſs what Precaution another Shepherd takes before he begins a Diſcourſe of conſiderable Length; and who knows but that our modern *Mantuan* valued himſelf mightily upon having copied Nature moſt faithfully in thoſe Paſſages?

I therefore am of Opinion, that Paſtoral Poetry cannot be very charming, if it is as low and clowniſh as Shepherds naturally are; or if it preciſely runs upon nothing but rural Matters. For, to hear one ſpeak of Sheep and Goats, and of the Care that ought to be taken of thoſe Animals, has nothing which in it ſelf can pleaſe us; what is pleaſing is the Idea of Quietneſs, which is inſeparable from a Paſtoral Life. Let a Shepherd ſay, *My Sheep are in good Caſe, I conduct them to the beſt Paſtures, they feed on nothing but the beſt Graſs*, and let him ſay this in the beſt Verſe in the World, I am ſure that your Imagination will not be very much delighted with it. But let him ſay, *How free from anxious Cares is my Life! In what a quiet ſtate I paſs my Days! All my Deſires riſe no higher than that I may ſee my Flocks in a thriving Condition, and the Paſtures wholeſome and pleaſing;*

pleaſing; *I envy no Man's Happineſs*, &c. You perceive that this begins to become more agreeable: The Reaſon of it is, that the Idea runs no longer immediately upon Country Affairs, but upon the little ſhare of Care which Shepherds undergo, and upon the Quietneſs and Leiſure which they enjoy; and what is the chiefeſt Point, upon the Cheapneſs of their Happineſs.

For, all Men would be happy, and that too at an eaſy Rate. A quiet Pleaſure is the common Object of all their Paſſions, and we are all controuled by a certain Lazineſs: Even thoſe who are moſt ſtirring, are not preciſely ſuch for Buſineſs ſake, or becauſe they love to be in Action, but becauſe they cannot eaſily ſatisfy themſelves.

Ambition, as it is too much an Enemy to this natural Lazineſs, is neither a general Paſſion nor very delicious. A conſiderable part of Mankind is not ambitious; many have began to be ſuch but by the means of ſome Undertakings and Ties that have determin'd them before they ſeriouſly reflected on what they did, and that have made them unfit ever to return to calmer Inclinations; and even thoſe who have moſt Ambition, do often complain of the Cares which it exacts, and the Pains that attend it. The Reaſon of this is, that the native Lazineſs of which we were ſpeaking, is not wholly ſuppreſt, tho' it has been ſacrificed to that preſumptuous Tyrant of the Mind; it prov'd the weakeſt,

and

and could not over-balance its Rival; yet it ſtill ſubſiſts and continually oppoſes the Motions of Ambition. Now no Man can be happy while he is divided by two warring Inclinations.

However, I do not ſay that Men can reliſh a State of abſolute Lazineſs and Idleneſs; no, they muſt have ſome Motion, ſome Agitations, but it muſt be ſuch a Motion and Agitation as may be reconcil'd, if poſſible, to the kind of Lazineſs that poſſeſſes 'em; and this is moſt happily to be found in Love, provided it be taken in a certain manner. It muſt neither be a hot, jealous, touchy, furious, deſperate Love, but tender, pure, ſimple, delicate, faithful, and, that it may preſerve it ſelf in this State, attended with Hopes: Then the Heart is taken up, but not diſturb'd; we have Cares, but no Uneaſineſſes; we are mov'd, but not torn, and this ſoft Motion is juſt ſuch, as the love of Reſt, and our native Lazineſs can bear it.

Beſides, 'tis moſt certain that Love is the moſt general and the moſt agreeable of all the Paſſions. So, in the State of Life which we have now deſcrib'd, there is a Concurrence of the two ſtrongeſt Paſſions, Lazineſs and Love; which thus are both ſatisfied at once; and that we may be as happy as 'tis poſſible we ſhould by the Paſſions, 'tis neceſſary that all thoſe by which we are moved, agree together in us.

This

This is properly what we conceive of a Paſtoral Life. For it admits of no Ambition, nor of any thing that moves the Heart with too much Violence; therefore our Lazineſs has cauſe to be contented. But this way of living, by reaſon of its Idleneſs and Tranquillity, creates Love more eaſily than any other, or at leaſt indulges it more: But after all, what Love! A Love more innocent, becauſe the Mind is not ſo dangerouſly refin'd; more aſſiduous, becauſe thoſe who feel it are not diverted by any other Paſſions; more full of Diſcretion, becauſe they hardly have any Acquaintance with Vanity; more faithful, becauſe with a Vivacity of Imagination leſs uſed, they have alſo leſs Uneaſineſs, leſs Diſtaſte, and leſs Fickleneſs; that is to ſay, in ſhort, a Love purg'd of whatever the Exceſſes of human Fancy have ſophiſticated it with.

This conſider'd, 'tis not to be admir'd why the Pictures which are drawn of a Paſtoral Life, have always ſomething ſo very ſmiling in them, and indulge our Fancies more than the pompous Deſcription of a ſplendid Court, and of all the Magnificence that can ſhine there. A Court gives us no Idea but of toilſome and conſtrain'd Pleaſures: For, as we have obſerv'd, the Idea is all in all: Cou'd the Scene of this quiet Life, with no other Buſineſs but Love, be plac'd any where but in the Country, ſo that no Goats nor Sheep ſhou'd be brought in; I fanſy it would be never the worſe; for the Goats and Sheep

add

add nothing to its Felicity; but as the Scene muſt lye either in the Country or in Towns, it ſeems more reaſonable to chuſe the firſt.

As the Paſtoral Life is the moſt idle of all others, 'tis alſo the moſt fit to be the Ground-work of thoſe ingenious Repreſentations of which we are ſpeaking. So that no Ploughmen, Reaper, Vine-dreſſers, or Hunts-men, can by any means be ſo properly introduc'd in Eclogues, as Shepherds: Which confirms what I ſaid, that what makes this kind of Poetry pleaſe, is not its giving an Image of a Country Life, but rather the Idea which it gives of the Tranquillity and Innocence of that Life.

Yet there is an *Idyllium* of *Battus* and *Milo*, two Reapers in *Theocritus*, which has Beauties. *Milo* asks *Battus* why he does not reap as faſt as he uſed to do? He anſwers, that he is in Love, and then ſings ſomething that's very pretty about the Woman that he loves. But *Milo* laughs at him, and tells him he is a Fool, for being ſo idle as to be in love; that this is not an Imployment fit for one who works for Food; and that, to divert himſelf, and excite one another to work, he ſhould ſing ſome Songs which he denotes to him, and which altogether relate to the Harveſt. I muſt needs own that I do not ſo well like this Concluſion. For I would not be drawn from a pleaſing and ſoft Idea to another that is low and without Charms.

Sanna-

Sannazarius has introduced none but Fiſhermen in his Eclogues; and I always perceive, when I read thoſe Piſcatory Poems, that the Idea I have of Fiſhermen's hard and toilſome way of living, ſhocks me. I don't know what mov'd him to bring in Fiſhermen inſtead of Shepherds, who were in Poſſeſſion of the Eclogue time out of mind; but had the Fiſhermen been in Poſſeſſion of it, it had been neceſſary to put the Shepherds in their place: For ſinging, and above all, an idle Life becomes none but Shepherds: Beſides methinks 'tis prettier and more genteel to ſend Flowers or Fruit to one's Miſtreſs, than ſend her Oyſters, as *Sannazarius*'s *Lyco* doth to his.

'Tis true that *Theocritus* hath an *Idyllium* of two Fiſhermen; but it doth not ſeem to me ſo beautiful as to have deſerv'd to tempt any Man to write one of that kind. The ſubject of it is this; Two old Fiſhermen had but ſparingly ſupp'd together in a wretched little thatcht Houſe, by the Sea-ſide: One of them wakes his Bedfellow to tell him, he had juſt dreamt that he was catching a golden Fiſh; and the other anſwers him, that he might ſtarve though he had really caught ſuch a one. Was this worth writing an Eclogue!

However, though none but Shepherds were introduc'd in Eclogues, 'tis impoſſible but that the Life of Shepherds which after all is yet very clowniſh, muſt leſſen and debaſe their

their Wit, and hinder their being as ingenious, nice, and full of Gallantry, as they are commonly repreſented in Paſtorals. The famous Lord *D'urfe's Aſtræa* ſeems a leſs fabulous Romance than *Amadis de gaule*; yet I fanſy that in the main it is as incredible, as to the Politeneſs and Graces of his Shepherds, as *Amadis* can be as to all its Enchantments, all its Fairies, and the Extravagance of its Adventures. How comes it then that Paſtorals pleaſe in ſpight of the falſity of the Characters, which ought always to ſhock us? Could we be pleaſed with ſeeing ſome Courtiers repreſented as having a Clowniſhneſs which ſhould reſemble that of real Shepherds, as much as the Gallantry which Shepherds have in Paſtorals reſembles that of Courtiers? No, doubtleſs; but indeed that Character of the Shepherds is not falſe after all, if we look upon it one way: For we do not mind the Meanneſs of the Concerns that are their real Employment, but the little Trouble thoſe Concerns bring. This Meanneſs would wholly exclude Ornaments and Gallantry, but on the other hand the quiet State promotes them; and 'tis only on that Tranquillity that whatever pleaſes in a Paſtoral Life is grounded.

Our Imagination is not to be pleaſed without Truth; but it is not very hard to pleaſe it; for often 'tis ſatisfied with a kind of half Truth. Let it ſee only the half of a thing, but letthat half be ſhown in a lively manner,

ner, then it will hardly bethink it ſelf that you hide from it the other half, and you may thus deceive it as long as you pleaſe, ſince all the while it imagines that this ſingle Moiety, with the Thoughts of which it is taken up, is the whole thing. The Illuſion, and at the ſame time the pleaſingneſs of Paſtorals therefore conſiſts, in expoſing to the Eye only the Tranquillity of a Shepherd's Life, and in diſſembling or concealing its Meanneſs, as alſo in ſhowing only its Innocence, and hiding its Miſeries; ſo that I do not comprehend why *Theocritus* dwelt ſo much upon its Miſeries and Clowniſhneſs.

If thoſe who are reſolved to find no Faults in the Ancients, tell us that *Theocritus* had a mind to draw Nature juſt ſuch as it is, I hope that according to thoſe Principles, we ſhall have ſome *Idyllia* of Porters or Watermen diſcourſing together of their particular Concerns: Which will be every whit as good as ſome *Idyllia* of Shepherds ſpeaking of nothing but their Goats or their Cows.

The Buſineſs is not purely to deſcribe, we muſt deſcribe ſuch Objects as are delightful: When the Quiet that reigns in the Country, and the Simplicity and Tenderneſs which are diſcover'd there in making Love, are repreſented to me, my Imagination, mov'd and affected with theſe pleaſing Ideas, is fond of a Shepherd's Life; but tho' the vile and low Employments of Shepherds, were deſcrib'd to me with all the Exactneſs poſſible, I

ſhou'd

ſhou'd never be taken with 'em, and my Imagination wou'd not in the leaſt be touched. The chief Advantage of Poetry conſiſts in repreſenting to us in a lively manner the things that concern us, and in ſtriking ſtrongly a Heart which is pleas'd with being mov'd.

Here's enough, and perhaps too much againſt theſe Shepherds of *Theocritus*, and thoſe who, like 'em, have too much of the Shepherd in 'em. What we have left of *Moſchus* and *Bion* in the Paſtoral kind, makes me extreamly lament what we have loſt of theirs. They have no manner of Ruſticity, but rather a great deal of Delicacy and Grace, and ſome Ideas wholly new and pleaſing. They are accus'd of being too florid; and I do not deny but that they may be ſaid to be ſuch in ſome few Places; yet I don't know why the Criticks are more inclin'd to excuſe *Theocritus*'s Clowniſhneſs, than *Moſchus* and *Bion*'s Elegancy; methinks they ſhould have done the contrary. Is it not that *Virgil* has prejudic'd every one for *Theocritus*, having done to no other the Honour of imitating and copying him? Or is it not rather that the Learned have a Taſte that uſes to nauſeate what is delicate and genteel? Whatever it is, I find that all their Favour is for *Theocritus*, and that they have reſolv'd to dubb him Prince of the Bucolick Poets.

The Moderns have not often been guilty of making their Shepherds thus Clowniſh. The Author of *Aſtræa*, in that Romance, which

which otherwiſe is full of admirable things, has rather run into the other Extream. Some of his Shepherds are abſolutely drawn ſuch as they ought to have been; but ſome others, if I am not miſtaken, might better have been plac'd in *Grand Cyrus*, or in *Cleopatra*. Theſe Shepherds often ſeem to me Courtiers diſguiſed in a Paſtoral Dreſs, and ill Mimicks of what they would imitate; ſometimes they appear to me moſt cavilling Sophiſters; for tho' none but *Sylvander* has ſtudied in the School of the *Maſſilians*, there are ſome others who happen to be as full of Subtilty as himſelf; though I don't comprehend how they cou'd even but underſtand him, not having like him took their Degrees in the *Maſſilian* Schools.

It does not belong to Shepherds to ſpeak of all ſorts of Matters, and when a Poet has a mind to raiſe his Style, he may make uſe of other Perſons. When *Virgil* deſir'd to give a pompous Deſcription of the imaginary Return of the Golden Age, which he promiſes to the World at the Birth of *Pollio*'s Son, he ſhould not have excited the Paſtoral Muſes to leave their natural Strain, and raiſe their Voices to a Pitch which they can never reach; his Buſineſs was to have left them, and have addreſs'd himſelf to ſome others. Yet I do not know after all, if it had not have been better to have kept to the Paſtoral Muſes; for he might have given a pleaſing Deſcription of the Good which the return of Peace

was

was ready to cauſe in the Country; and this, methinks, had been as acceptable at leaſt as all thoſe incomprehenſible Wonders which he borrows of the *Cumæan* Sibyl, this new Race of Men which is to deſcend from Heaven, theſe Grapes which are to grow on Bryars, and theſe Lambs whoſe native Fleece is to be of a Scarlet, or Crimſon Hue, to ſave Mankind the trouble of dying the Wool. He might have flatter'd *Pollio* more agreeably with things that might have ſeem'd more conſiſtent with it, at leaſt to the Party concern'd; for Praiſe is ſeldom thought ſuch by thoſe on whom it is laviſh'd.

Shall I dare to ſay that *Calpurnius*, an Author much inferiour to *Virgil*, ſeems to have handled a Subject of the ſame nature much more to the purpoſe? Take notice that I only ſpeak of the Deſign or Fable, and not at all of the Stile. He brings in two Shepherds, who to be ſkreen'd from the Sun's ſultry Heat, ſhelter themſelves in a Cave, where they find ſome Verſes written with the God *Faunus*'s own hand, which contain a Prophecy about the Happineſs which the *Roman* Empire is to enjoy under the Emperor *Carus*. According to the Duty of a Paſtoral Poet, he dwells ſufficiently on the Proſperity and Plenty that relates to the Country, and then proceeds to higher Matters; becauſe, as he makes a God ſpeak, he has a Right to do ſo; but he brings in nothing like the Sibyl's Prophecies. 'Tis pity that *Virgil* did not write the

the Verſes of this Piece; neither had there been need to have had them all written by him.

Virgil makes *Phœbus* ſay to him at the beginning of his ſixth Eclogue, that a Shepherd ought not to ſing Kings nor Wars, but to ſtick to his Flocks, and ſuch Subjects as only require a plain Stile. Without doubt *Phœbus*'s Counſel was very good, but I cannot imagine how *Virgil* could forget it ſo much as to fall a ſinging immediately after, the Original of the World, and the framing of the Univerſe, according to *Epicurus*'s Syſtem, which was a great deal worſe than to ſing Kings and Wars. I muſt needs own that I cannot in the leaſt tell what to make of this Piece; I do not underſtand what is the Deſign, nor what Coherence there is between the ſeveral Parts of it: For after theſe Philoſophical Notions, we have the Fables of *Hylas* and *Paſiphae*, and of *Phaetons*'s Siſters, which have no manner of Relation to them; and in the middle of theſe Fables, which are all borrow'd from very remote times, we have *Cornelius Gallus*, *Virgil*'s Contemporary, and the Honours which he receives on *Parnaſſus*; after which we preſently come to the Fables of *Scylla* and *Philomela*. 'Tis honeſt *Silenus* that gives all this fine Medly; and as *Virgil* tells us, that according to his laudable Cuſtom, he had taken a hearty Carouze the Day before, I am afraid the Fumes were hardly yet got out of his Head.

Here

Here let me once more take the Freedom to own that I like better the Deſign of an Eclogue of this kind, by *Nemeſianus*, an Author who was *Calpurnius*'s Contemporary, and who is not altogether to be deſpis'd. Some Shepherds, finding *Pan* aſleep, try to play on his Pipe, but as a Mortal can make a God's Pipe yield only a very unpleaſing Sound, *Pan* is awak'd by it; and tells them, that if they are for Songs, he'll gratify them preſently. With this he ſings to them ſomething of the Hiſtory of *Bacchus*, and dwells on the firſt Vintage that ever was made, of which he gives a Deſcription which ſeems to me very agreeable; this Deſign is more regular than that of *Virgil*'s *Silenus*, and the Verſes alſo are pretty good.

The Moderns have been often guilty of handling high Subjects in their Eclogues. The *French* Poet *Ronſard* has given us in his the Praiſes of Princes, and of *France*, and almoſt all that looks like *Bucolick* in them, is his calling *Henry* II. *Henriot*, [or *Harry*.] *Charles* IX. *Carlin*, and Queen *Catharine de Medicis*, *Catin*, [or *Kate*.] 'Tis true, he owns that he did not follow the Rules, but it had been better to have done it, and thus have avoided the Ridicule which the Diſproportion that is between the Subject and the Form of the Work produces. Hence it happens that in his firſt Eclogue it falls to the Lot of the Shepherdeſs *Margot* [or *Peg*] to ſing the Elogy of *Turnebus*, *Budæus*, and *Vatable*, the greateſt

greateſt Men of their Age for *Greek* and *Hebrew*, but with whom certainly *Peg* ought not to have been acquainted.

Becauſe Shepherds look well in ſome kinds of Poetry, many Writers proſtitute them to every Subject. They are often made to ſing the Praiſes of Kings in the ſublimeſt Stile the Poet can write; and provided he has but talk'd of oaten Pipes, Meads and Plains, Fern or Graſs, Streams or Vallies, he thinks he has written an Eclogue. When Shepherds praiſe a Hero, they ſhou'd praiſe him Shepherd-like, and I do not doubt but that this wou'd be very ingenious and taking; but it wou'd require ſome Art, and the ſhorteſt cut it ſeems is to make the Shepherds ſpeak the common Dialect of Praiſe, which is very big and lofty indeed, but very common, and conſequently eaſy enough of Conſcience.

Allegorical Eclogues alſo are not very eaſy. *J. B. Mantuanus*, who was a Carmelite Fryar, has one in which two Shepherds diſpute, the one repreſenting a Carmelite Fryar, who is of that Party of the Order which they call, *The ſtrict Obſervance*, and the other of that which they call the *Mitigated*. The famous *Bembus* is there Judge; and 'tis worth obſerving, that he prudently makes them lay down their Crooks, leaſt they fall together by the Ears.

Now, though in the main our *Mantuan* has pretty well kept the Allegory, 'tis too ridiculous to find the Controverſy between theſe two ſorts of *Carmelitans* handled Ecloguewiſe.

Yet I had rather ſee a Shepherd repreſent one of theſe, than have him act the *Epicurean*, and ſay impious things; 'tis what happens ſometimes to ſome of *Mantuanus*'s Shepherds, though they are very clowniſh, and he himſelf was of a religious Order. *Amyntas*, one of them, in an angry Fit, which makes him rail againſt the Laws and Vertue, meerly becauſe he is in Love, ſays, that Men are great Fools to feed themſelves up with a Fancy of being taken up to Heaven after their Death; and he adds, that the moſt that is like to happen then, is, that they may chance to tranſmigrate into ſome Birds, and ſo flutter up and down through the Air. In vain to make this excuſable, our Fryar ſays, that *Amyntas* had liv'd a long time in Town; and as much in vain *Badius* his worthy Commentator; for as much a Modern as *Mantuanus* is, he has one, and as bigotted and hot for his Author as thoſe of the Ancients; in vain, I ſay, he takes from thence an Opportunity to make this rare Reflection, that Love cauſes us to doubt of Matters of Faith: 'Tis certain that theſe Errors, which ought to be deteſted by all thoſe who have heard of them, ought not to be known, much leſs mention'd by Shepherds.

To make amends, ſometimes our *Mantuan* makes his Shepherds mighty godly. In one of his Eclogues you have a Catalogue of all the Virgin *Mary*'s Holidays; in another an Apparition of the Virgin, who promiſes a Shep-

herd, that, when he ſhall have paſt his Life on Mount *Carmel*, ſhe'll take him to a more pleaſant Place, and will make him dwell in Heaven with the *Dryades*, and *Hamadryades*, a ſort of new-faſhion'd Saints whom we did not yet know in Heaven.

Such groſs and inexcuſable Indecencies may be eaſily avoided in the Character of Shepherds, but there are ſome that are not ſo obſervable, of which ſome Writers cannot ſo eaſily be freed: 'Tis the making their Shepherds ſpeak too wittily. Sometimes even thoſe of the Marqueſs *de Racan* are guilty of this, though they generally uſe to be very reſerv'd in that point. As for the *Italian* Authors, they are alſo ſo full of falſe and pointed Thoughts, that we muſt reſolve right or wrong, to give them leave to indulge themſelves in that darling Stile of theirs, as natural to them as their Mother Tongue. They never take the Pains to make their Shepherds ſpeak in a Paſtoral Stile, but make uſe of as bold and exaggerated Figures, and are as full of *Conceipts* in that ſort of Poetry, as they are in others.

Father *Bouhours* in his excellent Treatiſe *of the manner of thinking juſtly in ingenious Compoſures*, finds fault with *Taſſo*'s *Sylvia*, who ſeeing the Reflection of her Face in a Fountain, and adorning her ſelf with Flowers, tells them ſhe does not wear them to mend her Beauty, but to leſſen them, and diſgrace them by being plac'd near her brighter

Charms. Our judicious Critick thinks this Thought too full of Affectation, and not natural enough for a Shepherdeſs, and none can refuſe their Aſſent to this Criticiſm which is the Reſult of a very delicate Taſte: But when this is done, let none give themſelves the trouble of reading *Guarini*'s, *Bonarelli*'s, and *Marini*'s Paſtoral Poetry with a Deſign to find any thing in them truly Paſtoral, for *Sylvia*'s Thought is one of the moſt unaffected and ſingle things in the World, if compared to moſt of thoſe of which theſe Authors are full.

And indeed *Taſſo*'s *Amynta* is the beſt thing that *Italy* has produc'd in the Paſtoral kind; and has certainly very great Beauties; even the Paſſage of *Sylvia*, except what we have obſerv'd in it, is one of the moſt ingenious and beſt deſcrib'd Things I ever read, and we ought to own our ſelves extremely oblig'd to an *Italian* Author, for not having been more prodigal of pointed Thoughts.

Monſieur *De Segrais*, whoſe Works are the moſt excellent Pattern we have of Paſtoral Poetry, owns himſelf, that he did not always keep exactly to the Stile which it requires. He ſays, That he has ſometimes been obliged to humour the Genius of this Age, which delights in Figures and glittering things: But this muſt be ſaid on his Behalf, that he only condeſcended to follow this Method after he had ſufficiently prov'd that he can when he

pleaſes.

pleaſes perfectly hit the true Beauties of Paſtoral. After all, none can well tell which is the Taſte or Genius of this Age, 'tis not determined either what is good or bad; but ſeems wavering ſometimes on this and ſometimes on that ſide. So I believe, that, ſince there is ſtill a Hazard to be run whatever ſide we take, 'twere better to follow the Rules and true Ideas of Things.

Between the uſual Clowniſhneſs of *Theocritus*'s Shepherds, and the too much Wit of moſt of our Modern Shepherds, a certain *Medium* ſhou'd be kept, but 'tis ſo far from being eaſily follow'd in the Performance, that 'tis even difficult to denote it. The Shepherds ought to have Wit, and it ought to be fine and genteel too; for they cou'd not pleaſe without it, but they ought to have that Wit only in a certain Degree, otherwiſe they are no more Shepherds. I'll endeavour to determine this Degree, and adventure to give my Notion of it.

The Men who have the moſt Wit, and thoſe who have but an indifferent Share of it, do not differ ſo much in the Senſe which they have of Things, as they do in their manner of expreſſing it. The Paſſions, amidſt all the Diſturbance which they cauſe, are attended by a kind of Light, which they impart almoſt equally to all thoſe whom they poſſeſs. There is a certain Penetration, certain Ideas, which, without any regard to the difference of the Minds, are always found in Men in

whatever concerns and affects them. But theſe Paſſions, at the ſame time that they in a manner inform the Mind of all Men alike, do not enable them to ſpeak equally well. Thoſe whoſe Mind is more refin'd, more capacious and more improv'd by Study or Converſation do, while they expreſs their Sentiments, add ſomething that hath the Air of a Reflection, and that is not inſpir'd by the Paſſion alone; whereas the others ſpeak their Minds more ſimply, and add in a manner nothing that's foreign. Any ordinary Man will eaſily ſay; *I ſo paſſionately deſir'd that my Miſtreſs might be faithful, that I believ'd her ſuch*; but it only belongs to a refined Wit, as the Duke *de la Rochefoucaut* to ſay, *My Underſtanding was fool'd by my Will*, or, *My Reaſon was cully'd by my Deſire*; [*l' Eſprit a ete en moy la Dupe du Coeur:*] The Sence is the ſame, the Penetration equal, but the Expreſſion is ſo different, that one would almoſt think 'tis no more the ſame thing.

We take no leſs Pleaſure in finding a Sentiment expreſt ſimply, than in a more thought-like and elaborate manner, provided it be always equally fine: Nay the ſimple way of expreſſing it ought to pleaſe more, becauſe it occaſions a kind of a gentle Surpriſe, and a ſmall Admiration. We are amaz'd to find ſomething that is fine and delicate in common and unaffected Terms; and on that account the more the thing is fine, without ceaſing to be natural, and the Expreſſion common, without

my Reason or understanding has been the bubble of my Heart.

without being low, the deeper we ought to be ſtruck.

Admiration and Surpriſe are ſo powerful, that they can even raiſe the value of things beyond their intrinſick Worth. All *Paris* has laviſh'd Exclamations of Admiration on the *Siameſe* Ambaſſadors for their ingenious Sayings: Now had ſome *Spaniſh* or *Engliſh* Ambaſſadors ſpoken the ſame Things, no Body would have minded it. This happen'd becauſe we wrongfully ſuppos'd that ſome Men who came from the remoteſt part of the World, of a tawny Complexion, dreſt otherwiſe than we are, and till then eſteem'd Barbarians by thoſe of *Europe*, were not to be endow'd with common Senſe; and we were very much ſurpriz'd to find they had it; ſo that the leaſt thing they ſaid fill'd us with Admiration, an Admiration which after all was injurious enough to thoſe Gentlemen.

The ſame happens of our Shepherds; for we are the more pleaſingly ſtruck with finding them thinking finely in their ſimple Style, becauſe we the leaſt expected it.

Another thing that ſuits with the Paſtoral Stile is, to run only on Actions, and never almoſt on Reflections. Thoſe who have a middling ſhare of Wit, or a Wit but little improv'd by a Converſe with polite Books or Perſons, uſe to diſcourſe only of thoſe particular Things of which they have had a Senſe; while others raiſing themſelves higher, reduce all things into general Ideas: The Minds of the

the latter have work'd and reflected upon their Sentiments and Experiments, it happens that what they have ſeen hath led them to what they have not ſeen; whereas thoſe of an inferior Order, not purſuing their Ideas beyond what they have a Senſe of, it may happen that what reſembles it moſt, may ſtill be new to them. Hence proceeds the inſatiable Deſire of the Multitude to ſee the ſame Objects, and their admiring always almoſt the ſame Things.

A Conſequence of this Diſpoſition of Mind is the adding to the Things that are related any Circumſtances, whether uſeful or not. This happens becauſe the Mind has been extreamly ſtruck with the particular Action, and with all that attended it. Contrary to this a great Genius, deſpiſing all theſe petty Circumſtances, fixes on what is moſt eſſential in Things, which commonly may be related without the Circumſtances.

'Tis truer than it ſeems, that in ſuch Compoſures wherein Paſſion is to be deſcrib'd, 'tis better to imitate the way of ſpeaking uſed by Men of indifferent Capacity, than the Stile of more refined Wits. I muſt own that thus there is little related beſides Actions, and we do not riſe to Reflections; but nothing is more graceful than Actions, ſo diſplayed as to bring their Reflection along with them. Such is this admirable Touch in *Virgil*; Galatæa *throws an Apple at me, then runs to hide her ſelf behind the Willows, and firſt would be perceiv'd.*

perceiv'd. The Shepherd does not tell you what is *Galatæa*'s Deſign, though he is fully ſenſible of it; but the Action has made a deep pleaſing Impreſſion on his Mind, and according as he repreſents it, 'tis impoſſible but you muſt gueſs its Meaning. Now the Mind is delighted with ſenſible Ideas, becauſe it eaſily admits of them, and it loves to penetrate, provided it be without Effort; whether it be that it loves to act but to a certain Degree, or that a little Penetration indulges its Vanity. So the Mind hath the double Pleaſure, firſt of getting an eaſy Idea, then of penetrating, whenever ſuch Caſes as that of *Galatæa* are laid before it. The Action, and in a manner, the Soul of the Action all at once ſtrike the Eyes of the Mind; it can ſee nothing more in the matter, nor more quickly, neither can it ever be put to leſs Expence.

In *Virgil*'s ſecond Eclogue, *Corydon*, to commend his Pipe, tells us that *Damætas* gave it him when he died, and ſaid to him, *Thou art the ſecond Maſter it hath had,* and *Amyntas* was jealous, becauſe it was not bequeath'd him: All theſe Circumſtances are altogether Paſtoral: It might not perhaps be diſagreeable to bring in a Shepherd who is puzzled in the midſt of his Story, and who finds ſome Difficulty in recovering himſelf; but this would require ſome Art in the Management.

There are no Perſons whom it becomes better to lengthen a little their Narrations with

with Circumſtances than Lovers. They ought not indeed to be abſolutely needleſs or too far-fetch'd; for this would be tedious, though it may be natural enough; but thoſe that have but a half relation to the Action which is talk'd of, and that ſhow more Paſſion than they, are conſiderable, can never fail to pleaſe. So when, in one of *Monſieur de Segrais*'s Eclogues, a Shepherdeſs ſays,

The Songs which Lyſis *and* Menalcas *ſing,*
Pleaſe ev'ry Swain, and makes the Vallies (*ring*;
But I like better thoſe which near This Tree,
My jealous Shepherd lately made for me.

The Circumſtance of the Tree is pretty, only as it had been needleſs for any other but a Lover. According to our Idea of Shepherds, Tales and Narrations become them very well; but for them to make Speeches, ſuch as thoſe in *Aſtræa*, full of general Reflections, and Chains of Arguments, is a thing which I do not think their Character allows.

It is not amiſs to make them give Deſcriptions, provided they be not very long. That of the Cup which the Goat-herd promiſes to *Thyrſis*, in *Theocritus*'s firſt *Idyllium*, ſomewhat exceeds the Bounds: Yet, according to that Example, *Ronſard*, and *Belleau* his Contemporary, have made ſome that are yet longer. When their Shepherds are about deſcribing

ſcribing a Basket, a Goat, or a Blackbird, which they make the Prize of a Paſtoral Combate, they never have done: Not that their Deſcriptions are ſometimes without great Beauties, and are writ without admirable Art; far from this, they have too much of it for Shepherds.

Vida a Latin Poet of the laſt Age, and of great Reputation, in his Eclogue of *Nice*, whom I take to be *Victoria Colonna*, the Marqueſs of *Peſcario's* Widow, brings in the Shepherd *Damon* giving a Deſcription of a Ruſh Basket which he is to make for her. He ſays, that he will repreſent in it *Davalos*, that is the Marqueſs, dying, and grieved that he does not die in Battle; ſome Kings, Captains, and Nymphs in Tears about him, *Nice* praying the Gods in vain, *Nice* fainting away at the News of *Davalos's* Death, and with Difficulty recovering her Senſes by the means of the Water which her Women throw on her Face; and he adds that he would have expreſſed many Complaints and Moans, if they could be expreſt on Ruſh. Here are a great many things to be ſhow'd on a Basket! Neither do I relate them all; but I cannot tell how all this can be expreſt on Ruſh, nor how *Damon*, who owns he cannot expreſs on it the Complaints of *Nice*, is not at a Loſs to diſplay on it the Marqueſs's Grief for dying in his Bed. I ſhrewdly ſuſpect that *Achilles's* Shield is the Original from which this Basket has been imitated.

I find

I find that *Virgil* has us'd Similitudes very often in his Paſtoral Diſcourſes: Theſe Similitudes are very properly brought in, to ſupply the place of thoſe trivial Compariſons, and principally of thoſe clowniſh proverbial Sayings, which real Shepherds uſe almoſt continually: But as there is nothing more eaſily to be imitated than this way of uſing Similitudes, 'tis what *Virgil* hath been moſt copied in. We find in all your Writers of Eclogues, nothing more common than Shepherdeſſes who exceed all others as much *as lofty Pines o'er top the lowly Reed, or higheſt Oaks the humbleſt Shrubs exceed*; we ſee nothing but the Cruelty of ungrateful Shepherdeſſes who are to a Shepherd, *What Froſts or Storms are to the tendereſt Flowers, like Hail to rip'ning Corn*, &c. I think all this old and worn thread-bare at this time of Day, and to ſay the Truth on't, 'tis no great Pity. Similitudes naturally are not very proper for Paſſion, and Shepherds ſhou'd only uſe them when they find it difficult to expreſs themſelves otherwiſe; then they wou'd have a very great Beauty, but I know but very few of that kind.

Thus we have pretty near diſcovered the Pitch of Wit which Shepherds ought to have, and the Style they ſhould uſe. 'Tis methinks with Eclogues, as with thoſe Dreſſes which are worn at Maſques or Balls; they are of much finer Stuff than thoſe which real Shepherds uſually wear; nay they are even adorn-

ed

ed with Ribbands and Points, and are only made after the Country Cut. In the ſame manner the Thoughts which are the Subject matter of Eclogues, ought to be finer and more delicate than thoſe of real Shepherds; but they muſt have the moſt ſimple and moſt rural Dreſs poſſible.

Not but that we ought to uſe both Simplicity and a Country-like Plainneſs even in the Thoughts, but we ought to take notice that this Simplicity and Country-like Plainneſs only exclude your exceſſive Delicacy in the Thoughts, like that of the refin'd Wits in Courts and Cities, and not the Light which Nature and the Paſſions beſtow of themſelves; otherwiſe the Poet would degenerate and run into childiſh Talk that wou'd beget Laughter rather than Admiration. Something of this kind is pleaſant enough in one of *Remi Belleau's* Eclogues; where a young Shepherd, having ſtoln a Kiſs from a pretty Shepherdeſs, ſays to her,

(*Swains,*
I've kiſt ſome new fawn'd Kids, like other
I've kiſt the ſucking Calf, which in our Plains
Young Colin *gave me; but this Kiſs I ſwear*
Is ſweeter much than all thoſe Kiſſes were.

Yet ſuch a Childiſhneſs ſeems more pardonable in this young Shepherd, than in the Cyclops *Polyphemus.* In *Theocritus's Idyllium* that bears his Name, and which is fine, he is thinking how to be reveng'd on his Mother,

a Sea Nymph, becauſe ſhe never took care to make *Galatæa* another Sea Nymph, have a Kindneſs for his Giantſhip; ſo he ſays to his Miſtreſs, that he'll tell his Mother, to make her mad, that he has a pain in his Head and in his Thighs.

'Tis hard to imagine that, ugly as he was, his Mother cou'd doat on him ſo much as to be very much concern'd to hear the poor little Urchin have thoſe petty Ills, or that the Clowniſh Giant cou'd invent ſo gentle a Revenge; his Character is better kept when he promiſes his Miſtreſs to make her a Preſent of a Litter of Cubs, or young Bears, which he breeds for her in his Cave. And now that I ſpeak of Bears, I wou'd gladly know why *Daphnis* when he is going to die bids adieu to the Bears, the Lyons, and the Wolves, as well as to the fair Fountain *Arethuſe*, and to the Silver Streams of *Sicily*: Methinks a Man does not often uſe to regret the Loſs of ſuch Company.

I have but one Remark more to make, which hath no manner of Connection with thoſe that go before: 'Tis concerning thoſe Eclogues which have a *Burthen* much like thoſe in Ballads, that is, a Verſe or two repeated ſeveral times. I need not ſay that we ought to place thoſe repeated Verſes in ſuch Parts of the Eclogue as may require, or at leaſt bear ſuch a Verſe to interlard them; but it may not be amiſs to obſerve, that all the Art that *Theocritus* hath us'd in an *Idyllium* of

this

this kind, was only to take this Burthen and ſcatter it up and down through his *Idyllium* right or wrong, without the leaſt Regard to the Senſe of the Places where he inſerted it, nay without even ſo much as reſpecting ſome of the Phraſes which he made no Difficulty to ſplit in two.

I have here ſpoken with a great deal of Freedom of *Theocritus* and *Virgil*, notwithſtanding they are Ancients; and I do not doubt but that I ſhall be eſteem'd one of the Profane, by thoſe Pedants who profeſs a kind of Religion which conſiſts in worſhiping the Ancients. 'Tis true, however, that I have often commended *Virgil* and *Theocritus*; but yet I have not always prais'd them; much leſs have I ſaid, like the Superſtitious, that even their Faults (if they had any) were beautiful; neither have I ſtrain'd all the natural Light of Reaſon to juſtify them; I have partly approved, and partly cenſur'd them, as if they had been ſome living Authors whom I ſaw every Day; and there lies the Sacrilege!

FINIS.

FRAGMENTS *taken from the* REMARKS *of Mr.* Dacier *upon Paſſages of* Ariſtotle's *Poetry, which have relation to the* 11 Chap. *of the* 3 Book *of this Treatiſe.*

THo' Epick Poetry is more extended by its Epiſodes than Tragedy, there is nevertheleſs the ſame Rule for the Length of theſe two Poems. We ought to be able to run over the one and the other with a Caſt of the Eye, and to embrace and retain them in the Memory without trouble; for if one loſeth the Idea of the Beginning, when one cometh to the end, it is an Argument that its Extent is too great, and that its Greatneſs deſtroyeth its Beauty.

Ariſtotle

Ariſtotle ſeeing the *Athenians* aſſiſt the ſame Day at ſeveral Tragedies with Pleaſure, and without loſing any thing of the Subject, judged with Reaſon that they were capable of comprehending and retaining the Subject of one Poem, the repeating of which ſhould not laſt a longer time, then the Recitation of all the different Pieces. He boundeth then the Extent of an Epick Poem to this Greatneſs, that is to ſay, he would that an Epick Poem might be read entirely in one Day, pretending that all that exceedeth theſe Bounds will be of an exceſſive Length, where the View will be loſt, and that one will not be able to ſee the End without loſing the Idea of the Beginning. And what extremely favoureth this Deciſion, is, that the *Iliad*, the *Odyſſee*, and the *Æneid*, are entirely comformable to the Rule of *Ariſtotle*: for every one of them may be read in a ſingle Day. This is the Explanation of this Paſſage, which hath either been eluded, or very indifferently cleared up. *Ariſtotle* here ſpeaketh only of the Duration of the Poem, he had no Thoughts of regulating the Duration of the Action, becauſe there are no certain Rules for that, for an Epick Poem may take up more or leſs time according to the Nature of the Action it repreſenteth. If it be an Action Violent and full of Paſſion, its Duration is the more ſhort, for what is violent can't laſt any long time,

time, which is the reaſon that the *Iliad* which repreſenteth the Anger of *Achilles* doth not contain in all any more than Forty ſeven Days; but if the Action be moderate, it may laſt as long as the Poet pleaſeth, provided it doth not increaſe to a Length that is remarkable. This is the Reaſon why *Homer* hath continued the Action of the *Odyſſee* to Eight Years and a half, and why *Virgil* hath given his *Æneid* almoſt Seven Years.